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Preface
People compare the process of writing a PhD-thesis with all kinds of things. When
I had just decided to undertake this adventure, I was very happy to hear from a
recent graduate that he had found it to be quite like a long solo journey, probably
comparable to the solo bike trip to Italy I had just returned from.
Being a traveller of the type for whom the planning of the route, at home on
the map, is almost half of the pleasure of the undertaking, I experienced the sci-
entific journey to be very different in this particular respect. While on the road,
a map gives you an indication of your progress and the distance to your target,
plus an overview of alternative routes. In science, there turned out to be no map,
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consist of drawing a map, an activity that I had to learn. Fortunately, there were
many people to help me find my way to reach my destination.
I thank my supervisors Harrie de Swart and Rob Nederpelt for providing me
with the opportunity to make this journey. I am grateful for their continuous
support and belief in me, and for their persistent attempts to irradicate my per-
sistent doubts. I also thank my second promotor Jos Baeten, for his interest in my
progress and the pleasant environment of his Formal Methods group in Eindhoven
as my home away from home: the department of Philosophy in Tilburg.
I specifically want to thank Theo Janssen, for our cooperation, our many dis-
cussions, and for his interest in my work and progress. This thesis contains many
issues and ideas discussed at our meetings in Amsterdam, and in our joint work.
I also thank Xavier Caicedo, whose fruitful ideas contributed substantially to the
work presented in chapter 6 of this thesis.
I thank Gabriel Sandu, Johan van Benthem, Theo Janssen, Reinhard Muskens
and Elias Thijsse, for their willingness to be in my committee. I value the time
they took to critically read the manuscript of this thesis, and appreciate their
useful remarks.
Working at two very different departments at two universities, has made me
feel like I was always riding in a peloton. Despite the fact that the subject of my
research was a bit off-topic for both the philosophers in Tilburg and the computer
scientists in Eindhoven, I have always felt at home at both of the Brabantse Uni-
versiteiten. This is due to the large number of colleagues, all of whom I would like
to thank for their company and friendship through the years. As my space here
is limited, I can only mention a few of them, my room- and lunchmates over the
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years: Eliora, Agnieszka, Roland, Mandy, Luigi, Joris, Anton, Michiel, Michael,
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dam, on a regular basis. The possibility to discuss my work with these people, and
their stimulating suggestions, have been invaluable for my work and motivation.
The schoolweken, summerschools, conferences and talks at the ILLC were always
great if only because they were occasions to meet again. In particular, thanks
to Marc Pauly, Barteld Kooi, Paul Harrenstein, Merlijn Sevenster, Boudewijn de
Bruin, Clemens Grabmayer, Joost Joosten, Nick Bezhanishvili, Clemens Kupke,
Balder ten Cate and Rosja Mastop for being such great company at several occa-
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Let me thank all my friends for the patience of waiting for me to finally call or
visit when I promised to (a promise that I did not keep in too many cases). I am
looking forward to making up for it in the near future. Other people may have
heard a bit too much from me over the last period: thanks to Adriaan, Pieter,
Arthur, and Jeroen for all the sense and nonsense we shared on our IRC-channel.
The last stretches of this ride have been a bit like the final kilometers of the
Mont Ventoux: you know you're almost there, but after every corner, another hid-
den turn appears. Joost, thank you very much for designing the colorful cover of
this thesis, when I could only see the grey rocks above the tree line. Adriaan and
Twan, thank you for turning into pinguins for me and with me at the cérémonie
Protocolaire at the top. Your friendship has been a major support for me along
the climb.
I am immensely grateful to my parents, my sister Marieke and my brother
Mark, for their love, support and inspiration. Together they form the firm base
from which each of my adventures begins, and the safe home that I can always
return to.
Tijn, it is magic that you happened to be on the path that I decided to take.
Let's take our bike and continue our journey together (back to back, hopefully a





1.1 Hintikka's view on logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Game Theoretical Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Independence Friendly logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Some properties of IF-logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6 Overview of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Preliminary definitions 11
2.1 The first order language GFOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 First order models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Tarski style semantics for first order logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Game theoretical semantics (GTS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 IF-logic: semantic games of imperfect information ......... 18
2.6 Existential second order logic: E i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Skolemization and falsity conditions 23
3.1 Introduction: what is a strategy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 The generalized Skolemization procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Skolemization for first order logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Skolemization for IF-sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.3 Translating Ei-sentences to IF-sentences . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Focus on truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Technicalities: symmetric syntax (GIFS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 Winning conditions for both players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6 IF-sentences correspond with Ei-pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.7 EÍ-pairs corresponding with IF-sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.8 Reflections on game-theoretic negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.9 Skolem functions and strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4 Game theory as formal framework 49
4.1 Introduction: using game theory in logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Games in extensive form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 The generalized language GIFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
v
V1
4.4 Modeling semantic games in extensive form . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5 Some reflections on the extensive model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6 Independence of connectives? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7 Imperfect recall in IFG-semantic games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.8 Thompson transformations for IFG-logic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.8.1 Inflation-deflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.8.2 Addition of a superfluous move . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.8.3 Interchange of moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.8.4 Coalescence of moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.8.5 Distribution in terms of Thompson transformations .... 81
4.8.6 About the status of the transformations . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Satisfaction for open IFG-formulas 87
5.1 Independence with free variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Game semantics for open formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.3 Inductive clauses for satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 On the positive existential clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.5 Conservative extension of first order logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.6 Signaling, IF-logic and regularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6 The prenex normal form theorem 105
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.2 Some monotonicity results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.3 Equivalence and Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4 Quantifier extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.5 Prenex normal form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.6 Elimination of slashed connectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7 General conclusions and open issues 143
7.1 Hintikka's approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.2 Game theory as framework for logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.3 The slash operator and its interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4 Semantics for open formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.5 The requirement of regularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.6 Some possible directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149








In his book The Principles of Mathematics Revisited, which appeared in 1996,
the Finnish philosopher and logician Jaakko Hintikka (1929) presents a`new and
better basic logic' to replace classical first order logic, and claims that this logic
can give a essential new impulse to the foundations of mathematics. The book
title bears a clear reference to Bertrand Russell's The Principles of Mathematics
[Rus03], in which he set out the lines of thought that led to the later, more tech-
nical, three volume work Principia Mathematica with A. N. Whitehead ([WR13]).
It may be clear from its aspiration to be the Principles for the next century, that
Hintikka's book aims to give inspiration by setting out lines of thought, rather
than to support the claims by providing mathematically precise accounts for them.
In the book, Hintikka proposes Independence Friendly logic, IF-logic for short,
to replace first order predicate logic. IF-logic comes with a game theoretical se-
mantics, which is to replace the usual Tarskian semantics. This thesis aims to
give a mathematically precise account of this logic and its semantics. In the pro-
cess, our attention is drawn to quite a number of subtleties (e.g. in the syntactic
choices). Also, we investigate what we can learn from results from game theory,
given that this logic is interpreted by game theoretical semantics.
In this first chapter, we give an informal, general introduction to the subject,
and describe a bit of its background.
1.1 Hintikka's view on logic
In [Hin96, Ch. 2], Hintikka distinguishes three functions for logic: logic as a means
of expressing (mathematical) propositions (`the descriptive function'), logic as the
study of relations of logical consequence (proof theory: `the deductive function'),
and logic as a medium for axiomatic set theory. One could say that first order
logic has great merits on all these three functions: it has considerable expressive
power (e.g. larger than propositional logic and the Aristotelian syllogisms), sound
and complete deductive systems, and it is the medium for axiomatic set theory.
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In his book, Hintikka argues that the descriptive function is the most impor-
tant one for the foundations of mathematics. Inference schemes are based on the
model theoretic meaning of logical constants ([Hin96, p. 21]): they must be sound.
Hence, he argues, the descriptive function of logic is more basic than the deductive
function.
This gives Hintikka his most important argument against classical first order
logic: it is not able to define truth within the language, as established by Tarski's
impossibility result of 1933 [Tar33] (which is closely related to Gódel's incom-
pleteness result of 1931 [G5d31], cf. [Hin96, p. 15]). Tarski proved that a truth
definition for first order logic can only be formulated in a(second order) metalan-
guage. This means that the expressive power of first order logic is in an essential
sense not strong enough.
Tarski's impossibility result holds more generally for formal languages satisfy-
ing certain conditions, among which compositionality: the meaning of a complex
expression is a function of the meanings of its components. This offers a way
out: a formal language with non-compositional semantics may be able to define
truth within the language. IF-logic with game theoretical semantics is such a
non-compositional system: satisfaction is only defined for sentences (closed, pos-
sibly complex formulas), the components are only evaluated within the conte~t of
a sentence. Indeed, due to a back-and-forth translation of IF-logic to existential
second order logic, it is possible to define a truth predicate within the language of
IF-logic ([Hin96, p. 116], [San98]).
With his focus on descriptive power and banning what he calls `Tarski's curse',
Hintikka sacrifices the deductive function of logic. The proposal of the book can
be well understood as being part of the branch of foundational research in mathe-
matics called E~tended Model Theory, which is part of the study of model theoretic
logics. Extended model theory looks for logics -mostly extending first order logic-
that are able to capture certain mathematical properties (e.g. sets being finite,
infinite, countable, uncountable, or functions being continuous, or relations being
well-orderings). The aim is to design logics that fit closely to a certain part of
mathematical practice, for example in the way the language mirrors the mathe-
matician's talk about the property, or by reflecting the structure of the property.
[Bar85] gives a nice introduction in the field.
Using Barwise's terminology, Hintikka's work can be seen as an attack on the
first order thesis: "a view of logic and mathematics which claims that logic is first
order logic" [Bar85, p. 3]. This view may have spread among mathematicians and
logicians due to the interest and hopes for Hilbert's program, and the success of
formalizing parts of mathematics in a first order theory like Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory. Hintikka calls this thesis a"dogma ripe for rejection" ([Hin96, p. viii]).
Unlike most ofextended model theory, in which a logic is designed to reason within
a class of structures that have a specific mathematical property, Hintikka seems
to want to replace the first order thesis with the thesis that the logic is IF-logic.
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1.2 Game Theoretical Semantics
To introduce the two ingredients of Hintikka's proposal, we start by looking at an
example from mathematics.
The work of Cauchy and Weierstrass 1 gave us the so-called `e - b'-definitions,
that provide us with means to formally express what we mean when we say "ar-
bitrarily close" . In these definitions, Cauchy and Weierstrass are among the first
to treat variables not as quantities actively changing, an approach that had led
to many controversies. Instead, they use variables as static symbols for any mem-
ber of a set of possible values. Take for example the definition of continuity of a
function, which we can nowadays formulate by a formula from first order logic: a
function f: Il8 -~ 1[8 is continuous on its domain if
t1x(b'e~o)(~b~o)dy[(I y- xI G b) --~ (I f(y) - f(x)I C E)l (1.1)
Weierstrass did not have the language of first order logic to express this like we
do. But (paraphrasing [Ste92], as quoted in [Hin96, p. 29]), Weierstrass described
the quantifications in terms of a game: first, player Epsilon picks a value for x,
and tells player Delta how close he wants the function values to be to f(x) by
picking a positive value for e. Then player Delta tells player Epsilon how close the
originals need to be to x: knowing x and e as chosen by Epsilon, she picks d 1 0.
Player Delta wins this little play if I f(y) - f(x)I G e for each y E(x -~, x-~ 8).
The function f is continuous if and only if Delta can win every play of this game,
in other words: if she has a winning strategy.
This game interpretation of quantifiers, which apparently was present in the
practice of mathematicians even before F~ege formalized quantification in his Be-
griffsschrift ([F~e79]), forms the basis for Game Theoretical Semantics (GTS).
GTS associates with every first order sentence cp and suitable model a so-called
semantic game. This game is played by two players: Eloïse, whose goal it is to
show that cp holds in the model (she starts in the role of `verifier'), and Abélard,
whose goal it is to show that cp does not hold in the model (he starts in the role
of `falsifier'). The game follows the syntactic structure of cp outside-in, and both
quantifiers and connectives prompt moves for one of the players. Moves in the
game are either choices for assignments to the variables bound by the quantifiers
~(move for player in the role of verifier) and `d (move for the player in the role
of falsifier) or choices for one of the two subformulas connected by a connective
V and n(move for verifier and falsifier respectively). The negation sign ~ does
not prompt a move for one of the players, but makes the two players change roles.
lIn the eazly nineteenth century, Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789-1857) was professor at the
Ecole Polytechnique in Pazis, where he taught courses in Analysis. In his classes he consistently
used a higher standard ofexactness than was usual at the time, and Laplace urged him to publish
his course notes as a book. Even though Gauss and Bolzano had used similar approaches, it were
the Cauchy's books that were generally accepted. And we still do accept his approach nowadays:
the modern definition of `convergence' hardly differs from the one Cauchy gave. This may also
be due to Karl Weierstrass, who corrected many of the errors and flaws that Cauchy made in his
writings. ([vR86, p. 4~41])
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A play of the game ends with an atomic formula and an assignment to its free
variables. If the atomic formula is satisfied by the assignment in the model, then
the player currently in the role of verifier wins, otherwise the player currently in
the role of falsifier.
These semantic games allow us to define a satisfaction relation in terms of the
existence of winning strategies (cf. the continuity example above): cp is true in a
given model, if there exists a winning strategy for Eloïse in the semantic game,
and cp is false in a given model if there exists a winning strategy for Abélard. (We
give a more detailed definition of GTS for first order logic in the next chapter.)
1.3 Independence ~iendly logic
One of the improvements of F'rege's Begriffsschrift over Aristotelian syllogistic (in
which no more than one quantifier occurs in each statement), is that by the use
of the dependency relation between quantifiers in a formula we can express rela-
tionships between the values of the variables. To illustrate the meaning of this
dependence we look again at the definition of continuity (1.1). Here for example,
8 may depends on .~. If this would not be the case, this would result in a different
(more strict) notion of continuity: uniform continuity. In that case one chosen S
should work for all x in the domain of f.
In first order logic, only a certain type of dependence relations between the
quantified variables can occur: scopes of quantifiers are always either nested or
non-overlapping. The feature that distinguishes the language of IF-logic from the
language of first order logic, is the so-called slash-operator. With this operator,
we can remove a quantification or a connective from the scope of another quan-
tification. We can thereby create more general patterns of dependency between
quantifications than in first order logic. For example, it gives us the possibility
to change continuity into uniform continuity by a simple application of the slash
operator to the quantification over b(where we abbreviate the quantifier free part
of (1.1) with C):
dx(be~o)(~b~o)~~dy~C(b, E, x, y)~ (1.2)
Of course, we know that we can also express uniform continuity in first order logic,
by changing the order of the quantifiers:
(dE~o) (~b~o)`d~b'y~C(a, E , ~, y)~ (1.3)
An argument for the IF-formulation could be that it shows in a direct way the
difference between (ordinary) continuity and uniform continuity. But IF-logic not
only offers a different way of formulating first order definable properties. With the
more general patterns of dependence between quantifiers in a formula, we are able
to express properties that were not expressible in first order logic. A case in point is
the expressibility of infinity of the domain, which we will demonstrate in chapter 3.
1.4 SOh1E PROPERTIES OF IF-LOGIC
For the interpretation of IF-formulas, we hardly need to adapt the game the-
oretical semantics for first order logic. We only need to define how we deal with
the slash operator.
In game theoretical semantics, the scope of a quantifier corresponds to avail-
ability of information. If au existential quantifier ~y is in the scope of a universal
quantifier b'x, then Eloïse knows the value previously chosen by Abélard when she
is to choose a value for y. Similarly, if Eloïse has to choose between subformulas
zG(x) and B(x) connected by a disjunction in the scope of dx, she can base her
choice on the value of x. Semantic games for first order sentences are therefore
games of perfect information.
By the effect of the slash operator, which can remove existential quantifications
and disjunctions from the scope of previous universal quantifications, the seman-
tic games turn into games of imperfect information. If we look at the IF-version
(1.2) of uniform continuity, we can interpret the slash at the quantification of S by
stating that player Delta does not know the value of x when she has to choose a
value for 8. This introduction of imperfect information does not alter the semantic
game in terms of its rules. However, it restricts the type of strategy a player can
use: if Delta does not know the value of x when she chooses a value for fi, she
cannot play a strategy that picks S as function of x.
Finite depth, two-player win-loss games of perfect information have the prop-
erty that they are determined, in the sense that one of the players has a winning
strategy (this is a consequence of the Gale-Stewart theorem [GS53]). In partic-
ular, semantic games for first order formulas are determined, a fact which, in
logical terms, corresponds with the law of the exclnded middle. However, finite
depth, two-player win-loss games of imperfect information no longer have the fea-
ture of being determined. It follows that the principle of the excluded middle
does not hold for IF-logic. This is already witnessed by a simple IF-sentence like
b'x~y~x[x - y], as will be demonstrated when we give a more formal definition of
IF-logic in chapter 2.
1.4 Some properties of IF-logic
IF-logic not only extends first order logic, it is also an extension of the theory of
Henkin quantifiers. In [Hen61], Henkin introduced a 2-dimensional quantification
pattern, the branching- or Henkin quantifier:C dx ~y 1 R(x, y, z, u). (1.4)`dz ~u J
The meaning of this sentence is defined by an existential second order formula,
obtained through Skolemization:
~f ~gHxdzR(x, f (x), z, 9(z)). (1.5)
In [Hen61], this definition is motivated by a game theoretical argument. One could
say that with his Game Theoretical Semantics, Hintikka takes this motivation as
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his definition of the semantics for IF-logic. But at the same time, as we will
describe in detail in chapter 3, Hintikka's approach to game theoretical semantics
for IF-logic in practice uses a similar Skolemization procedure to obtain tr~th
conditions for IF-sentences. For example, the IF-sentence
dxdzdy~Z~n~~R(x, y, z, u) (1.6)
has, under Hintikka's approach, exactly the second order sentence (1.5) as its truth
condition. (Why we add `under Hintikka's approach' here, and what this means
is the topic of section 3.9 of this thesis.)
Branching quantification, and more generally, partially ordered quantification
([Wa170]), naturally share many properties with IF-logic, as all these logics are
based on the idea of allowing more general relations of dependence between quan-
tifiers in first order languages. Henkin quantifiers in which (indexed) connectives
occur, are also studied, e.g. in [SV92]. A property they all share, is their expressive
power: in all cases, it eqnals that of existential second order logic (Ei). For par-
tially ordered quantification this was proved independently in [Wa170] and [End70].
Even with this shared expressive power, we could say that IF-logic is more gen-
eral than partially ordered quantification, because it allows for the most general
dependence relations. First, IF-logic also allows (unindexed, normal first order)
connectives to be made independent. And second, less visibly: the dependence
relations in IF-sentences do not have to be transitive, while "partially ordered"
implies "transitive" . An example of an IF-sentence in which the dependence rela-
tion of the quantifiers is not transitive, is the formula
dx~z~y~x[x - y]. (1.7)
In this formula, y may depend on z and z may depend on x, while the slash operator
indicates that y may not depend on x. This example, proposed by Hodges [Hod97a,
p. 547], gives rise to interesting comments on logic with imperfect information and
Hintikka's presentation of it. The formula will recur many times in this thesis.
For example, it is the typical example for a phenomenon called signaling (a.o. dis-
cussed in section 5.6), and it demonstrates that a certain type of i~nperfect recall
occurs ín semantic games (section 4.7). In section 3.9, Hintikka's interpretation
of this formula is used to demonstrate that his approach to IF-logic was probably
more inspired by the Skolemization procedure for partially ordered quantification
than by the game theory of the semantics he defined.
Now that we introduced the basic ideas of IF-logic, we sum up some of the
important properties mentioned in [Hin96]:
. The law of the excluded middle does not hold (e.g. p. 132, and section 3.8
of this thesis);
. By its treatment of strategies as functions, game theoretical semantics in-
corporates, and thereby "vindicates", the Axiom of Choice (p. 40);
. IF-logic is not compositional (see, for example, pp. 106-112);
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. Every IF-first order sentence can be translated into a(classical) existential
second order sentence (Ei) and vice versa (pp. 61-63, and section 3.2 of this
thesis);
.(Therefore) a truth predicate can be defined within the language (p. 116);
. We can express a number of mathematical concepts that aren't expressible
in first order logic, among which: the infinity of the domain of a model
(section 3.2.3 of this thesis); that a certain (first order definable) relation is
not a well-ordering; that two predicates have the same cardinality;
. The following metalogical theorems hold for IF-logic: the compactness theo-
rem, the separation theorem (in a strengthened form), the Downward Lbwen-
heim-Skolem theorem, and Beth's definability theorem (pp. 59-61);
. The class of valid sentences of IF-logic is not axiomatizable, although the
class of inconsistent sentences is (pp. 66-68);
. In so-called E~tended IF-logic, which adds a second, weak contradictory nega-
tion to the language, the following mathematical concepts can also be ex-
pressed: that a certain relation is a well-ordering; the principle of mathemat-
ical induction; the notion of power set (in a certain sense, cf. [KV89]); the
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem; continuity in the topological sense; transfinite
induction (pp. 188-190).
1.5 Related literature
We higlight a fragment of the literature that has appeared in reaction to Hin-
tikka's proposal. First, there is a number of reviews of the book: by Philippe
Kreutz [Kre97], Wilfrid Hodges [Hod97b], Harold Hodes [Hds98], Roy Cook and
Stewart Shapiro [CS98], Laurence Goldstein [Go198], David Corfield [Cor98], Har-
rie de Swart, Tom Verhoeff and Renske Brands [dSVB99], and the more extensive
and detailed one, by Neil Tennant [Ten98].
The claim that IF-logic does not admit of a compositional semantics, has given
rise to Hodges' paper [Hod97a]. This paper introduces a compositional semantics
for open IF-formulas ([Hod97c] presents the same semantics in a slightly different
way). This so-called "tram~ semantics "2 coincides with game theoretical semantics
on IF-sentences (if we take it to be without the extra specification introduced by
Hintikka, which we will discuss at the end of chapter 3). However, in [SHO1], it
is argued that there are different types of compositionality. Hodges' semantics is
not of the strong type meant in Hintikka's claim.
Caicedo and Krynicki [CK99] give a very similar semantics for open IF-formu-
las, and use it to prove a prenex normal form theorem for IF-formulas. We will
2The name derives from the term 'trump' that is used to indicate a set of partial assignments
for which Eloïse has a winning strategy. The word `trump' is a corruption of `triumph' ([Hod97a,
p. 552] ).
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extensively come back to this system and the results of the paper in chapters 5
and 6.
An interesting different approach to the issue of compositionality is proposed by
Theo M.V. Janssen in [Jan02]. The Subgame semantics given in this paper gives a
strictly context independent interpretation to open IF-formulas. This makes most
formulas containing the slash undecided, i.e. neither true nor false. The expressive
power of IF-logic with subgame semantics exceeds that of first order logic by the
addition of the truth value undecided, but it is not clear if it can characterize non-
first order properties.
Jouko Vi3,ii,nánen [Vii502] gives a different game semantics for IF-sentences.
The moves for Eloïse in his version of semantic games correspond with the choice
of functions rather than domain elements. It can be seen as a sort of `higher or-
der' semantic game, that is played on the EÍ-truth-condition we get in the usual
game theoretical semantics. This higher order game is of perfect information,
but the role of Abélard is no longer symmetric to that of Eloïse. By definition,
Abélard has a winning strategy whenever Eloïse does not have one, so the law
of the excluded middle holds in this approach. Váánii,nen also introduces an IF-
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game characterizing IF-definability and IF-elementary equiv-
alence. It is used to define a distributive normal form for IF-logic.
All papers above dealt with IF-logic as extension to classical first order pred-
icate logic. But the idea of generalizing dependence patterns by a slash operator
can be applied in all formal languages in which there is such notion as dependence.
In [SPO1], independence is introduced in propositional logic, and combined with
partiality. In [Bra00], the ideas of IF-logic are applied in a modal logic setting,
to examine the associated fixpoint logics. Tero Tulenheimo has studied IF-modal
logic and its expressive power ([Tu102], [Tu103]). At the end of [San01] an atteinpt
is made towards IF-linear logic.
In [Hin02b], Hintikka suggests that quantum logic could be viewed as a frag-
ment of extended IF-logic. In [San97], Sandu studies the properties of IF-logic in
finite models. Finally, Parikh and Víiíá.nánen studied the idea of using a slash
operator in a dual manner: not to express what information is not available
(independence), but to make explicit which information is available (dependence).
The result is called Finite Information logic (FI-logic), and it is shown to be a
decidable sublogic of first order logic ([PV03]).
IF-logic features regularly in van Benthem's more general program of exploring
and exploiting the interplay between logic and game theory, cf. [vB00b], [vB01],
[vB02b], [vB03], [vB04], [vB05].
1.6 Overview of this thesis
As we hope to convey with the first part of the title of this thesis, "Game, Set,
Maths" , especially by the `Maths' in it, the aim of our work has been to get a
mathematical grip on the concepts introduced in [Hin96]. As mentioned at the
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start of this chapter, Hintikka did not focus on (formal) details of the concepts
he introduces in [Hin96]. One could say that in this thesis, instead of selling the
shiny new car with the new features, we open the hood, and study how the motor
is constructed from nuts and bolts.
In the next chapter, "Preliminary Definitions", we collect a series of basic defi-
nitions, to which we will later refer back. Because Hintikka defines his IF-language
in terms of classical first order formulas, we start by giving a definition of the lan-
guage of first order logic. We then give the definitions of the IF-language GIF and
game theoretical semantics as given by Hintikka, where necessary adapted to our
conventions for this thesis. This chapter is meant to be used as reference in the
later chapters.
Chapter 3, "Skolemization and Falsity conditions" , gives a precise account of
the translation procedure from IF-logic to existential second order logic (Ei) and
back. Hintikka's treatment only takes aspects of truth into account, while, by the
failure of the law of the excluded middle, falsity has become a second dimension
to the descriptive power of an IF-sentence. We show how to formulate falsity con-
ditions, and study the resulting `two-dimensional' expressive power of IF-logic.
In chapter 4, "Game Theory as formal framework", we take the "Game Theo-
retical" of GTS seriously (corresponding to the `Game' in the title of this thesis).
We define a more general language GtFC, and formalize semantic games for the
IFG-sentences in game-theoretic terms. We use the so-called extensive forin to
model them, and look for new insights in the logic by looking at it from a game-
theoretic perspective: we study correspondences between logical equivalence and
the Thompson transformations, and we study the character of imPerfect recall as
present in IF-semantic games.
In the work of Hintikka and in the previous chapters, only sentences (closed
formulas) are interpreted. In chapter 5, "Satisfaction for open formulas" , we in-
troduce and comment the semantics for IFG-formulas with free variables. These
work with sets of valuations in order to be able to interpret independence of free
variables (this part therefore corresponds to the `Set' in the title). In chapter 6 we
then study the prenex normal form theorem of [CK99] that uses this semantics.
We highlight several flaws in the original formulations and proofs of the lemmas,
and give improved versions of them. It turns out that the main result holds for the
natural class of regz~lar formulas. We also show that a similar restriction should
be made for the claim that IF-logic is a conservative extension of first order logic.
In the last chapter, chapter 7, we end with some general conclusions. We finish
with a list of interesting open problems, that were unfortunately out of the scope
of this project, and may serve as inspiration for further research.
Chapter 2
Preliminary definitions
In this chapter, we collect precise definitions known from the literature, of basic
languages and notions that will be used throughout this thesis: first order logic,
game theoretical semantics and IF-logic as proposed by [Hin96], and the language
of existential second order logic: Ei.
The definitions of game theoretical semantics and IF-logic are the central ones.
But we start with definitions of the first order language -because the IF-language
is built from it- and Tarski style semantics -because game theoretical semantics
is compared with it. We end with a definition of Ei, as preparation for the next
chapter, where the relation between IF-logic and Ei is elaborated.
2.1 The first order language GFOL
We define what we will mean when we say `(classical) first order language'. (The
definitions in the first sections of this chapter are based on [Sch67], [dS93], and
[Fit96]. Because we assume the reader to be familiar to first order logic, we state
the definitions without much explanation.)
Definition 2.1.1 (first order signature) A first order signatzlre is a.~-tzL~le
Q - (C, P, F)
wherel
. C is a finite or cov,ntable set of constant symbols,
. P is a finite or cov,ntable set of predicate symbols, Pln`l , where m E Í~Y indi-
cates the fi~ed arity of the symbol,
. F is a finite or countable set of function symbols f ~n~, where n E N` indicates
the fi~ed arity of the symbol.
l It would be formally more correct to deRne P and F to be arbitrazy sets of symbols, and let
the signature o provide `arity assigning' functions aP and ar. I chose not to do so, because that
level of formality does not seem necessary, and could harm the readability.
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Convention: we omit the superscript of any of the symbols in P or F, whenever the
arities are clear from the context.
Definition 2.1.2 (alphabet) Let Q be a first order signature. The first order
language GFOL has the following alphabet:
. logical symbols: ~(negation), n, V (binary connectives) and V, ~ (quanti-
fiers);
. punctuation: (,),~,~ (parentheses);
. countably many variables: x, y, z, s, t, u, xl, x2, x3, ..., yl, yz, y3 ... ;
. individual constants: the elements of C:
. predicate symbols: the elements of P
. function symbols: the elements of F.
Definition 2.1.3 (terms) The set of terms of the language GFOG is defined by:
. every variable and every índividual constant is a term;
~ if f ~n~ E F, and if tl, ..., tn are terms, then f(tl, ..., tn) is a term;
. that's all.
Definition 2.1.4 (first order formulas) The set of formulas of the language
GFOG is defined by:
. If P~~~ E P, and if tl, ..., t,,, are terms, then P(tl, . .., t,,,) is a formula.
These formulas are called atomic.
. If cp is a formula, then so is ~(cp);
. íf cp and z[i are formulas, then so are (cp) V(zG) and (cp) n(z[i);
. if cp is a formula, and x a variable, then dx[cp] and ~x[cp] are also formulas.
. That's all.
We say that cp is a first order formula (c~ E GFOG) if cp E GFOG for some first
order signature Q.
The parentheses are used to avoid ainbiguities. The priority order of the con-
nectives is ~, n, V. If there is no risk for ambiguities, we will almost always omit
the parentheses.
l~rthermore, if strict formality is not required, we will not explicitly mention
Q, but use predicate symbols P, R, ... and function symbols f, g, h, . .., and let
their arities be clear from the context.
Definition 2.1.5 (subformulas) The set of subformulas of a first order formula
cp is defined inductively:
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. if cp is atomic, then Sub(cp) -{cp};
. if cp is ~1 n z~2 or zlil V~2i then Sub(cp) - Sub(z~l) U Sub(~2) U{cp};
. if cp is ~~i,b'x~ or ~xcJ~, then Sub(cp) - Sub(zli) U{~p}.
Definition 2.1.6 (free and bound variables) The set of free variables and the
set of bound variables of a,first order formula ~p are both defined inductively:
. if cp is atomic, then Fv(cp) is the set of all variables that occur in cp, and
Bv(cp) - 0,
. if cp is ~~, then Fv(cp) - Fv(zV) and Bv(cp) - Bv(~i),
. if cp is ~lnzli2 or~l VzIi2, then Fv(cp) - Fv(z~l)UFv(~2), Bv(cp) - Bv(zl'1)U
Bv(~2),
. if cp is b'xzli or ~x~, then Fv(cp) - Fv(~) `{x}, Bv(~p) - Bv(~) U{x}.
A formula cp with Fv(cp) ~ 0 is called an open formula. A sentence is a formula
cp with no free variables: Fv(cp) - 0.
Definition 2.1.7 (negation normal form) A formula cp is in negation nor-
mal form, if negation occurs only at atomic level. (I. e.: if cp is a formula in
negation normal form, and ~zG is a subformula of ~p, then ~ is atomic).
Definition 2.1.8 (scope) If Qx[~J with Q E{d, ~} is a subformula of cp, then ~i
is called the scope of the quantification Qx in cp.
2.2 First order models
Definition 2.2.1 (first order model) Let v- (C, P, F) be a first order signa-
ture. A first order model of signature o- is a tuple:
~ - (A, Ic, Ip~ IF)
where
. A is a non-empty set, and is called the domain of 2L
. Ic : C--~ A; for every constant symbol c E C, we call Ic(c) the interpretation
of c in 21.
. Ip : P---~ U,,~ P(A~`) with for every predicate symbol P~"`~ E P: Ip(P) C A"`
("the interpretation of P~~`~ in 2i").
. IF : F---~ Un A~AR~ with for every function symbol f l~~ E F: IF(f) E A~An~
("the interpretation of fl~`~ in 2l").
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As hinted in [Bar85, p. 5~, there is a slight disagreement among the adherents
of the first order thesis, i.e. the view that logic is what is implicit in the logical
constants (quantifiers, connectives), as to whether equality (identity, -) should be
counted as a logical constant. We choose not to regard `-' to be a logical constant,
but it will be present in most models we encounter in this thesis. If it is, we assume
its interpretation satisfies the equality axioms. (As we will see in section 3.2.2 in
the next chapter, equality is needed in Hintikka's approach to IF-logic.)
When discussing an arbitrary model 2l, we will use the symbol A to indicate
its domain (as in the definition above). Informally, if the sets of symbols of o'
contain only a few elements, we will indicate models by writing the interpretations
explicitly. For example, íf Q- ({c}, ~, { f ~li})), then we mean by (1`Y, 0, S) the
first order model of signature Q with the natural numbers as domain, the natural
number 0 as the interpretation of the constant symbol c, and the successor function
S as interpretation for the unary function symbol f.
We will usually omit explicit reference to the first order signatures Q. When
we say cp is a first order formula (or cp E GFOL), we mean that cp E GFOL for some
first order signature a~. Signatures play a role implicitly in the notion of `suitable'
model:
Definition 2.2.2 (suitable model) If cp is a first order formula, a first order
model of signature Q is called suitable for ~p, if cp E GFOL (i. e. the model has an
interpretation for all symbols in ~p; if cp is clear from the conte~t, we will simply
call 2l `a suitable model').
2.3 Tarski style semantics for first order logic
The classical way of evaluating first order formulas in first order models is by
a recursive satisfaction relation, which was introduced by Alfred Tarski in 1933.
Before we can define it, we need some extra definitions.
We deviate from the usual definition of satisfaction in one respect: we work with
valuations instead of assignments. If we let Var denote the set of all variables in the
language, assignments are functions v: Var --~ A assigning a domain element to
all variables in the language. The evaluation of first order formulas only depends
on the values assigned to the free variables in this formula. However, as will
be demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, for open formulas with the
independence operator of IF-logic, the evaluation can be influenced by values that
are assigned to variables that do not occur in the formula. Such formulas are
therefore evaluated using partial assignments, which we call valuations.
In the light of a comparison between classical satisfaction and satisfaction for
open formulas as part an IF-language ( section 5.5), we also use valuations to define
satisfaction for first order formulas:
Definition 2.3.1 (valuations) Let X C Var be a set of variables and 2l a first
order model. Then a function v: X~ A is called a valuation (of X in 2l). If cp
is a first order formula, we call a valuation v suitable for cp, if Fv(cp) C dom(v)
(again, if cp is clear from the conte~t, we will simply call v`a suitable valuation').
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In practice, all valuations we encounter will be partial assignments with a finite
domain. For these we introduce the following explicit notation:
Notation 2.3.2 (explicit notation for valuations) We write v E A{~'' '-'~k}
as (xl ... x~ : al ... ak), where a2 - v(x2). For example, (xy: O1) is the valuation
in {0, 1}{x,y} assigning the value D to x and the value 1 to y.
For the atomic case of the definition of satisfaction, we use the following definition:
Definition 2.3.3 (valuations extended to terms) Given a first order model
~l -(A, Ic, IP, IF) of signature a, and a set of variables X, let T~,X denote the set
of terms of GFOt that contain only variables from X. A valuation v: X -~ A
is uniquely extended to a function v: To,X -~ A interpreting the terms, by the
following inductive definition:
. for every x E X: v(x) :- v(x)
. for every individual constant c E C: v(c) :- Ic(c)
. if f{~`} E F and tl, ... , t~, are terms, then
v(J (tli...,tn)) :- IF(f)(v(tl)~...iv(tn))~
For the quantifier case, we will need the following definition:
Definition 2.3.4 (x-variants) If v E AX is a valuation of X in A, x an ar-
bitrary variable and a E A, then we use the notation v(x: a) for the valuation
v' : X U{x} --~ A, defined by v'(x) :- a and v'(y) - v(y) for all y E X-{x}. We
call a valuation of the forna v(x: a) an x-variant of v.
We can now define satisfaction for first order formulas in the Tarski-style. (The
notation we use, with the valuation between brackets rather than before the turn-
style, is chosen to accord with the notation used for satisfaction for open formulas
in an IF-language by [CK99], given here in chapter 5).
Definition 2.3.5 (Tarski-style satisfaction) Let cp be a first order formula,
~l -(A, Ic, IP, IF) a suitable model, and v: X-~ A a suitable valuation. We
then define the satisfaction relation
~ ~ ~G[v]
inductively by distinction of the following cases:
(At) If cp is atomic, say cp - P(tl, ..., t~ ) , then 21 ~ cp[v] if and only if
(v(tI ), . . . v(tn)) E jP(P)
where v is defined as in definition ,2.3..3.
(~) If cp -~~, then 2( ~ cp[v] if and only if 21 ~ z(~[v] (i.e. not: ~l ~~[v]).
(v) If ~p -~1 n zG2i then 2l ~ cp[v] if and only if 2l ~ z~il[v] or 2[ ~ zU2[v].
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(n) If cp -~1 n~2i then 2l ~ cp[v] if and only if 2( ~~1 [v] and 2! ~~2[v].
(~) If cp -~~(i, then 2[ ~ cp[v] if and only if there e~ists an a E A, such that
`~ ~ ~[v(~: a)].
(b) If cp -~~, then 2l ~ c~[v] if and only if for all a E A, 2l ~ zG[v(x: a)].
If ~L ~ cp[v], we say that cp is satisfied in ~l with respect to v. If cp is a sentence,
we write 2t ~ cp instead of 2l ~ cp[~], where ~: 0-~ A is the valuation with empty
domain; if ~1 ~ cp we say that cp is true in 2l.
2.4 Game theoretical semantics (GTS)
Game theoretical semantics ( GTS) constitutes a notion of satisfaction through the
analysis of what we will call semantic games. The following definition of semantic
games is a slightly adapted version of the definition given by Hintikka in [Hin96,
p. 25].
Hintikka's definition does include a rule for negation (role-switch), but there is
no component in the definition that keeps track of the role distribution of the two
players. Admittedly, for formulas in negation normal form, with which Hintikka
usually works, role switches do not really occur. But we prefer to define the
semantics for the general case ( as Hintikka does as well), and take the negation
rule seriously. Therefore, we define the game for two players with names that do
not include their roles ( Eloïse, Abélard)2 and take the names Uerifierand Falsifier,
used by Hintikka, as names of the roles these players can have in the game. These
roles can be seen in analogy to playing White or Black in a game of chess, and
negation is like turning the board such that the player who played White now
plays Black and vice versa. (Karpov does not become Kasparov and vice versa,
they only switch roles.)
Definition 2.4.1 (semantic games) Let ~p be a first order sentence, and 2l a
suitable model. The semantic game G~ (cp) is played by two players: Abélard and
Eloi'se. There are two roles they can play in the game: falsifier and verifier. Each
position in the game is described by a triple (~, v, p), where ~ is a subformula of
cp, v a valuation for zí, in ~l, and p E {-1, ~-1} a parameter indicating the role
distribution: p- 1 designates that Abélard plays the role of falsifier, and Eloi'se
plays the role of verifier, p--1 indicates reversal of these roles. The game starts
from the initial position (cp, ~, 1). A play of the game proceeds along the following
rules:
(~) In a position (3~zG, v, p), the player in the role of verifxer chooses an element
a E Dom(2l). The game continues from position (z~, v(x: a), p).
2The names Abélard and Eloïse are commonly used for players of logic games, obviously
because of the association by their initials of Abélard with the universal quantification b' and
Eloïse with the existential quantification 3. Also, to have one male and one female player has the
practical advantage that they can unambiguously be referred to by male and female pronouns
respectively. In both respects, e.g. the names Adam and Eve would serve just as well, but we like
the fact that the actual Abélazd studied (Aristotelian) logic for a while, and Eloïse, as his pupil,
may also have known a bit about logic too. See Appendix A for a brief description of their lives.
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(b) In a position (bxzU, v, p), the player in the role of falsifier chooses an element
a E Dom(2l). The game continues from position (zv, v(x: a), p).
(V) In a position (~1V~2, v, p), the player in the role of verifier chooses i E {1, 2}.
The game continues from position (z(~2f v, p).
(n) In a position (z~l n~2,v,p), the player in the role of falsifier chooses i E
{1, 2}. The game continues from position (zGi, v, p).
(~) In a position (~~, v, p), the two players switch roles, and the game continues
from position (z~, v, -p).
(At) In a position (~i, v, p) with ~ atomic, the player currently in the role of veri-
fier wins if 2l ~ cp[v], and the player in the role of falsifier loses. Otherwise,
i.e. if 2l ~ cp[v], the player in the role of falsifier wins and the player in the
role of verifier loses.
To give a simple example, consider the sentence bx~`dy[x - yJ in the model
~Z( -({0,1}, -). A play of the game starts with the choice by Abélard of a value al
for x, followed by a role switch, so Eloïse gets to pick a value a2 for the universally
quantified variable y. We then hit the atomic formula x- y: Abélard is currently
in the role of verifier, so he wins if al - a2, while Eloïse, currently falsifier, wins if
al ~ a2.
While we understand very clearly from the definition of semantic games what
the plays of such game are, it is not clear what the outcome of a particular play
of the game means in logical terms (cf. the table on page 38 of [Hin96]). But the
semantics is not defined in terms of outcomes of single plays, but by the existence
of a winning strategy. In our example, it is clear that in this game Eloïse can win
every play: whether Abélard chooses 0 or 1, she can pick 1 and 0 respectively. In
other words: she has a winning strategy. It is the existence of a winning strategy
that gives us the game-theoretic definition of satisfaction for first order sentences:
Definition 2.4.2 (truth and falsity in GTS) Let cp be a first order sentence
and ~1 a suitable model, then we define:
2t ~~t cp ("cp is true in 2[") if and only if Eloi'se has a winning strategy in G~(cp).
2l (~f cp ("cp is false in 2l") if and only if Abélard has a winning strategy in G~(cp).
What we define to be a strategy is therefore central to GTS. Hintikka gives no
formal definition of the notion of strategy. He describes what he means by the
concept as follows: "In my sense, a strategy for a player is a rule that determines
which move that player should make in any possible situation that can come up
in the course of a play." In practice (i.e. in his work, like in [Hin96]), Hintikka lets
strategies be sets of (generalized) Skolem-functions: for example in the semantic
game described above, a strategy for Eloïse would be a unary function f: A--~ A,
such that (21, f)~ b'x[x ~ f(x)].
We mention some elementary properties of semantic games for first order sen-
tences: as they are finite-depth two-player win-loss games of perfect information,
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they are determined in the sense that one of the players has a winning strategy.
This follows from the Gale-Stewart theorem.3 Note that, in win-loss games, it can
never be the case that both players have a winning strategy at the same time. So,
logically:
2[ ~~t cp or ~i ~~f cp, while not: 2t ~~t cp and ~[ ~~f ~p
GTS for first order sentences can be proved to coincide with Tarksi semantics,
but how this is proved depends on the chosen definition for the concept of strategy.
If we take a strategy for a player to be some function prescribing one choice in every
possible situation of the game where this player has to make a move (determinate
strategies), then the axiom of choice is needed. An alternative is to take a strategy
to be a relation, prescribing non-empty sets of possible choices (undeterminate
strategies), in which case it can be proved without the axiom of choice. In this
thesis all strategies will be of the functional type thereby incorporating the axiom
of choice in GTS (cf. [Hin96, p. 40]).
2.5 IF-logic: semantic games of imperfect infor-
mation
In [Hin96, p. 52], Hintikka defines the language of IF first order logic essentially
as follows:
Definition 2.5.1 (GIF: IF-sentences) Given a first order signature o, the lan-
guage GIF is determined by the following conditions:
. GIF contains all sentences of GFO~ in negation normal form;
. If cp is in GÍF and if a quantification ~y occurs in cp within the scope of uni-
versal quantifiers among which dxl , f1x2i ..., dxn, then the formula resulting
from replacing 3y by ~y~{y1,~2,.. ,xn} is also in GiF
. If cp is in GÍF and if a disjunction V occurs in cp within the scope of universal
quantifiers among which b'xl, b'x2, ..., b'x~, then the formula resulting from
replacing V by V~{x,,x2,...,xn} is also in GIF
~ That's all.
Convention: for simplicity of notation, we usually write the variables under the
slash as a sequence ( `xl, ..., x~ '), rather than as a set (`{xl, ..., xn}'). We iden-
tify first order quantifications ~y with ~yj0 and ordinary disjunction V with V~g.
We say that cp is an IF-sentence (y~ E G~F) if cp E GÍF for some first order
signature Q.
3It is also common practice to refer to the earlier theorem from [Zer13], but [SWOl] warns that
most "modern statements of Zermelo's theorem bear only partial relationship to what Zermelo
really did." One difference with our situation and the situation of chess discussed by Zermelo,
is the fact that in semantic games, the number of positions in the game may be infinite (if the
model is infinite), while Zermelo assumes flnitely many positions. We therefore refer more safely
to the Gale-Stewart theorem.
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Remark: We deviate from the syntax introduced by Hintikka by omitting the
universal quantifiers under the slash: Hintikka writes ~y~y~,,...,y~,,. We see no
technical reason why mentioning the quantifiers would be necessary, and think the
formulas are more easily readable without the quantifiers. In this respect we follow
a.o. [Hod97a] and [CK99]. However, mentioning the quantifiers with the variables
would make the characteristic fact explicit that in GIF existential quantifiers and
disjunctions are only slashed for universally quantified variables.
The slash operator in a quantification ~y~x,,,,,,y„ removes the quantification
from the scope of the universal quantifications b'xl, ..., dx~,. In other words, by
the addition of ~~,,...,y„ to the quantification ~y, this quantification no longer de-
pends on the quantifications dxl, ...,`dx~ : it makes it independent. The name
Independence Friendly logic, which is usually abbreviated to IF-logic, is due to the
feature that the slash operator allows for -"is friendly towards"- a more general
class of dependency patterns: in this language we can introduce independence
where this was not possible in first order logic (where scopes are either nested or
non-overlapping).
Semantics for the IF-language is in a sense the same game theoretical semantics
as defined for first order logic. The rules for the games (hence the plays of the
games) remain the same, and so does the definition of satisfaction. How then are
the applications of the slash operator interpreted? The independence introduced
by the slash operator at an existential quantifier or disjunction, is interpreted
in terms of the information available for Eloïse when she is to make a move.
Independence of a quantification dx, means that Eloïse does not know the value
previously assigned to x by Abélard. Semantically, the slash operator turns the
semantic games for first order logic into games of imperfect information.
This is best illustrated by a simple example. Consider dx~y~x[x ~ y]; note how
this IF-sentence is the result of application of the slash operator to the negation
normal form of the first order formula `dx~dy[x - y], which we used as example
after the definition of semantic games in the previous section. In the semantic
game for this IF-sentence in the model ~l -({0, 1}, -), Abélard chooses a value
for x, then Eloïse chooses a value for y, but she now does so without knowing
the value chosen by Abélard. Does she still have a winning strategy? The answer
is easily seen to be `no': if she chooses 0, then she loses if Abélard happened to
choose 0 as well, and similarly for the choice 1. It is also easy to see that similarly,
Abélard does not have a winning strategy either. This simple example already
illustrates that the law of the excluded middle fails in IF-logic with GTS.
The transition from games of perfect information to games of imperfect infor-
mation (which also allows for the indeterminacy of the semantic games), is hence
not visible in an alteration of the games in terms of the rules, or the possible plays.
It is reflected in the `higher order' concept of strategy. In Hintikka's approach with
Skolem functions, the slash operator in IF-sentences results in a reduction of ar-
guments for these functions (cf. the first order example in the previous section):
for the IF-sentence dx~y~x[x ~ y], Eloïse would have a winning strategy if there
were a 0-ary Skolem-function, or, in other words, a Skolem constant f, such that
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CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
2.6 Existential second order logic: ~i
In preparation of, in particular, the following chapter, we define the language
of existential second order logic, Ei. The E-notation comes from the analogy
with set-theoretic hierarchy theory, as can be understood from the following quote
from (Wa170, p. 537]: "Using the symbols En and II~ of hierarchy theory, we
classify the ordinary quantifier prefixes and sentences of higher-order logic as fol-
lows. The character of any universal quantifier is b', the characterof the existential
quantifier is ~. A sequence of quantifiers is a En prefix if the highest order of any
of its variables is m~ 1, its first quantifier is existential, and it has n quantifiers
including the first which are of different character than their immediate predeces-
sors. A II~ prefix is the dual of a E~ prefix. A sentence is a E~ sentence (IIn
sentence) if it is of the form Qcp where Q is a E~ prefix (IIn prefix) and cp is a
formula all of whose quantified variables have order c m."
We define Ei as an extension of the language of first order logic as follows:
Definition 2.6.1 (Ei ) Let Q- (C, P, F) be a first order signature. (See defini-
tion 2.1.1.) We add two new sets of second order variables:
. Function variables: for each n E I~Y, infinitely many n-ary function symbols
fi~~ ~ f2n~ ~.-. (with for each i, n: f~ni ~ F~.
. Predicate variables: for each n E I`~, infinitely many n-ary predicate symbols
Xi~i, X2ni, ... (with for all i, n: X~ ~`~ ~ P).
Let a'' - (C, P U{X2 n~ ~i E 1`Y, n E lY}, F U { f~ ~~ ~i E N` , n E ~`1}) 6e the extension
of Q with the new function and predicate variables. As usual (cf. the definition of
GFOL in section 2.1), the superscripts (n) are omitted whenever the arities of the
variables are clear from the context.
Then Ei(a) is the collection of second order sentences of the form
~fZ 1 . . . ~f~,k ~X~l . . . ~X~,n 7' ~
where cp is a sentence of GFOL, containing no function symbols that are not in
F U{ f21 ... fik }, and no relation symbols not in P U {X~, ... X~m }. (In other words:
all first order variables are óound 6y first order quantifications in cp, and all second
order variables in cp are bound by an `initial' sequence of existential second order
quantifications.~
As with GFOL, we will usually omit e~plicit reference to the first order signa-
tures Q. When we say ~ is a Ei-sentence, we mean that ~ E Ei(Q) for some
first order signature Q. Again, signatures play a role only implicitly in the phrase
`suitable model': If ~ is a Ei-sentence, a first order model of signature Q is called
suitable for ~ if ~ E Ei(Q) (i.e. the model has an interpretation for all symbols in
~).
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For second order logic, and E i as part of it, the meta-logical properties de-
pend largely on which domains of quantification are chosen for the second order
variables: see [V~,~,O1]. There are basically two approaches:
. full semantics, in which the set A~A'~~ of n-ary functions on the domain A
of a model 2[ (as determined by the axioms of ZFC) serves as domain of
quantification for the n-ary function variables, and similarly, the set 1~(A~)
of all n-ary predicates on A serves as domain of quantification for all n-
ary predicate variables. We use the turnstile `~gol' for full second order
semantics.
. Henkin-semantics, in which the domains of quantification for the second-
order variables are given as explicit parameters in the models.
The first option, full semantics, allows us to evaluate second order sentences
in first order models: the domains of quantification for the second order variables
are determined in terms of the (individual) domain A, by the axioms of ZFC. The
second option implies that in order to interpret second order formulas, first order
models need to be extended with separate domains of quantification for the second
order variables.
We refer to e.g. [Man96] and [Lei94] for more extensive descriptions of second
order logic in general.
In the next chapter we will show how Hintikka uses Ei to reason about strate-




We follow [Hin96] in regarding strategies in semantic games as sets of Skolem func-
tions. First, we discuss and give a formal account of the Skolemization procedure
which is central in Hintikka's approach to IF-logic, as it delivers Ei-tru,th condi-
tions for IF-sentences. We notice that for soundness of the procedure, the models
of evaluations need to satisfy some mild conditions; most notably, they should
contain at least two elements.
Using a generalization of the IF-language, allowing us to write the negation of
an IF-sentence into negation normal form, we give a procedure to obtain falsity
conditions for IF-sentences. The expressive power of an IF-sentence is then shown
to be captured in a stronger sense by a Pairof Ei-sentences. We translate a recent
result of John Burgess for Henkin sentences to show that, conversely, any pair of
incompatible Ei-sentences corresponds with an IF-sentence.
The study of falsity gives rise to some reflections on the nature of game-
theoretic negation. Furthermore, we explain how the order of the Skolemization
steps (inside-out versus outside-in) makes a difference in IF-logic.
This chapter is based on [Dec05].
3.1 Introduction: what is a strategy?
In chapter 2, we gave a definition of the semantic games in terms of their rules. For
the evaluation of (IF-)sentences however, it is the notion of strategy that is most
crucial, and this was not formalized as a mathematical object in this definition.
In general understanding, a strategy prescribes a choice for a player in every
possible position of the game in which it is that player's turn. In semantic games,
we may describe every choice associated with a subformula by a function working
on a set of valuations, and a strategy can be regarded as a sequence of such func-
tions. The arguments of those functions reflect the available input information of
the choices. By this correspondence, the existence of a winning strategy can be
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expressed as an existential second order sentence: a statement about the existence
of functions satisfying certain first order properties. This truth condition can be
obtained by the syntactical procedure of Skolemization.
In Hintikka's work, the connection between the functions constituting strategies
in semantic games, and (generalized) Skolem functions is taken to be an immediate
one (e.g. [Hin96, p. 40]). It is not made expplicit how this connection follows from
the definition of semantic games in terms of their rules; we will give such a formal-
ization in the next chapter (section 4.4). In [Hin96, p. 49], an argument is made in
the converse direction: any existential second order statement can be interpreted
as the winning condition for Eloïse in some well-interpreted semantic game. But
this game may not be a semantic game for a traditional first order formula. It is
enough to extend it to IF-sentences to let every existential second order sentence
be a winning condition for a semantic game: an inverse Skolemization procedure
translates any Ei-sentence into an IF-sentences of which it is a truth condition.
This approach is closely related to the theory of first order logic with Henkin
quantifiers, introduced by Henkin in [Hen61]. Sentences in this language are also
interpreted by Skolemization into Ei-sentences (with supporting inotivation in
terms of games), and the expressive power was proved to be equal to Ei indepen-
dently by Enderton in [End70] and by Walkoe in [Wa170].
In this chapter, we first give a precise account of the generalized Skolemization
procedure to obtain Ei-truth conditions for IF-sentences, and the translation of
Ei-sentences into IF-sentences that are true in the same models. In the book
[Hin96], as in most other work on IF-logic, the focus is almost exclusively on the
expressive power by truth conditions. In a second part, we show how falsity condi-
tions can be formulated as Ei-sentences as well by some syntactical manipulations
and the same Skolemization procedure. We end the chapter with some reflec-
tions on the nature of game-theoretic negation, and on the semantic assumptions
underlying the (syntactic) translation procedures.
3.2 The generalized Skolemization procedure
3.2.1 Skolemization for first order logic
For first order logic with traditional semantics, Skolemization is often used as an in-
strument to eliminate existential quantifiers (e.g. in automated theorem proving,
cf. [Fit96, section 7.11]). It replaces existentially quantified variables by `func-
tional' terms, explicitly expressing how these variables depend on the universal
quantifications that have scope over it.
For simplicity (and as usual), we formulate Skolemization here for first order
formulas that are in negation normal form. (Theorem 7.11.2 of [Fit96] is formu-
lated for arbitrary first order formulas, using the concept of positive and negative
occurrences of subformulas.)
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Theorem 3.2.1 (Skolemization (steps) for first order logic) Suppose cp is
a first order formula in negation normal form, and let 3xz~(x) 6e a subformula of
cp. We indicate this by writing cp[~xz~i(x)]. Suppose Fv(~(x)) - {x} -{yl, ..., ytt},
and let f 6e an n.-a.ry function symbol that does not occur in cp. Then the formula
cp[~xz~(x)] is satisfiable if and only if the formula cp[zli( f (yl, ..., yn))] is.
Proof.. See the proof of Theorem 7.11.2 in [Fit96, p. 188]. a
We call the process of removing one existential quantification and replacing the
variable it bound by a functional term, as in the Theorem, a Skolemization step.
We will use the term Skolemization for the removal of all existential quantifications
in this manner.
Note that Skolemization is a non-deterministic procedure, even if we forget
about the indeterminacy in the choice of the `new' function symbols. Another type
of indeterminacy results from the fact that the order of the removal of the existen-
tial quantifications is not prescribed. For example, the formula dx3y~zR(x, y, z)
becomes `dx~zR(x, f(x), z) after replacing the outer existential quantification 3y,
and if we then replace the inner quantification ~z, we get the Skolemized form:
`dxR(x, f(x), g(x)). Applying the Skolemization steps `inside-out', we first get
`dx~yR(x, y, f(x, y)), followed by dxR(x, g(x), f(x, g(x))). The resulting formulas
are visibly different: the inside-out procedure shows how the replaced variables de-
pended on other existentially quantified variables, while the outside-in procedure
only shows direct dependence on universally quantified variables. But the theo-
rem above ensures that in any chosen order of Skolemization steps, the result of
Skolemization for a first order formula is equisatisfiable with the original formula.
We will show in section 3.9 how a similar result for IF-sentences fails.
In the form of Theorem 3.2.1, Skolemization is a statement on satisfiability:
there is a(suitable) model that satisfies the original formula if and only if there
is a model (with an extended signature) that satisfies the Skolemized formula.
Skolemization steps reduce the number of quantifiers, which improves the efficiency
of algorithms checking the logical validity of first order formulas: a first order
formula zG is valid if and only if ~zli is not satisfiable, which is the case if and only
if a Skolemization of ~zli is not satisfiable. To check the latter algorithnucally, we
could apply Tableaux methods (see e.g. [Fit96, p. 189]).
To make Skolemization a matter of truth in a given model, we leave the first
order level. If we treat the new function symbols as function variables, we can
make the Skolemized formula into a second order formula of the same signature
(without any free second order variables) as follows: we prefix the Skolemized
formula with a second order quantification ~fti for each newly introduced function
f2. The resulting existential second order sentence can then be read as a truth
condition: a statement (in a different language) expressing the necessary and
sufficient condition a model has to satisfy in order for the sentence to be true in
that model. In the context of GTS, this Ei-Skolemization of a first order sentence
cp may be read as expressing the existence of a winning strategy for Eloïse.
26 CHAPTER 3. SKOLEMIZATION AND FALSITY CONDITIONS
Theorem 3.2.2 (Skolemization into Ei) Let cp[z[il(fi,(yl)),...,~k(fik(yk))]
be the result of k successive applications of theorem 3.2.1 to the first order sentence
cp, and if 2l is suitable model for cp, then:
~ ~ ~ ZJJ ~ ~sol ~fil . . . ~fik [~[fii (yl )i . . . ~ fik (yk)]]
Proof.. This follows from Theorem 3.2.1 and the Axiom of Choice. a
Note that if cp is a first order formula of signature Q, then the Ei-sentence ~
in the theorem:
~ :- ~fii ...~fgk[~lfii(yl)i..., fik(yk)1l~
is also of signature Q. So, any model suitable for the first order sentence cp is
suitable for the Ei-sentence ~ and conversely. Note that first order semantics
(`~') does not interpret the second order quantifications in the Ei-sentence ~,
therefore ~ has to be evaluated with second order semantics. With `~SOl', we
indicate full semantics for second order logic.
This theorem depends on the use of full semantics, in which the axioms of ZFC
determine the domain of quantification for the function variables (see section 2.6).
3.2.2 Skolemization for IF-sentences
Skolemization for IF-sentences (that are automatically in negation normal form
by definition 2.5.1) is in two respects an extension of Skolemization for first order
logic. First, the generalized procedure deals with the slash operator applied to
existential quantifications (by omitting the variables occurring under the slash
as arguments for the corresponding Skolem function). Second, it also introduces
Skolem functions for the disjunctions. The latter is easily motivated by the fact
that in the semantic games, disjunctions correspond to moves by Eloïse as well.
More technically, Skolemization of the disjunctions is needed in order to remove
slash operators applied to disjunctions in the IF-sentence, in order to get a truth
condition that is in classical Ei, i.e. without any slashes.
We define the procedure of Skolemization for IF-sentences as follows ( in Hin-
tikka's book [Hin96] there is no formalized definition):
Definition 3.2.3 (Skolemization for IF-sentences) Let cp be an IF-sentence.
A Skolemization of cp is a Ei-sentence
~fil . . . ~fi„~ ~ [wl (.fi,i (zl))~ . . . , ~m (fi,,. (zm))]
where the first order formula cp' is obtained by repetition of the following replace-
ment steps until all existential quantifccations and (original~ disjunctions occurring
in cp are replaced
(a) af ~y~x,,...,2kz~(y) occurs as a subformula in cp under the scope of the universal
quantifications in {d~l, ..., b'xk, b'zl, ..., b'zn}, and if f is an n-ary function
symbol that does not occur in cp, then replace ~y~x,,...,xk~i(y) in cp by
~G(.f (zI, . . . , z,~))
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(b) zf ~i1V~x,,,,,,xk ~2 occurs as a subformula in cp under the scope of the universal
quantifications in {dxl ,..., dxk, `dzl, ..., b'zn }, and if f is an n-ary function
symbol that does not occur in cp, then replace ~1 V~y,,...,xk ~2 in cp by
(f (z1 i . . . , .Zn) - O n Wl) U (f (zi, . . . , zn) ~ O n ~2)
(This procedure is also applied if l~ - 0, in other words: if the quantification or
disjunction is not slashed.)
For example, the IF-sentence
b'xdy~z~x[R(x, y, z) Vly P(x, y, z)]
is, by this Skolemization procedure, translated into the Ei-sentence
~f~gdxdy[(9(x) - 0 n R(x, y, f(y))) V(9(x) ~ 0 n P(x, y, f(y)))~.
We make three remarks about this procedure. First, apart from the choice of
fimction symbols, the procedure above is now deterministic: because existentially
quantified variables are not taken as arguments for the Skolem functions, it does
not matter anymore in which order the existential quantifiers are eliminated. (Not
taking the existentially quantified variables as arguments corresponds to applying
Theorem 3.2.1 outside-in.)
Second, note that this translation is strictly speaking not signature preserving
(unlike the first order procedure 3.2.2): for the interpretation of the result of the
second clause, a suitable model should interpret the constant `0' and the predicate
symbol equality `-'. Furthermore: not just any model with this extended signature
will give the Skolemization the intended interpretation. In order to do so, a model
needs to satisfy the axioms stating that the interpretation of `-' is in fact equality
(and not an arbitrary binary predicate), and also, the model should contain at
least two elements. We will call models that satisfy these requirements IF-safe:
Definition 3.2.4 (IF-safe models) A first order model 2l is called IF-safe if
its signature v contains the individual constant `0' and the óinary relation symbol
`-', and if it satisfies the equality axioms for GFOL (see (Fit96, section 8.3f) and
~x[x ~ 0~ (2l contains at least two elements).
Third, we realize that there is a hazard of circularity in clause (b), as it replaces a
disjunctive subformula (possibly with a slashed disjunction), by a new disjunctive
formula (without a slashed disjunction). The procedure assumes that the new
disjunction will not be replaced again. Formally, we could ensure this by only
replacing slashed disjunctive subformulas (zlil V~~,,..,,x~ ~i2 with k) 0). However,
this destroys the one-one correspondence between moves of Eloïse in the semantic
game on the one hand, and Skolem-functions on the other.
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Hintikka gives no (formal)
argument for the following statement:
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Statement 3.2.5 (Hintikka's approach) If cp is an IF-sentence, and ~ is a
Ei-sentence obtained by the Skolemization procednre of definition 3.2.3, then for
any suitable IF-safe model 2L:
~ ~ ~t ~P z~ `~ ~Bai ~
The requirement of `IF-safety' is not explicit in the description in (Hin96]. But
as we noted in our comments on definition 3.2.3, it is necessary in order for the
translation procedure to be sound.
We have reasons not to state 3.2.5 as a Theorem, but refer to this as `Hintikka's
approach'. Hintikka takes the Skolemization procedure of definition 3.2.3, based
on the `outside-in' Skolenvzation procedure for first order logic, as primitive for
the interpretation of IF-sentences. As he admits elsewhere ( [Hin02a, p. 407], see
the quote on page 50 of this thesis), the semantic games of GTS only serve as "an
explication of our pretheoretical ideas about quantifiers and truth". This means
that statement 3.2.5 is a definition rather than a theorem.
A consequence of taking this Skoleinization procedure as primitive, is that de-
pendencies of previous existential quantifiers are neglected. For first order logic,
this happened to give the same result as taking these dependencies into account.
In section 3.9 and in the next chapter we show that for some IF-sentences (like
Hodges' example ( 1.7)), a natural game-theoretic interpretation of the semantic
games would give a different truth condition from the one obtained by Skolemiza-
tion as in definition 3.2.3. This interpretation would correspond to an `inside-out'
Skolemization procedure, taking dependencies of previous existential quantifica-
tions into account.
In response to Hintikka's attitude to semantic games as informal explications of
our pre-theoretical ideas, we reply that we may need to form new pre-theoretical
ideas for IF-logic. One of our pre-theoretical ideas about quantifiers, viz. that
their dependence relation is transitive, is challenged by IF-logic. A principally
game-theoretic interpretation can help us deal with this challenge ( and we will try
to do so in the next chapter).
3.2.3 T~anslating Ei-sentences to IF-sentences
In the previous subsection, we have shown how a Skolemization procedure trans-
lates IF-first order sentences into Ei-sentences, that are viewed as truth conditions
for the IF-sentences. In this section we give a detailed formalization of Hintikka's
procedure to translate a Ei-sentence into IF-first order logic, which is described
in (Hin96, p. 62-63] (with an easily reparable mistake in (3.44): the double ar-
row should be a single one). This leads to the claim that IF-first order logic has
precisely the expressive power of Ei.
First, it is proved that we may take any Ei-sentence ~ to be written in a
specific form:
Lemma 3.2.6 Any Ei-sentence ~ can be rewritten into a Ei-sentence ~Y in a
specific form, such that for every IF-safe svitable model 2l:
~ ~Sai ~ i.~ ~ ~goi ~,
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This specific form is:
~fl~f2 . . . ~ fldxlflx2 . . . flxn[~~ (3.1)
where zV is a quantifier-free first order formula (in which the function variables
fl, ..., f~ and individual variables xl, ..., xn occur), and such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. the function variables fi do not occur nested;
2. each function variable fi occurs with only one sequence of arguments.
Proof.- Let ~o be an arbitrary Ei-sentence, i.e. a first order formula cpo prefixed
by a list of existential quantifications ~fj13fj2 ... over function variables, and
possibly also a list of existential quantifications over predicate variables ~X ....
We bring ~o into the form of the lemma by a sequence of transformations.
First, replace the first order formula cpo with an equivalent first order formula cpl
in prenex normal form (which implies negation normal form). Let cp2 be the result
of the Skolemization of cpl according to Theorem 3.2.1, such that all first order
existential quantifications are removed. Let fil ,..., fik be the Skolem functions
introduced in the process. Let ~ be the formula we get from ~o by replacing cpo
with cp2 (which is of the form dxl ... dxn[~i], with ~ quantifier free), and prefixing
the result with existential quantifications over the introduced Skolem functions:
Y' :- ~fy,l , . . . , ~ fik 7 fjl ~fj2 . . . ~X . . . CP2.
To satisfy the two extra conditions of the lemma, we apply the necessary num-
ber of the following transformations to ~:
. If ~ contains an existential quantification over an n-ary predicate variable
X, it is replaced by a quantification over an n-ary function variable f, which
acts as `characteristic function' for the original predicate: every occurrence
of the predicate X with arguments (tl, . .., t~) in ~, is replaced by the atomic
formula f (tl, . . . , tn) ~ 0. For example: ~Xdx[X (x)~ becomes ~ fdx[f (x) ~
0] .
. If in ~ two function variables occur nested, i.e. in a term fi(tl, . .., tn) we
have tk - fj (tl, . .., t;,,) for some k E { 1, . .., n}, then the nested term t~ is
replaced by a new individual variable x, and the first order part
~(fi(tl,...,tk,...,tn))
of ~ is replaced by
dx[x ~ fj (tl, . . . , tm) U ~(fi(tl ~ . . . , x, .
. . , tn))~
(It would be more natural to write `x - fl(y) -~ ~P(fa(x))' rather than
`x ~ fl(y) V cp(f2(x))'. But we will use the outcome of this procedure
for translation into IF-logic where we have no satisfactory interpretation
for implication in general. The formulation with negation and disjunction,
translates directly into IF-logic, because the negation sign (implicit in ~)
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~fl~f2dydx~x ~ fl(y) V ~(f2(x))~~
. If in ~ one function variable occurs with dif~erent sequences of variables, say
fi(xl, ..., x~ ) and fti(yl, ..., yn) both occur in the first order part cp of ~,
we then add an existential quantification of a new n-ary function variable
f~, replace occurrences in cp of fi(yl, ..., y~ ) by f~ (yl, ..,, y~ ), and conjunct
the result with the quantifier free formula
~(xl - yl I` . . . xn - 7Jn) U (.fi (xl ~ . . - ~ xn ) - f! (yl ~ . . . ~ yn) )
For example:
~f1fÍx1dx2~(fl (xl )i fl (x2))i
becomes
3fi~fadxlb'x2~(xi ~ xz u fi(xi) - fa(xa)) ~~P(fi(xi), fa(xa))l.
(The same remark holds with respect to the avoidance of implication.)
The result of each these transformation is equivalent to the original (in IF-safe
models). a
Note that the Ei-sentences that result from the Skolemization procedure 3.2.3
are of the form (3.1) and satisfy the two conditions of the lemma. In fact, all
sentences of this form can be seen as the result of Skolemization for some IF-
formula, as will be demonstrated by the translation procedure from Ei into IF-
logic.
Theorem 3.2.7 Every Ei-sentence is equivalent (on the class of IF-safe models)
to the Skolemization of some IF-sentence.
PTOOf.- Given an arbitrary Ei-sentence ~, we transform it into the form (3.1) of
the previous lemma (satisfying the two conditions):
~fi ~f2 . . . ~ftdxldx2 . . . b'xn ~~(.fl, . . . , ft, xI, . . . , xn)~ (3.2)
To transform the latter Ei-sentence into an IF-sentence, apply the following trans-
formation to replace the quantification ~f2 by an IF-quantification 3y2~Z , for
i- 1, ..., l: let xi be the (unique) sequence of arguments of f2, and let Zz :-
{xz, ,..., xi,~ } be the set of variables from xl, ..., xn that do not occur in ~i.
Remove the quantification dfi, and insert the IF-quantification ~y2~Z; directly
left from the quantifier free part ~ of the formula (such that it falls under the
scope of all universal quantifications). In zli, replace every occurrence of the term
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fz(~i) by the variable y2. (Note that under Hintikka's approach, the order of these
replacements does not inatter.)
The result is an IF-sentence of the form:
cp :- dxl . . . dx~ ~yl~Zl . . . ~yt~z~ [~(xi, . . . , xn, yi, . . . , y~)]
The Skolemization of cp following the procedure of 3.2.3 then gives us the formula
(3.2) back (modulo choice of the second order variable names).
(Technical remark: note that the Ei-formula may contain implication signs, but
in the formula (3.2) these only occur between quantifier free first order formulas.
On that level, an implication a --; b is equivalent to ~a V b, also in IF-logic: at
atomic level, game theoretical negation and classical negation coincide. We can
therefore safely translate them.) a
Corollary 3.2.8 (Translation from Ei to IF) For every Ei-sentence ~, there
exists an IF-sentence cp snch that in every sv,itable IF-safe model 21:
.̀2l ~gai ~ i}f ~ ~ ~t ~P
Proof.. By the previous theorem and statement 3.2.5. a
It follows that all Ei-definable properties can be expressed in IF-logic. To
illustrate this, we show how a Ei-formula expressing Dedekind infinity can be
translated into an IF-sentence:
Example 3.2.9: (Dedekind infinity expressed in IF-logic) Dedekind infinity
defines infinity of a set A by the existence of an injective, non-surjective function
f: A-~ A. The Ei-sentence
~c3fdxb'y[(f (x) - f(y) ~ x - y) n .f (x) ~ c]]
is true precisely in models whose domain is Dedekind infinite. This formula is
almost in the form of ~Y in Lemma 3.2.6, except that the function variable f
occurs both with argument x and with argument y. If we also avoid the use of
implication, we get the equivalent EÍ-sentence:
~c~f~gb'xdy[(x ~ y V f(x) - 9(y)) n((f (x) ~ 9(y) V x- y) n f(x) ~ c)].
This Ei-sentence is the Skolemization of the following IF-sentence:
dxdy~z~~,y~s~y~t~x[(x ~ yV s - t) n((s ~ t V x- y) n s~ z)].
Note that by a back-and-forth translation from IF-logic to Ei, the IF-sentences
return in a specific normal form: on the outside a block of (unslashed) universal
quantifiers, then a block of existential quantifiers (with slashes), and in the scope of
all these quantifiers a quantifier free, slash free formula. This is the strong Skolem
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normal form mentioned by Hintikka in [Hin96, p. 60, item (D)]. (In his supporting
argument, Hintikka uses a prenex normal form for IF-sentences, without proof. In
chapter 6 of this thesis, we give a detailed account of the conditions under which
IF-sentences can be written into a strongly equivalent prenex normal form.) Note
that in the translation procedures the slashed disjunctions disappear, which proves
that they do not essentially contribute to the expressive power of IF-logic.
This concludes this section on the standard translations from IF-logic to Ei
and back, which form the basis of most of the metaproperties stated by Hintikka
in [Hin96], items (A)-(G) on pages 59-63: the fact that its expressive power equals
that of E1, compactness, (downward) LSwenheim-Skolem (by which fact it can-
not distinguish between countable and uncountable), separation, Beth definability
(which follows from separation). Also, it is crucial in the definability of a truth
predicate within the IF-language (chapter 6 of the book). In all cases only the
truth conditions of IF-sentences play a role. The rest of this chapter is dedicated
to the study of falsity conditions, and their relation to truth conditions.
3.3 Focus on truth
It is a well known fact that finite depth, two-player win-loss games of perfect
information are deternuned, in the sense that one of the players has a winning
strategy. This result follows from Zermelo's theorem in [Zer13], or the more general
theorem of Gale and Stewart in [GS53] ( and uses the axiom of choice). By this
fact, it follows that GTS makes first order sentences always either true or false.
For IF-sentences in general, this is no longer the case: the interpretation of the
slash operator turns the semantic games into games of imperfect information (cf.
section 2.5). In those games, it can be the case that none of the two players has a
winning strategy. Hence: if an IF-sentence cp is not true in a given suitable model
~l, this does not necessarily imply that cp is false in that inodel.
In his book, as in his other work on the subject, Hintikka focuses strongly on
when IF-sentences are true. We give three points where this focus is visible (these
have also been pointed out by others in the literature, e.g. []). We illustrate these
points by a comparison of the simple IF-formula dx~y~x [x - y] with the first order
formula ~yb'x[x - y].
The first point ( also pointed out in [vB00a] and [vB05]) is the notion of equiv-
alence: for Hintikka, sentences are equivalent if they are true in exactly the same
models ( cf. [Hin96, p. 65]):
Definition 3.3.1 (truth-equivalence) For all IF-sentences cp and zG:
dcp -~ zG t~ for all suitable models ~l :~[ ~~t cp i, fj~ ~( ~~t ~.
We call `-t ' truth equivalence.
In this sense, the formulas `dx~y~x[x - y] and ~ydx[x - y] are equivalent: they
are both true in one-element models only. However, the first formula is never false
(Abélard can never pick an element that is unequal to all elements), whereas the
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second formula is false in all models with at least two elements (Abélard, knowing
the value chosen by Eloïse for y, can then pick a different value). This means
that IF-sentences that have the same truth conditions, may have different falsity
conditions. This shows that falsity conditions cannot be expressed in terms of
truth conditions, and are hence a separate aspect of the descriptive power of an
IF-sentence.
We prefer a stronger notion of equivalence, that also takes falsity into account.
Such notion is a natural extension of truth-equivalence:
Definition 3.3.2 (strong equivalence) For all IF-sentences cp and z~:
~P-~~~P-c~ and~P-f ~,
where -f is the obvions counterpart of -t:
cp -t ~~ for all suitable models 2[ : 2l ~~f cp i,f,f 2i ~~f ~i.
We call `-f ' falsity equivalence, and `-' strong equivalence.
A second issue that makes the focus on truth evident, is related to the issue
of equivalence. In the previous section, we have seen how every IF-sentence has
a E}-translation, and conversely, how every Ei-sentence is translatable into an
IF-sentence. The word `translation' implies some form of equivalence.
But the translation procedures are only truth-preserving, and disregard the
falsity-aspects of the IF-sentences involved. This is demonstrated by the applica-






(3) dx~y~x [x - y]
The sentences (1) and (3) share (2) as their truth condition, but where the orig-
inal formula is false in all models containing at least two elements, the formula
that arises after the back-and-forth translation is never false. This example shows
in particular that the back-and-forth translation is not closed on the first order
fragment of IF-logic, exactly by the fact that falsity conditions are not preserved.
Finally, the focus on truth is also visible in the syntax (see definition 2.5.1):
Hintikka defines IF-logic from first order formulas in negation normal form, and
then applies the slash operator only to existential quantifiers and disjunctions.
This means that the information restrictions only restrict Eloïse in her choice of
strategies, and therefore affect only the truth aspect of a formula.
The formula 3ydx~y [x - y] -which is strongly equivalent to our IF-example
dx~y~2[x - y]: both are true in one element models only, and never false- is for
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example not an IF-formula in Hintikka's definition.
[Hin96] stresses the importance of the descriptive function of logic: characteri-
zation of classes of models by logical formulas. Usually this is done by investigating
the class of models in which a formula is true (by the given semantics). In the case
of IF-logic, as the following sections will demonstrate, the class of models in which
an IF-sentence is false can not be expressed in terms of the class in which the
sentence is true. This makes falsity a second dimension of the descriptive power
of IF-logic, which is neglected if we, like Hintikka, only focus on truth.
In the rest of this chapter, we will study how to characterize the class of mod-
els in which an IF-formula is false. We have to mention that in the definitions
of Sandu's Appendix to [Hin96], falsity is taken into account. In this Appendix,
Sandu defines the IF-language through the definition of a class of standard (quan-
tifier) prefixes and their duals, thereby generalizing the IF-language as defined by
Hintikka. We will give our own, more direct, generalization.
3.4 Technicalities: symmetric syntax (GjFS~
In this section, we will define an extension of IF-logic (`IFS'), which is closed under
(the game-theoretic) negation, i.e. if cp is an IFS-sentence, then so is ~cp. In the
way Hintikka defines the IF-sentences (definition 2.5.1), this is not the case: IF-
sentences are defined from first order formulas already in negation normal form,
and with the slash applied to existential quantifications and disjunctions only.
This means that the moves of Abélard are always of perfect information. As a
consequence, there is no IF-sentence that is strongly equivalent to the negated
IF-sentence ~dx~y~x [x - y] (which is never true, and false in one-element models
only), as this would be the sentence ~xdy~x[x ~ y], containing a slashed univer-
sal quantifier. On the other hand, game-theoretical semantics gives us a precise
understanding of what this latter formula means.
The extended language of IFS-sentences that we define in this section, is de-
signed to remove the asymmetry between the two players, induced by the choice
of syntax in definition 2.5.1. We allow quantifiers and connectives that correspond
to moves for Abélard, to be slashed for variables whose value was chosen by Eloïse.
We design it such that negation normal form is no longer included in the definition,
and yet with the property that any IFS-sentence is strongly equivalent to an IFS-
sentence that is in negation normal form. (We should remark that the formalism
of Sandu's Appendix to [Hin96], does allow for the symmetric treatment of the
players and is closed under negation, but employs quantifier-blocks closely related
to Henkin quantifiers, cf. (Hin96, p. 255]. We choose a more elementary language.)
Because we allow negation to occur anywhere in the formula, we need the
following definition to keep track of which quantifiers and connectives correspond
to moves of which player:
Definition 3.4.1 (polarity of quantifiers and connectives) If cp is a first
order sentence (not necessarily in negation ~tormal form), and Qxz(~ is a subformula
of cp, then Qx is called positive in cp if Q-~ and Qxz~i is in the scope of an
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even number of negation signs in cp, or Q- d and Qxz~i is in the scope of an odd
number of negation signs. In the two dual combinations (Q -`d and even, Q-~
and odd), Qx is called negative in cp. Similarly, if ~1 o z~2 is a subformula of
cp, then o is called positive in cp if o- V and ~1 o z~i2 is in the scope of an even
number of negation signs in cp, or o- n and ~1 0~i2 is in the scope of an odd
number of negation signs. In the two dual combinations (o - n and even, o- v
and odd), o is called negative in y~. Schematically:







In sentences in negation normal form, the existential quantifications are pre-
cisely the positive quantifications, and the universal quantifications the negative
ones. Similarly, the disjunctions are precisely the positive connectives, and the
conjunctions the negative ones.
Definition 3.4.2 (symmetric IF-sentences: GIFS) Given a first order signa-
ture Q, the set of IFS-sentences of signature Q: GÍFS, is determined by the follow-
ing conditions:
1. Every first order sentence of signature Q(not necessarily in negation normal
fOrl72) 2S 2n GIFS'
2. Let cp 6e in GiFS. Then the result of any of the following replacements is
also in GiFS:
(a) replacement of a positive quantification Qy in cp, occurring within the
scope of negative quantifiers among which Qlxl~z,,... ,Qkx~~zk, by
Qy~{~~,x2....,~k }
(b) replacement of a negative quantification Qy in cp, occurring within the
scope of positive quantifiers among which Qlxl~z,,... ,Q~x~~zk, by
Qy~{~~,z~,...,~k}
(c) replacement of a positive connective o in cp, occurring within the scope
of negative quanti,fiers among which Qlxl~z,,... ,Qkxk~zk, by
~~{21~~2r...~2k1
(d) replacement of a negative connective o in cp, occurring with,in the scope
of positive quantifiers among which Q1xI~z1,...,Qkx~~zk, by
~,7S1~t2,...~~kf
(The notation Qixti~z; denotes an ordinary first order quantification, i.e.
without a slash, if Zi is taken to be the empty set.)
.~. This defines all GÍFS-sentences
We call cp an IFS-sentence, if there is a first order signature v such that cp E GÍFS.
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This language now includes the sentence ~ydx~y[x - y], which is strongly equiva-
lent to the IF-sentence dx~y~x[x - y].
Note that we did not extend the language of the IF-sentences with elements
that require new semantics. Instead, we enable a more complete use of game
theoretical semantics, in the definition of which no difference is made between the
capacities of both players ( we emancipated the syntax, to borrow a term we found
in the 2002 version of ( vB00b]). Also, because this language does not presuppose
negation normal form ( like the IF-language by definition 2.5.1), the negation rule
gets truly used as role exchange. The definition of this symmetric language took
some extra work because we adopted Hintikka's convention to make choices of one
player in the game only independent of moves of his~her opponent (and not of
his~her own, at least: not explicitly, cf. section 3.9). The syntactically determined
polarity of the quantifiers and connectives, corresponds with the player who makes
the associated moves in the semantic games for the formula: positive quantifiers
and connectives give rise to moves for Eloïse, negative quantifiers and connectives
give rise to moves for Abélard.
This enables us to state the following:
Lemma 3.4.3 (De Morgan's laws for G~FS) For any IFS-sentence cp, write
cp[~] - cp[~~'J to express that if ~ occnrs as a subformula of cp, then the resz~lt
of replacing ~ with zG' in cp, is strongly equivalent to cp. We can then state De
Morgan's laws for IF-logic as follows:
~[,(ex~Ytl~)] - ~[~x~Y(,~)]
~[,(~xi~G)J - ~[~x~Y(,~G)l
~P[~(~i n~Y~a)] - ~P[(~~i) U~Y(~~2)]





In fact, these equivalences hold in the strongest sense possible. Not only does there
exist a winning strategy for the formula on the left side iff there exists a winning
strategy for the one on the right side (for a given player, in a given model). The
following stronger situation is the case: a winning strategy for the formula on the
left side is a winning strategy for the right side and vice versa. This is because
the games for the sentences on the left side, are exactly the same games as those
for the sentences on the right side. What we mean by `the same game' becomes
more precise in section 4.4 of the next chapter, where we model semantic games
in game-theoretical terms. Informally: the exchange of roles combined with the
flipping of the quantifier (or connective) cancels out.
Corollary 3.4.4 (NNF) For every IFS-formula cp there ezists a strongly equiv-
alent IFS-form~ala in negation normal form.
Proof.. This follows from the previous lemma and the fact that double negation
cancels: cp[~~~] - cp[z(i] (exchanging roles twice in a row brings the game to the
original situation). a
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We now reflect on the question whether the introduction of imperfect infor-
mation for Abélard (which is made possible by our move from IF-sentences to
IFS-sentences), might increase Eloïse's winning potential. The answer to this is
`no':
Lemma 3.4.5 An IFS-sentence cp in negation normal form is tru.th-equivalent
with the IF-formula cp' resulting from cp after removing the slashes at universal
quantifiers and conjunctions.
E.g.: b'x~y~xdz~yz~ -t dx~y~xb'zzG. (This lemma corresponds to item (i) of the
Corollary on p. 258 in the Appendix of [Hin96].)
Proof.. The imperfect information does not reduce the set ofactions for Abélard:
in the most restricted case for Abélard, he has to play `constant choices', i.e. choices
that do not respond to earlier moves of Eloïse. But even in that case, Eloïse will
never know in advance which constants Abélard chooses to play. Her strategy
therefore still has to be winning for all possible actions of Abélard. (This is an
informal argument, by the absence of a formal representation of semantic games.
When we give the representation in the game-theoretic extensive form in chapter 4,
we see that information sets of the other players are no parameter in the definition
of strategy.) a
This lemma makes every IFS-sentence truth equivalent to an IF-sentence, which
enables us to use the Skolemization procedure for IF-sentences (definition 3.2.3)
to find Ei-truth conditions for IFS-sentences. We needed the slashes at universal
quantifiers and conjunctions in the process of writing an IFS-formula in a(strongly)
equivalent negation normal form. But after this process, we can ignore them again
when looking for a truth condition. This way, we avoid obtaining an existential
second order truth condition with slashed universal quantifiers and connectives
(which would not be a Ei-formula because of these slashes).
The dual of the lemma is of course also true, but we will not need it: an
IFS-sentence cp in negation normal form is falsity-equivalent to the IF-formula
cp" resulting from cp after removing the slashes for existential quantifiers; e.g.
`dx~y~xdz~y~ -f `dx3ydz~yz~.
3.5 Winning conditions for both players
The following simple observation shows how truth- and falsity conditions are two
sides of the same coin:
Lemma 3.5.1 A falsity condition for an IF(S)-sentence cp is a truth condition of
the IFS-sentence ~~:
~I~f~ ZJJ~I~t~~.
This follows easily from the interpretation of negation as role exchange in GTS.
Corollary 3.5.2 We can express the truth and falsity conditions of an IF(S)-
sentence cp 6y two Ei-sentences, ~t and ~f .
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To obtain ~t, we write cp in negation normal form (if necessary, by Corollary 3.4.4),
then drop occurring slashes for universal quantifiers (by Lemma 3.4.5), and finally
apply the Skolemization procedure to the result (definition 3.2.3). To obtain ~f,
we do the same for ~cp.
As an example, we formulate a falsity condition for an IF-sentence that ex-
presses Dedekind infinity:
Example 3.5.3: (falsity of an IF-sentence expressing infinity) The truth
condition of the following IF-sentence (slightly different from the formula in Exam-
ple 3.2.9), easily shows that the sentence expresses the existence of a injective, non-
surjective function. We give its truth- and falsity conditions (in the Ei-sentences
we use double implication to improve readability):
~p :- ~zdxb'y~s~~~t~~[(x ~ y V s- t) n((s ~ t V x- y) ~(s ~ z))]
~t : ~fi~.fz~fsdxdy[(x - y H fa(x) - fs(y)) n (fa(x) ~ .ii)]
,cp - dz~x~yds~ydt~~[(x - y n s~ t) V((s - t n x~ y) v(s - z))]
~f . ~f1~J2tÍzdSdt[~(fl(~) - f2(z) H S - t) V S- 2]
We can now conclude that cp is false in 2l precisely if 2l is a 1-element model,
because only in that case: 2l ~gol ~f. o
We remind the reader that any IF-sentence that is true in precisely the class
of infinite models, must be undetermined in some finite models. If an IF-sentence
would be false in (precisely) all finite models, its falsity condition would be a Ei-
sentence expressing finiteness. This is impossible because E i is compact. This
shows how we should be careful with the notions like finiteness and infinity (the
one is the contradictory negation of the other), in combination with the game-
theoretic negation and the associated notions of truth and falsity. Because IF-logic
does not have the contradictory negation implicit in the term infinity, expressibility
of infinity does not imply expressibility of finiteness.
3.6 IF-sentences correspond with ~1-pairs
With the procedure described above, we have a mechanism to associate with every
IF-sentence cp, a pair (~t, ~f) of Ei-sentences, such that for every suitable IF-safe
model ~l, extending Hintikka's approach 3.2.5:
~ ~~c ~P ~ ~ ~sol ~c
and
~ I~f ~ ~~ ~ ~sol ~f-
The pair (~t, ~f) divides the class of all suitable IF-safe models for cp into three
disjoint subclasses: the class ,Mt of models satisfying ~t, the class ,Mf of models
satisfying ~f, and finally the class .Mu of models satisfying neither. We remark
that the class ~1;; is not Ei- but IIi-definable (IIi is universal second order logic,
and the IIl-definable classes are precisely the complements of the Ei-definable
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classes of models). If cp is first order, then of course .M;; is empty.
For a Ei-sentence ~, let JVlál denote the class of suitable models ~l in which
~ is satisfied (~l ~gol ~). We can then say that, if cp is an IF-sentence and ~ a
Ei-sentence, then ~ is a truth condition for cp if ,Mt - JVIs1. Also, ~ is a
falsity condition for cp if Nlf -.Mól.
On a sentential (propositional) level, we can formulate a nice correspondence
between the propositional connectives n, V, ~ operating on IF-sentences (cp,zv), and
operations on the pairs of Ei-sentences as their truth- and falsity conditions:
IF-sentence E1 x E1
~ (~t ~ ~f )
y~ (~ti ~f)
~~ (~f ~ ~t)
~ n ~ (~t ~ ~ti ~f V ~f)
~ V W (~t V ~t i~f n~f)
~~ V 4' (~f V ~t~ ~t n ~f)
The last line of the table gives some insight in the problems we have defining
implication for IF-logic. It shows that a definition of implication in terms of
game-theoretic negation and the disjunction would be stronger than intended.
Intuitively, one expects an implication cp ~g íG in GTS to express "if Eloïse has
a winning strategy in G~ ( cp), then she has one in G~ (~i)" . This is a(material)
implication on the level of strategies, and would correspond to the truth condition:
~~t V~t. This condition is weaker than the condition ~f V~Yt, because .Mf C
(Ntt )~, which for IF-sentences in general is a proper inclusion. More importantly,
~~t V~t is in general not Ei, while truth conditions of IF-sentences are always
~1i
As suggested by [Hin96, 161, item (k)~, this problem could be solved by moving
to so called Extended IF-logic (EIF), in which contradictory (weak) negation (-)
is added as a truth functional operator, which may be added sentence-initially:
~l~~t-cpiff2i[,~tcP.
In words: an EIF-sentence -cp is true in a model2l, if and only if Eloïse fails to have
a winning strategy in the game G~ (~p). But this introduces a syntactic element
into the sentences that cannot be defined in terms of moves in the semantic games:
it operates at the level of strategies. This makes the evaluation of EIF-sentences a
`higher order' activity. On the other hand, Hintikka's approach to IF-logic already
uses the ( existential) second order truth conditions as primitive, rather than the
games. From that perspective a move to a bigger fragment of second order logic
is not that big a step. Meta-logically, it would however mean a loss of some nice
properties that IF-logic borrowed from Ei.
3.7 Ei-pairs corresponding with IF-sentences
In [CK99~, the following question is posed:
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Is it true that for each pair of disjoint Ei-classes Kl, KZ of structures
of the same type there is an IF-sentence cp such that Kl - ~1~1~ and
K2 - ~1~t f? In such case part (b) [of Theorem 5.1 in their paper]
would give a quick proof of Craig's interpolation theorem. ([CK99,
30], translated into our notation)
In a recent note of J. Burgess, [Bur03], about this question in logic with Henkin
quantifiers, the issue is attacked in the reverse direction. Using Interpolation for
Ei, more specifically: the fact that for any incompatible pair of Ei-sentences ~, ~
(i.e. .M ól n .Mól - 0), there is a first order sentence B such that .M ól C ~1~isa1
and .Mól C(.MeOl)~, Burgess proves that for any pair of incompatible Henkin
sentences (~o,~l), there is a Henkin sentence 6 such that 9 is (truth-)equivalent
with ~o and ~6 is (truth-)equivalent with ~1. In order to prove this, he needs a
restriction similar to our restriction to the class of IF-safe models:
"To avoid trivialities, in the logic of first-order sentences it is conven-
tional to exclude models with an empty domain, while in the logic
of Henkin sentences it will be convenient to exclude models with a
one-element domain as well." ([Bur03, p. 2])
Note that under this restriction, the formula Bo :- dx~y~~[x - y] is never (i.e. in
no IF-safe model) true, nor false. So: .MBo - ~1~1 fo - 0
We can easily translate the result for Henkin sentences into the following the-
orem about pairs of E1-sentences and IF-logic:
Theorem 3.7.1 Let ~ and ~ be incompatible EÍ-sentences. Then there is au
IF-sentence B such that ~ is a truth condition for 9, and ~Y is a falsity condition
for 9.
Proof.. We use the IF-sentence Bo :- b'x~y~y[x - y].
First, consider the simple case where Nl ól - f~ (~ is an inconsistent Ei-
sentence). Applying Corollary 3.2.8 to ~, we find an IF-sentence ~p such that




- ,Mf (~ .Mfo - .Mf (Ï Y~ - v - JVlsol
In the general case, we can find IF-sentences cp', ~' such that .M~ -.M al and
JVIi -~1 ól. We now form ~p :- cp' V 9o and zv :- ~' V Bo. Then: ,M~ - ~1~1g 1,
JVIi -.M ól, and .Mf -~1f- 0. By Craig's theorem for Ei, because ~ and ~
are incompatible, there is a first order sentence X such that .Mi - ~1~1 ól C,Mi
and J1~lt -,M ól C(~1.(t )~ - ~1.1 f(X is first order). Now take B :- cp n(~~ V X),
and we will have the following, to complete the proof:
.Me - J~lt fl (JVit ~ U J~lt ) - JVit Íl (.Mf U .l~lt ) - J:~1~ (~ .IVIt - JVl ol
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.1~~ - .IVip l1 (.IVif ~ (1 J~f) - ~it (1 J:~f - ~ol
4
We can conclude that the ( strong) expressive power of IF-sentences consists of
all pairs of incompatible Ei-sentences.
As Burgess stresses in [Bur03, 3], contrary negation on Henkin sentences (for
which we can read game-theoretic negation on IF-sentences) "does not correspond
to the semantic operation of complementation on classes of models, but further
it does not correspond to any semantic operation at all." The theorem above
shows that there can be many different IF-sentences that are truth equivalent, but
pairwise not strongly equivalent. In fact, there are as many of these sentences as
there are Ei-definable classes of models disjoint with the (one) class of models in
which they are all true.
To illustrate this, for every n E 1`Y, let ~n be a first order formula expressing
that the domain contains at least n elements (for example, we can take ~i3 -
~x1~x2~x3[xl ~ x2 n x2 ~ x3 n x3 ~ xl]), and let cp be an IF-formula that is
true in infinite models only (e.g. the formula cp on page 38 of this thesis). Define
cpn :- ~p n?lin. Then for every n, Nli"- Nt~ ( i.e. the class of all infinite models),
while for all m with n G m: JVl f" ~ Nlfm(i.e. the classes of models with less
than n and m elements respectively).
3.8 Reflections on game-theoretic negation
In the last sections, we have focused on falsity aspects of IF-sentences, a topic
closely related to the subject of game-theoretic negation (as witnessed by lemma
3.5.1). In this section we make some remarks on the nature of game-theoretic
negation. In these remarks, we want to apply negation at non-atomic level, so we
have to formulate the remarks for IFS-logic.
The definition of game-theoretic negation as role exchange, makes the formula
~p V~cp a statement expressing the determinacy of the games G~(cp). We know
that games for IFS-sentences cp are in general not determined, so cpV ~cp, the `law'
of the excluded middle, is not a logical law for IFS-logic.
This reminds us, of course, of negation in intuitionistic logic, which is also too
strong to make the law of the excluded middle hold. We would like to point out
that this eye-catching shared property does not automatically make IFS-logic and
intuitionistic logic related. In this respect, we make three remarks.
First, as easily as we see a shared property of the negations in the two logics,
we can also find a significant difference. In intuitionistic logic, the law of the
excluded middle can be seen to be equivalent to the cancellation of double negation
(~~A -~ A), and conversely. In IFS-logic however, ~~cp is clearly equivalent to cp,
by the fact that a double role exchange ( "turning the game board around twice in
a row" ) has no significant effect to the semantic game. Another inference scheme
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that distinguishes them, is the part `~b'~~i ~~x~~i' of De Morgan's laws, which
does not hold intuitionistically.
Another important difference is that at the atomic level, game-theoretic nega-
tion is equal to classical negation: the winner of the game is determined by a
purely classical evaluation of the atomic formula in the given model. This gives
every run of a game a winner. In intuitionistic logic, it is possible that we do not
have a proof for an atomic proposition, nor a proof that there can be no proof:
atomic formulas may be undetermined.
Furthermore, game-theoretic negation can be seen to coincide with classical
negation not only at the atomic level, but on all unslashed formulas: for all classical




Zl ~ ~~p ~ ~l ~ [-t ~~p
This follows from the axiom of choice, because this makes first order sentences
(interpreted classically) equivalent to their Skolemizations (as in Theorem 3.2.2),
which are the truth conditions of these sentences in GTS. In the game-theoretic
definition of truth, the axiom of choice is incorporated ( [Hin96, 40]).
We see game-theoretic negation and its behavior in GTS for IFS-logic, as an
extension of classical negation rather than related to intuitionistic negation. The
truth value gap introduced by the extension of the game-theoretic negation beyond
first order logic is in some sense unavoidable: truth and falsity conditions are
incompatible and both Ei, while Ei is not closed under classical negation (in
other words: the collection of EÍ-definable classes of models is not closed under
complements). However, if we would like to regard game-theoretic negation as
an extension of the oPeration that classical negation defines on the first order
definable classes of models to the Ei-definable classes, we have to realize that the
game-theoretic negation does not correspond to any operation at all, as shown by
the result of Burgess (our theorem 3.7.1).
3.9 Skolem functions and strategies
In this chapter, we have followed Hintikka's approach, identifying strategies in
semantic games with series of Skolem functions. These functions were obtained for
IF-sentences by generalizing the Skolemization procedure for first order logic. In
the original procedure, as we noted with respect to Theorem 3.2.1, the order of the
Skolemization steps determined whether existentially quantified variables would
occur as arguments of the Skolem functions. However, any chosen order gives
an equisatisfiable result, and the existential second order closures are equivalent.
The outside-in order, corresponding with universally quantified variables only as
arguments, gives the least complex Skolemization, so this is how the procedure is
usually applied.
For the interpretation of Henkin quantifiers (cf. section 1.4), the arguments of
the Skolem functions are naturally taken to be universally quantified variables as
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well: the Henkin-sentence
C b'x ~y ~ R(x, y, z, u)dz ~u
is interpreted through its Skolemization:
~f ~gdxdzR(x, .f (x), z, 9(z)) (3.7)
This is also Hintikka's intended truth condition for the (linear) IF-version, of the
Henkin sentence above:
dx`dz~y~Z~u~yR(x, y, z, u). (3.8)
But this linear notation makes one existential quantification (~u) fall in the scope
of the other (~y), while the 2-dimensional notation of the Henkin quantifier makes
clear that neither of the two existential quantifications is in the scope of the other.
If we would base the Skolemization procedure for IF-sentences on `inside-out'
Skolemization for first order logic, we would get
~f~gdxb'zR(x, f(x), z, 9(z, f(x))) (3.9)
as truth condition for the IF-sentence (3.8).
The linear IF-sentence (3.8) gives the order of the moves in the semantic game.
When Eloïse chooses a value for u, values for x, z, and y have already been chosen.
The slash operator forbids her to use the value x, so one would expect her to base
her choice on the values of both z and y (while y was chosen as a function of the
value of x: f(x)). This is reflected in the Skolemization (3.9), but not in (3.7),
where the existentially quantified variable y (replaced by f(x)) does not occur as
argument of g. We now wonder: are the two approaches equivalent?
That this is not the case, is demonstrated by the example proposed by Hodges
( [Hod97a, p. 548] ):
dx~z~y~x[x - y] (3.10)
Note that this formula is not expressible with Henkin quantifiers: the dependency
of the quantifications in Henkin quantifiers forms a partial order, hence is transi-
tive. In (3.10), we see that dependence of quantifications in IF-sentences may be
non-transitive: y depends on z, z depends on x, but y may not depend on x.
Even though z does not occur in the atomic part of this IF-sentence, the
move for Eloïse that corresponds to ~z in the semantic game is everything but
inessential. Without the `empty' quantification over z, in games for the IF-sentence
`dx~y~x [x - y], it is easy to see that Eloïse has no winning strategy in models
containing more than one element. But with the additional move corresponding
to the quantification ~z, Eloïse gets the possibility to signal information that later
is supposed to be hidden for her, which gives her a winning strategy in all models:
she can choose the value for z equal to the value assigned to x, and then choose
the value for y equal to the value assigned to z. This is reflected in the `inside-out'
truth condition for (3.10):
~f~gb'x[x - .f (9(x))]
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and not in the truth-condition we get from the `standard' Skolemization procedure
of definition 3.2.3 (where f comes out as Skolem constant, i.e. a 0-ary Skolem
function):
~f~gb'x[x - f ]
Hintikka intended to generalize the usual Skolemization procedure for first or-
der logic (or stay as close as possible to the theory of Henkin quantifiers), as
reflected by what we called `Hintikka's approach' 3.2.5. He ensures this by intro-
ducing a convention:
"At this point, it is in order to look back at the precise way the in-
formation sets of different moves are determined in semantic games
with IF-sentences. The small extra specification that is needed, ís that
moves connected with existential quantifiers are always independent
of earlier moves with existential quantifiers. [. ..] The reason for this
provision is that otherwise `forbidden' dependencies of existential quan-
tifiers on universal quantifiers could be created through the mediation
of intervening existential quantifiers." ([Hin96, p. 63] )
(The quote does not mention explicitly that moves connected with disjv,nction are
always independent of earlier moves with existential quantifiers, but we take that
this is the case as well.) In [Jan02] this `specification' is referred to as the slashing
convention, and we will adopt this term for it.
In [Hod97a] and [CK99], we find alternative semantics for (more general) IF-
languages, without this convention. The strategy functions in these semantics can
be seen to correspond with inside-out Skoleinization, as they use all previously
quantified variables as arguments for the functions.
On sentences such as Hodges' formula (3.10), these semantics therefore dif-
fer from the evaluation under Hintikka's approach. We note that semantics cor-
responding to inside-out Skolemization, also give us the means to characterize
Dedekind infinity in a more compact way (with less quantifiers than in exam-
ples 3.2.9 and 3.5.3): the IF-sentence
~vb'x~y3z~x[x - z n y~ u] ([CK99, example 1.4])
gets, by inside-out Skolemization, the truth condition:
~kSg~fdx[x - f(k, 9(k, x)) ~ g(k, x) ~ k)
This Ei-sentence expresses that there is a function gk - g(k, ...) that is injective
(because it has a left-inverse fk - f(k, ...)), and non-surjective (because k is
outside the range of gk).
Dropping the slashing convention (or in terms of Skolemization, switching from
outside-in to inside-out Skolemization) still delivers Ei-truth conditions. The ex-
pressive power ofIF-logic as a whole therefore does not depend on the order chosen
(see also [CK99, theorems 4.2 and 4.3]).
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In order to make the slashing convention less counterintuitive, we may think
of the players as being two teams, with each team consisting of as many players
as there are positive (resp. negative) quantifiers and connectives in the formula.
Each player then plays according to one function. They may communicate before
the start of the game, to coordinate the choice of functions (whose arguments are
exclusively choices of the opponent), but during the game, they no longer interact.
This makes it easier to understand how for example the first order formula
~x~y[x - y] (3.11)
can still be true in all (suitable) models, if Eloïse is supposed to have forgotten
the value she chose for x when she has to choose the matching value for y. (This
formula is one of the examples of [Jan02] to show how IF-logic sometimes conflicts
with intuitions on independence.) In this coordination game, the two players of
team Eloïse have to play constants, as there are no choices of the opponent in this
game. But in a coordination phase before the start of the game, we can imagine
them deciding to pick the same constant.
An interesting elaboration of this team-interpretation in game-theoretic terms,
using the concept of weak dominance, is suggested in [Sev04].
Avoiding the slashing convention does not rid us of the problem of understand-
ing game-theoretically how the formula (3.11) can be true. In the more general
languages of [CK99] and [Hod97a], where any set of variables may occur under
the slash (not only those whose values were chosen by the opponent), without the
slashing convention, we can express a formula with the same `meaning' by adding
an explicit indendence to the second existential quantifier:
~x~y~~[x - y]
This formula then has the same truth condition: ~ f~g[f- g], hence is true in
all models. A standard game-theoretic analysis using information sets to model
the imperfect information, will also make this formula true in all models, as we
will see in the next chapter. Our struggle to understand it, may be explained by
the fact that the semantic games for these formulas are games of imperfect recall,
which are conceptually difficult and are therefore even avoided in most work in
Game Theory. We will come back to this in section 4.7 in the next chapter, where
we formalize the semantic games in so-called extensive form.
In that chapter, we will start working with the more general language GrFC~
which is the language of [CK99]. From then, we use the terms "IF-logic" or
"IF-sentence" to imply that the slashing convention is adopted, while "IFG-logic"
or "IFG-formula" imply that all independences are explicitly written in the for-
mula(s).
3.10 Conclusions
We started this chapter by giving a detailed description of the Skolemization pro-
cedure for first order logic. By prefixing the result with existential quantifications
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over the newly introduced function symbols, the result of the Skolemization pro-
cedure is a E1-sentence, that allows us to `lift' Skolemization from being about
equisatisfiability to eqv,ivalence.
We noted that the steps in the first order procedure can be applied in any order,
giving different but equivalent results. If we apply the procedure `outside-in', the
Skolem functions only have universally quantified variables as argument, if we
apply it `inside-out', they also have existentially quantified variables as arguments.
Hintikka generalizes the outside-in Skolemization procedure to IF-logic, and states
that the result serves as truth condition for the original IF-sentence. We noted that
the generalized Skolemization procedure for IF-logic presupposes a restriction to
IF-safe models, i.e. models with equality and an interpretation for the constant
`0', and containing at least two elements.
We also gave a precise presentation of Hintikka's procedure to translate any
Ei-sentence back into an IF-sentence. The combination of the Skolenuzation pro-
cedure and this translation back, shows that the expressive power of IF-logic equals
that of Ei. The result of the back and forth translation has a specific normal form
(the Skolem normal form mentioned by Hintikka on [Hin96, p. 60]), which does
not contain any slashed disjunctions. This shows that they do not essentially con-
tribute to the expressive power. Fïirthermore, the back and forth translation is not
closed on the first order fragment, which demonstrates that the procedure ignores
the falsity aspects of the original formula.
In general, Hintikka focuses on truth of IF-sentences only, as demonstrated for
example by his use of truth eqa~ivalence rather than strong equivale~ece. However,
falsity of IF-sentences can be seen to be an independent second dimension to the
descriptive power of an IF-sentence. We showed how a falsity condition for an
IF-sentence can be obtained as a truth condition for its negation. In the process,
we had to extend the original IF-language just enough to be able to write the
negation of an IF-sentence into negation normal form. With both truth- and
falsity conditions, IF-sentences are strongly characterized by a PairofEi-sentences.
Translation of a result of [Bur03] for Henkin quantifiers, shows that there is a
correspondence between IF-sentences and incompatible pairs of Ei-sentences.
This demonstrates the curious fact that gaine-theoretic negation does not cor-
respond with any operation on classes of models. F~rthermore, we argued that
game theoretical negation should not be associated with intuitionistic negation too
easily, just because both make the `law' of the excluded middle fail. IF-logic with
GTS incorporates some nonconstructive elements (most notably ~~cp - cp) that
make the game-theoretic negation more classical than intuitionistic.
The implication ~--~ ~ for two Ei-sentences ~, ~ is not Ei in general. There-
fore, a natural notion of implication cp ~~ for IF-sentences cp, ~(expressing that
ifEloïse has a winning strategy in the game for cp, the~, she has one in the game for
zli) is not definable using the connectives V, n and the game-theoretic negation ~.
Adding a sentence-initial contradictory (weak) negation `-' (-~p is true iff cp is not
true) would solve this, but this introduces a connective that cannot be interpreted
on the level of the game rules (only on the level of strategies).
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Skolemization (outside-in) for first order logic, and the Skolemization proce-
dure that constitutes the meaning for Henkin quantifiers, appear to have been Hin-
tikka's inspirations for the semantics for IF-logic rather than the game theoretical
semantics he advocates. However, in some cases, like for Hodges' formula (3.10), a
straightforward game-theoretic analysis gives a different evaluation than the truth
condition obtained by Hintikka's Skolemization procedure. This difference seems
to be caused by the fact that in IF-logic, other than in first order logic or logic with
partially ordered quantification, the dependence relation of the quantifiers can fail
to be transitive. To remove this difference, Hintikka introduces a provision, which
we call the slashing convention, that forces the game-theoretic interpretation to
become the same as the interpretation by the Skolemization procedure.
In the next chapter, we approach IF-logic from the other side: we study game
theoretical semantics from a game-theoretic perspective.
Chapter 4
Game theory as formal
framework
From this chapter, we use the generalization GIFC (from [CK99]) rather than
Hintikka's language GIF, as the generalized language is more natural in the game-
theoretic approach.
In the first part of this chapter, we present the terminology from Game Theory
that is necessary to formalize semantic games as so-called games in extensive form
(of imperfect information). We give a detailed account of how the components
of this representation can be expressed in terms of the parameters of a semantic
game (viz. an IFG-sentence and a suitable model), extending similar formalizations
for IF-propositional logic in [SPO1] and [SP03]. This gives a game-theoretically
supported formalization of the concept of strategy in semantic games. We re-
flect on some characteristics of semantic games. Elaborating on an observation
in [Hod97a], we demonstrate that, in general, independence of connectives instead
of variables is game-theoretically problematic.
In the second, more exploratory part, we use the fact that we have `embedded'
semantic games into game theory: we attempt to apply game theoretical results
and concepts to semantic games. This approach is closely related to ideas presented
in van Benthem's program of exploring and exploiting the interplay between logic
and game theory. We show what types of i~rcperfect recall are present in semantic
games, and we explore to which extent the four Thompson transformations on
games in extensive form, correspond with logical equivalence schemes.
This chapter combines and extends the papers [Dec02] and [Dec04].
4.1 Introduction: using game theory in logic
In chapter 2, game theoretical semantics was defined by the description of semantic
games in terms of their rules, and defining truth in terms of Eloïse having a winning
strategy in such game. But Hintikka's formal arguments use the truth conditions
resulting from the syntactic procedure of Skolemization, which we discussed in
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the previous chapter. The Skolemization procedure in itself bears no reference to
the games and game theory brought in by Game Theoretical Semantics. Indeed,
Hintikka seems to have intended the reference to games to be pre-theoretical rather
than a formal basis for the logic:
"Game theoretical semantics might at first look like a recondite way
of approaching IF first-order logic. In reality, it is little more than an
explication of our own pre-theoretical ideas about quantifiers and truth.
For if you contemplate what Skolem functions are - and even if you do
not contemplate it - obviously their job description is to produce the
very "witness individuals" (usually depending on earlier choices of such
witness individuals) that show the truth of the quantifier sentence in
question. [. ..] One can therefore look upon game-theoretical seinantics
as being little more than an elaboration of our pre-theoretical idea of
truth as applied to quantified sentences." [Hin02a, p. 407]
In his skeptical paper about the helpfulness of logical games in semantics
[HodOla], Hodges asks the question why these are generally considered "to `shed
light' ", or "`help to understand' "(loc. cit., p. 18). We share the general skepti-
cism of this paper about whether existing logics are really clarified by new seman-
tics in terms of games. But in the case of IF-logic, we feel the rceed to understand
the logic in terms of the semantic games of imperfect information that are defined
to form its semantics. Especially because several examples (like Hodges' formula
(3.10), or the other examples in the section Deathtraps of [Hod97a], show us that
an analysis in terms of the games may differ from an analysis by Skolem-functions
(while both are supposed to reflect our pre-theoretical ideas about quantifiers).
In this chapter we will deviate from the treatment of semantic games and
strategies as pre-theoretical background, and study how (or even: if) we can rea-
son about IF-logic if we take game theory as a formal framework. In order to do
so, we model semantic games as games in extensive form.
So, our initial motivation for the modeling of semantic games in a suitable
game theoretical framework, is to find a definition of the concept of strategy for
semantic games as game theorists would give it in their standard framework, in
order to bridge the conceptual gap between the description of semantic games in
terms of their rules, and the concept of strategy as a set of Skolem functions.
While Hintikka seems to avoid using game theoretic concepts or results, the
description of semantic games as extensive games has become more common in
the work on IF-logic by other people, maybe most prominently in that of Johan
van Benthem (early references being (vB00a] and [vB00b]). For IF-propositional
logic, a formalization can be found in the papers [SPO1], where it is also indicated
how to extend this formalization to IF-predicate logic, and [SP03], which paper
studies to which extent the IF-propositional games satisfy some conditions that
are usual in game theory. Extensive semantic games for IF-modal logic are defined
in [~103].
We agree with van Benthem that game-theoretic results and discussions at least
shed an interesting light on logic in general, and the semantic games of imperfect
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information for IF-logic in particular (cf. [vB00a] and [vB05], [vB01], [vB02b],
[vB03], [vB04]). In section 4.7, we show how imperfect recall is omnipresent in
the semantic games, while situations of imperfect recall are traditionally avoided
in game theory because of conceptual difficulties. In section 4.8 we will point out
correspondences between game equivalence (by the so-called Thompson transfor-
mations) and logical equivalence schemes. The transformations indicate how to
deal accurately with imperfect information if we want to generalize equivalence
schemes from propositional or first order logic.
But first, we give the details of the model we will use to formalize semantic
games in game-theoretic terms. In this part of the chapter, we do not assume
familiarity with game-theoretic terminology.
4.2 Games in extensive form
Game theory deals with a very general class of strategic interactions, far more
general than our abstract semantic games. Our games can be characterized as two-
player, non-cooperative, win-loss games of imperfect information. Game theory
has two main ways of representing games: in strategic form and in extensive form.
In a strategic form, an interaction is modeled by the players simultaneously
choosing a strategy. Every player makes just one decision, at the start of the game,
and immediately afterward the outcome is determined. Mathematically, a game
in strategic form is an n-dimensional matrix, where n is the number of players,
with the numbers of columns~rows in each dimension determined by the number
of possible strategies for the corresponding player. The entries in the matrix give
the respective outcomes for the players given the chosen strategies. Probably the
most famous game-theoretic example, the Prisoner's dilemma, is well represented
in this form (we slightly adapt [OR94, Fig. 17.1]):
I`II Confess Don't confess
Confess -3`-3 0`-4
Don't confess -4`0 -1`-1
(It represents two suspects (I,II) in one crime, who are interrogated separately.
They can both either confess and cooperate, or deny and deflect. But their sentence
depends on the combination of both player's choices. The number of years of
imprisonment they get in all cases are indicated as negative numbers in the matrix.
Analysis of this game in terms of Nash equiliória learns that the optimal choice
for both players to make is to confess.)
In a sense, all games in strategic form are of imperfect information, because the
players decide simultaneously, hence without knowing the other players' choices.
(This makes the study of repeated games especially interesting for games in strate-
gic form: repetition allows for reasoning on the other players' expected behavior.)
The e~tensive form represents games as a tree structure with parameters, which
allows for a more dynamic view of the game and distinctions between perfect and
imperfect information, and perfect and imperfect recall. It corresponds most di-
rectly to Hintikka's definition of the semantic games in terms of their rules, and
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gives us a formalization of the concept of strategy. We give an introduction to
the more general extensive game representation (section 4.2). In section 4.3, we
define a generalization of the IF-language, and give a thorough formalization of the
corresponding semantic games. In sections 4.5-4.6 we collect several reflections on
relations between the game structures and the syntax of IF-logic.
We first give the definition of a general inathematical model for games in ex-
tensive form, based on [OR94, pp. 200-203], which in its turn goes back to the
model introduced by [Kuh53] as a reformulation of the model by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern ([NM47]). In the light of the intended application, viz. modeling
of the semantic games of GTS, we leave out the so-called chance moves that are
included in the original model. Like [OR94], we impose the consistency condition
on our informations sets, rather than employing an alternative partition as in the
original model of [Kuh53]. Also, we choose to model the outcomes by a function
(like in [vD91]) rather than by a preference relation ( like in [OR94] and [Kuh53]),
because a payoff function can be easily simplified for the representation of win-loss
games like our semantic games.
In the definition of the model, we use the following notations for sequences:
Notation 4.2.1 (finite sequences) For any set A(`the alphabet'), let A' -
U,~E~ An be the set of finite sequences of elements of A. Fora- (al, ..., ak) E A`and a E A, we use the following notations:
~ len(a):- k;
. for m C len(a): a~m :- (al, ..., a~,);
' a'a:-(ai,.-.,ak,a);
. a E a:- there exists j C len(a) with a- a~.
Finally, () denotes the empty sequence.
Definition 4.2.2 (games in extensive form) A game of imperfect informa-
tion in extensive form (without chance moves) is defined to be a 5-tuple I' -
(H, N, P, U, r), where
. H is a set of ftnite sequences that satisfies the following conditions:
-() is a member of H;
- H is prefix closed: if a E H and m C len(a), then a~m E H.
These conditions makes it possible to regard the set H as a tree structure,
with () as root. Notation: A :- ~JhEx{a~a E h} (thus: H C A"). Define
for h E H: A(h) :- {a E A~h . a E H}. Let Z:- {h E H~A(h) - 0}, and
D:-H`Z.
The elements of H will be called histories; the elements of Z are the termi-
nal histories, and the elements of D the non-terminal histories or decision
points. A terminal history is called a play (cf. see (Kuh53~). A(h) is the
set of actions from h.
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. N-{pl, ..., pn} is a non-empty, finite set of players. We let n-~N E I~Y
be the number of players. N is often identified with the set {1, ..., n}.
. P: D--~ N. Notation: for i E N we write Di :- P-1({i}).
P is the player function: it determines for each decision point whose turn
it is. Di ís the set of decision points in which it is player i's turn. The sets
D2 form a partition of D. Note that one or more of the Di might be empty.
. U - ~JiEN Ut, where for every i E N, U1 ís a partition of Di,
such that for
all u E Uti the so-called consistency condition is satisfied: if h, h' E u then
A(h) - A(h').
U is called the information partition, and the elements of U are called
information sets; A[u] is the set of actions from information set u. Due
to the consistency condition, A[u] can be defined as A(h) for some arbitrary
h E u.
. r: Z-j IE~N is the payoff function, giving for all plays of the game the
respective payoff for each player.
A two-player game is called strictly competitive or zero-sum if for each
h E Z: r(h)(1) --r(h)(2). In that case the payoff function could be sim-
plifzed into a function r' : Z-~ I[8, specifying at each h E Z the outcome for
player 1. A two-player game is called a win-loss game if it is strictly com-
petitive and after each play, the payoff for the winning player is the same:
~r'(h)~ - c for some c E][~ and all h E Z. In that case the payof,j" function
may be modeled as an `outcome function' r" : Z--~ N assigning a winner to
each play.
The information partition U makes this a model for imperfect information
games: the intended interpretation of an information set u in U2 is that, if the
actual history h. is in the information set u, then player i knows she is in one of the
positions in u, but she is not able to determine in which one. (Perfect information
games are characterized by the property that all information sets are singletons.)
When player i chooses an action in the actual situation h, she therefore has to
choose one action from A(h) - A[u] for all histories in u at the same time. This
is reflected in the definition of strategy:
Definition 4.2.3 A (pure) strategy for player i in the game I' is a function
F2 : Ua --~ A s.t. for every u E Ui : Fi(u) E A[u].
The addition of the adjective pure is to contrast this notion of strategy with the
notion of mixed strategy, in which a player may include e.g. the toss of a coin to
choose one of two possible actions: in mixed strategies a player puts a probability
distribution over the set of her pure strategies ([OR94, definition 212.1]). But
because mixed strategies play no role in our discussion, we refer to pure strategies
simply as `strategies'.
Note that a strategy always prescribes an action for all information sets as-
signed to the player concerned, even if an action taken at one information set
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Figure 4.1: Visualization of a game in extensive form
prevents the player from ever reaching some other one. We illustrate these notions
with an example:
Example 4.2.4: (a game in extensive form) Figure 4.1 gives the tree repre-
sentation of the game I' modeled by the following tuple (H, N, P, U, r):
. The set of actions A can be read along the branches of the tree:
A-{a, b, s, t, p, q, r}.
The set of histories H- D U Z is the union of the set of non-terminal
sequences in the tree (the decision points)
D - {O, (a), (b), (b, s), (b, t)},
and the set of terminal histories (the plays)
Z-{(a, p), ( a, q), ( a, r), ( b, s,p), (b, s, q), (b, t, p), (b, t, q)}.
. N - {I, II}
. P: D~ N assigns the decision point (b) to player II, and the other decision
points to player I. So, DII -{(b)} and DI - D- DI~.
~ U- UI U UII, where UI partitions D~ into the information sets {()}, {(a)},
and {(b, s), (b, t)}. Note that the consistency condition holds for the non-
singleton element of the partition: A[{(b, s), (b, t)}] - A((b, s)) - A((b, t)) -
{p, q}. Because DII is a singleton, Uli has automatically just one element:
DII(- {(b)}) itself.
. the payoff function r: Z-r ]EFN is depicted at the bottom of figure 4.1;
it determines for example that player I loses 2 after the plays (b, s, p) and
(b, t, q), but gains 2 after (b, s, q) and (b, t, p). We see that this game is not
zero-sum: not for all plays h E Z do we have r(h)(I) ~- r(h)(II) - 0.
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A strategy for player I is a function F: UI -~ A, so for example: the function F
that assigns the action a to the information set {O } at the root of the tree, P to
the information set {(a)}, and q to the information set {(b, s), (b, t)}. Playing this
strategy gives player I a payoff of 1, regardless of player II's actions.
In fact, the choice for action a in the first move prevents 77 from getting to
make a move at all, and also guarantees that the information set {(b, s), (b, t)}
for player I is not reached. So, the action prescribed by F in {(b, s), (b, t)} is
irrelevant. However, as noted above, this `irrelevant' action may not be omitted:
a strategy for a player assigns an action to all information sets of that player. A
reason to adhere to this, is that it allows us to speak about "the strategy F' that
differs from F only in its assignment of action b to {() }" . If F would not assign an
action to the information set {(b, s), (b, t)}, F' would not define a full prescription
for player I how to play this game.
It is not hard to verify that F is an optimal strategy, in the sense that it
gives player I the highest guaranteed payoff: if she would have played b in the
first information set, player I can not ensure that she gets the higher payoff of
2. Because she cannot distinguish between the histories (b, s) and (b, t), both the
action P and the action q (prescribed by F) leave the possibility open for the lowest
payoff (viz. -2). o
We have now introduced the general model of games in extensive form. In
section 4.4, we will specify semantic games in terms of this standard game model.
But first, we take the opportunity to switch to a more general, symmetric language,
which we will call GIFG.
4.3 The generalized language GIFc
FYom now on, we will use a generalization GIFG of the languages GIF as it was
defined by Hintikka (cf. definition 2.5.1), and also of its symmetric variant G~FS,
which we used in the previous chapter (cf. definition 3.4.2). We will introduce this
language and some useful syntactic notions first.
We will model the semantic gaanes for the language GIFC (defined as L;; in
[CK99]; the subscript `ii' stands for imPerfect informatio~n). This language is a
natural generalization of the language of IF-logic as defined in e.g. [Hin96], and
a sublanguage of the language presented by [Hod97a], as it lacks the indexed
connectives (i.e. formulas of the form niEl ~i).
We explain how the IFG-language is more general than the IF-language. First,
the IFG-language does not presuppose negation normal form (as the IF-language
did). While this does not make the IFG-language more general than the IFS-
language yet, the following does: the IFG-language does not contain only sen-
tences, like both GIF and GIFS. In IFG-formulas variables may occur freely (pos-
sibly under slashes). This will be important in the next two chapters. Finally: the
IFG-language allows arbitrary sets of variables under the slashes, not just variables
whose values `were chosen by the opponent', as in IF- and IFS-sentences.
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Definition 4.3.1 (The language GIFC) Given a first order signature Q, the
terms and atomic formulas of the language GÍF~ with equality are defined as in
first order logic. The set of formulas of GÍFC is defined as the least L such that
. each atomic formula of GIFG belongs to L;
. ifcpELthen~cpEF
. if cp E L and Y is a finite list of distinct variables not containing x, then
~x~Ycp E L
. if cp, ~ E L and Y is a finite list of distinct variables, then cp V~Y ~i E L.
b'x~Ycp will be an abbreviation for ~~x~Y~cp and cp n~Y ~ will be an abbreviation
for ~(~cp V~Y ~~i). If Y- 0, we omit the slash and write ~xz~, b'xz~, cp V z~, cp n zli.
We say that cp is an IFG-formula if cp E GÍFG for some first order signature Q. As
usual, the first order signatures Q will play imPlicit in the yhrase suitable model.
The following conventions, notations and definitions in this section, are all de-
fined in terms of the unabbreviated versions of the formulas in GIFG: the formulas
contain no universal quantifiers or conjunctions (these are assumed to be written
out in terms of negations and existential quantifiers or disjunctions respectively).
This saves us otherwise recurring case distinctions: between existential and univer-
sal quantifiers, and between disjunctions and conjunctions. This choice is justified
semantically by the interpretation of the negation sign as role exchange on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, the fact that universal and existential quantifica-
tion (and conjunction and disjunction) correspond to the same type of move in the
semantic game. If we use the negation sign to determine the player assignment,
there is no need for two quantifiers, or two connectives. In our definitions, by
this choice, existential quantification and disjunction indicate the (two) types of
moves, while negation has a monopoly on determining the player distribution.
Usually in the literature (as in the IF-language), the opposite choice is made:
both quantifiers and both connectives are used, while the negation signs occur
only on atomic level (in other words, the formulas are taken to be in negation nor-
mal form). Our later examples will also be chosen to be abbreviated, and thereby
preferably in negation normal form, because this improves their readability, and
makes comparison with classical logic more direct.
Semantic games of imperfect information are defined for IFG-sentences in a
given suitable model. To express the components of the game model in terms of
these parameters, we use the following sets and notions. We will also use these
definitions in the next two chapters, when we define semantics for oPen IFG-
formulas as well, so we give most definitions for arbitrary formulas ~.
Definition 4.3.2 (subformulas) The set of subformulas Sub(cp) of an IFG-for-
mula cp is the smallest set S that satisfies:
~ cpES
4.3 THE GENERALIZED LANGUAGE .CIFG 57
. if~~ES, then~c~iES
. if z~il V~y~2 E S, then ~1,z~2 E S
. if ~x~y~ E S, then ~c~i E S.
Additional remark: This results in a set of formulas, which would mean that
every element occurs only once (a set {e, e} is the same set as {e}). In the logical
language, syntactically identical subformulas can occur more than once in one
formula, but by their position in the formula, they may have different roles, e.g.
like ~ in the formula zli V~~. We must therefore treat syntactically identical
subformulas that occur more than once in cp as different subformulas, hence as
different elements of Sub(cp). For example, Sub(~iV --~~) must contain the left and
the right occurrences of z~ (and its subformulas) as distinct elements, for in the
semantic games, the two different occurrences obviously define different subgames
(in this case, they di,fj"er by reversal of the player assignment and designation of
the winner at the atomic formulas).
We choose not to give a formal procedure to make the distinction between the
syntactically identical formulas, but one could imagine that at connectives, we
label the left conjunct~disjunct with `I' and the right one with `r', and let their
subformulas inherit these labels. These labels are not part of the syntax of the
subformulas, but enable us to distinguish the difj`erent occurrences.
Notation 4.3.3 (stripping initial negation signs) For every IFG-formula ~,
we use the notation ~~~ to indicate the formula resulting from stripping all initial
negation signs from ~. We will frequently use the set of non-negated subformulas
of cp: S(cp) :- {~~(il~z(i E Sub(cp)}.
This notation is particularly useful, because in the definition of the components,
we will use the unabbreviated versions of the formulas. This means that every
change of turn corresponds to a negation sign in the formula, hence the formula
may contain quite a number of negations.
Definition 4.3.4 (free and bound variables) If ~ is an IFG-formula, the set
of free variables Fv(zG) and the set of bound variables Bv(~) are defïned inductively
as usual (see ~.1.6), except for the following cases:
(V) Fv(~1 V~y~2) :- Fv(~1) UYU Fv(~2)
Bv(~1 V~Y~2) .- Bv(~I) U Bv(~2)
(~) Fv(~x~y~) :- (Fv(~) `{x}) UY
Bv(~x~yz~) :- Bv(~i) U {x}
Note that Fv(zj~) includes the free variables in the sets Y under the slashes at
quantifications and connectives in ~. Furthermore, note that one variable may
occur both free and bound in the same formula, like x in the following (unslashed)
example: (x - y) V(dx(P(x, y)]). In this chapter, we assume that in the IFG-
sentences we work with, no nested quantification over the same variable
occurs (thereby implying that in the subformulas of the sentences no variables
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occur both free and bound at the same time). Why we need this restriction, which
we will call regularity, is demonstrated in the examples in chapter 6(cf. the intro-
duction to the chapter, section 6.1).
The following notations will be useful in expressing the components of the
game model for a semantic game for cp in terms of the formula. We will let the
histories of the general model (definition 4.2.2) correspond to pairs consisting of a
subformula and a valuation: an assignment of values to a(finite) set of variables.
This set of variables -the domain of the valuation- consists of the variables that
are quantified higher up on the branch of z~ in the syntactic tree of the sentence
Definition 4.3.5 (relative domain) Let cp be an IFG-sentence, and let z(i E
Sub(cp). Then the relative domain X~ of ~ in cp is the set of variables that
have scope over z~ in cp. Formally, by outside-in induction, for all z~ E Sub(cp):
~ X" :- 0 .w ~
. if ~ - ~zv', then X~ :- X,~ ;
~ if ~- B V~Y x, then Xé :- X,~ and XX :- X~ ;
. if ~-~x~yi(~', then X~ :- X~ U{x}.
It may be clarifying to note that the set of variables X,~ includes the set of free
variables of ~ (Fv(z~i) C X~ ), but the two sets are not necessarily equal. This
depends on the context provided by the sentence cp for zv. For example, if ~ is the
subformula 3y~x[x - yJ of Hodges' example
cP :- b'x~z~y~2[x - y~,
then Fv(~) -{x}, while X,~ -{x, z}. X,~ gives the set of all variables to which
a value has been assigned during a semantic game for cp.
With this (relative) domain, we define for each subformula of an IFG-sentence
~p, the corresponding set of valuations:
Definition 4.3.6 (valuations for subformulas) Let c~ be an IFG-sentence, ~l
-(A, ..,) a suitable model for ~ with Dom(21) - A, and let ~ E S(cp). Then
V~ :- A(X~ i is defined as the set of all valuations v: X,y --~ A.
Let V`~ :- U,~ES(~v) V~G '
To define the player distribution and the outcome function, we will use the
notion of polarity of subformulas of (unabbreviated!) IFG-sentences:
Definition 4.3.7 (polarity of subformulas) Let cp be an IFG-formula. A sub-
formula zr~ E S(cp) is positive in cp if it occurs under the scope of an even number
of negation signs, and dually, it will be negative in c~ if it occurs under the scope
of an odd numbers of negations.
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4.4 Modeling semantic games in extensive form
In section 2.4, the semantic games for (IF-)first order sentences were described
in terms of the game r~iles, as is done in [Hin96]. Even though this description
makes it intuitively clear how the plays of such games go, it does not define in
mathematical terms what kind of object a strategy is. Using the description of the
semantic games in terms of their rules, we will formalize them in the mathematical
model of the previous section. Similar formalizations of semantic games have been
presented in [SPO1] and [SP03], with a focus on an IF-propositional language.
Using the language and the syntactic notations of the previous section, we
define for a given IFG-sentence cp and a suitable model 2[ -(A, ...) the extensive
game representation I'(2l, cp) -(H, N, P, r, U) of the semantic game G~ (cp). To
clarify our terminology, we will illustrate the construction of the model with a
concrete example:
Example 4.4.1: (A semantic game modeled in extensive form) We study
the semantic game in a model 2l with domain {0, 1}, for the IFG-sentence
b'x[~y~~(x - y) U ~y~x(x - y)]~
hence, in the unabbreviated version:
cp :- ~~x~[~2J~x(x - zJ) ~l ~~J~x(x - 2J)]~
The semantic game G~ (cp) is played as follows: first, Abélard (A) chooses a value
from {0, 1} as assignment for x. Then Eloïse (E) may choose whether she continues
on the left or on the right disjunct. In both cases, it is then her turn again, and
in both cases she may then choose an assignment from {0,1} for y. When she
does so, she does not know which assignment Abélard chose for x(as indicated
by the ~x at the two quantifications ~y~x). In all cases, the game ends after that,
with the evaluation of one of the atomic formulas (x - y) with respect to some
valuation of x and y in {0,1}: Eloïse wins if the assignments to x and y are the
same, otherwise Abélard wins. The semantic game is visualized as a game tree in
figure 4.2.
We name the elements of S(cp) (i.e. the non-negated subformulas, different
occurrences distinguished) as follows:
~- ~~P~ - ~x~[~y~~(x - y) V ~y~x(x - y)]
.- ~y~x(x - y) V ~y~x(x - y)
.- ~y~x(x - y) (left coPY)
.- ~y~x(x - y) (right coPY)
.- (x - y) (left copy)
.- (x - y) (right copy)
The syntactic tree of cp is pictured in figure 4.3. Some components of the game
model I'(tiZl, cp) are illustrated in figure 4.4. The construction of the components is
explained in the course of this section. o
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Figure 4.3: Syntactic tree of the formula (cf. example 4.4.1)
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The set of histories H
The histories in a game are the possible sequences of moves from the start of
the game. These sequences of moves bring us either in a position where the
game prescribes one of the players to make a next move (a decision point), or
to a position in which none of the players can make a move and the outcome
determined (a terminal history, play).
In the semantic games, there are two types of moves: choice of a domain element
(at a quantifier), and choice of one out of two subformulas (at a connective). The
sequences of moves will therefore be sequences of elements from the set (of actions)
Dom(~l) U{1, r}. Which moves occur, and in which order, is determined by the
syntax of the sentence cp. The set of histories is most easily defined by first defining
for every zv E S(cp) a set of finite sequences H~,. Note that we do this by induction
on the structure of ~p -from outside to inside- in a way that keeps us within S(cp):
the induction `skips' the negation signs. It terminates at the atomic formulas.
. HI~I :- f O};
. Let ~ E S(cp) and suppose H~ already defined. There are three cases that
can be distinguished:
1. if ~ is atomic, induction stops;
2. if ~ is of the form z~l V~YZ~2, then HI~,~ :- {h.I~h E H~} and HI,~,21 ~-
{h . r~h E H~}.
3. if ~ is of the form ~x~y~', then HI~~I :- {h . a~a E Dom(~l), h E H,~};
Let H :- ~J,~ES~~,i H,~, then H is the set of histories for the 5-tuple I'(~l, cp)
modeling the semantic game G~(cp). If h E H~„ we say that h leads to the sub-
formula z~. For h E H, we write zlih for the unique ~ E S(cp) such that h E H,~,.
Let D and Z be defined as the sets of non-terminal and terminal histories
respectively ( cf. the general case in section 4.2). We see that the set of actions is
A- Dom(~1) U{1, r}, and for every h E D: either A(h) - Dom(21) (if z[ih prompts
a choice for a quantifier) or A(h) -{I, r} (if z~h prompts a choice for a connective).
Note that S(cp) -{z~h~h E H}. If we define SD :- {z~ih~h E D} and SZ :-
{zvh~h E Z}, then SZ is the set of atomic formulas in cp, and SD is the set of
non-negated, non-atomic subformulas of cp.
Every history h E H defines a valuation vh E V~h for the formula ~h:
. vii :- ~;
. if vh has been defined and ~ih -~1 V~Y~i2i then vh.I - vh.,. :- vh;
. if vh has been defined and ~ih - 3x~yc~', then for every a E Dom(~l):
vh U {(x,a)}.
71h.a :-
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~~1, ~)) ~~r, ~))
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
~~~, ~xy: 00)) ~~r, ~xy: 00)) ~~~, (xy: 10)) ~~r, ~xy: 10))
~~~, ~2y: Ol)) ~~r, ~xy: O1)) ~~I, ~2y: 11)) ~~n ~xy: 11))
Figure 4.4: Some histories and information sets as pairs (cf. example 4.4.1)
In fact, the mapping h H(~h, vh) is a one-one correspondence of the set
of histories H with the set {(~i, v)~z~ E S(cp), v E V~ }, consisting of pairs of sub-
formulas and valuations. In correspondence with the definition of semantic games
(definition 2.4.1), we will sometimes call these pairs the positions in the game.
(The duality between histories and positions corresponds to the two dual ways of
representing tree structures: as a prefix-closed set of sequences, or as a specific
type of graph, which is a set of nodes with a certain type of relation on them.)
Example 4.4.1 continued: (See figure 4.4.) The sequence h:- (0,1, 1) is an
example of a(terminal) history in this game. This history corresponds with the
pair (~~, (xy: O1)), consisting of the subformula z~ih - t;~, and the valuation vh -
(xy: O1). -
The set H~, consists of the four histories h' for which z~h~ -~~, viz. (0,1, 0),
(0,1, 1), (1,1, 0), and (1,1, 1). These respectively code the valuations (xy: 00),
(xy: O1), (xy: 10), and (xy: 11).
The set of players N
Semantic games are two-person games by definition, and we chose to call these
players Abélard and Eloïse throughout this thesis (in accordance with a large part
of the literature on logic games; see also Appendix A). Here, we use the symbols A
and E to indicate them: we take the set of players N in the extensive game model
to be {A, E}.
The player function P
We define the player function P by using the concept of polarity for subformulas
in cp (cf. definition 4.3.7).
From the rules of the semantic games, it is easy to observe that all positive,
non-atomic subformulas of cp will prompt a move for Eloïse, while the negative
ones will prompt a move for Abélard in a semantic game for cp. In terms of the
game model, the player function P: D-~ N is determined for each h E D by the
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polarity of ~h E SD in cp:
P(h) - E if ~h is positive
P(h) - A if ~~h is negative
Given a decision point h E D, only the subformula zvh defined by h is relevant
for P, not the valuation vh. In other words: P is constant on each H~, and each
H~ C P-1(i) for either i - A or i- E. In the context of semantic games, it is
natural to say that a certain subformula (in S(cp)) is assigned to a player, rather
than the histories that lead to it. We will frequently use this convention.
Example 4.4.1 continued: (See figure 4.2.) The only negative subformula of cp is
the formula ~, so the (one) history in H~ -{()} is the only decision point assigned
to Abélard in this semantic game. All other decision points h are assigned to
Eloïse, because their corresponding subformulas z~h are positive. We also say that
the subformula l; is assigned to Abélard, and that the other non-atomic subformulas
(X, zlil and ~r) are assigned to Eloïse.
The outcome function r
Because semantic games are win-loss games, we can define r as an outcome
function: r assigns to each terminal history h E Z a winner in N. This outcome
is fixed by the polarity of zlih in cp, and the (classical!) evaluation of ~h in ~l with
respect to the valuation vh:
( r(h) - E if either: zlih is positive and ~l ~ z~h[vh~or: zlih is negative and 2l ~ zlih[vh~r(h) - A in the other cases
Example 4.4.1 continued: (See figures 4.2 and 4.4.) Both atomic formulas ~I
and ~r are positive, and satisfied by the valuations (xy: 00) and (xy: 11), and
not by the other two valuations in V~~ - V~ -{0, 1}{~~y}. This means that the
histories (0,1, 0), (1,1,1), (0, r, 0) and (1, r, 1) are winning for Eloïse, and the other
terminal histories for Abélard.
The information partition U
The information sets in the game model for semantic games are induced by the
slash notation in IF-logic: it is the slash notation that makes semantic games for
IF-formulas into games of imperfect information. Informally, the effect of a slash
at a quantifier or connective in a sentence cp, is that the player making the choice
associated with it, may not use the values chosen for the variables under the slash.
In other words: the player has to make the same choice as in a situation where
other values had been chosen for those variables.
To express this formally, let for ~ E So (i.e. non-atomic z~i E S(cp)), Y,~ be the
-possibly empty- sequence of variables occurring under the slash of the main con-
nective or quantifier of ~. Using this set of variables, we can define an equivalence
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relation on the set of valuations V,~ for zli: if v, v' E V,~ , then
v' ~,~ v~ v'(x) - v(x) for all x E X~ - Y~
In other words: v' ~,p v if and only if v and v' coincide outside the values they
assign to the variables in Y~. This induces an equivalence relation ~U~, on the set
H,~ of histories with z~ih - zli: h~U,~ h' iff vh ~~ vh~.
The information sets in the semantic game for cp are then the equivalence classes
u[h] -{h' E H,~,,~h ~~,, h'} of the equivalence relations ~~,,, or in other words,
of the equivalence relation ~U on D, defined by:
i d ',1 ",1
h NU h~ Y'h' - Whi and TJh, ti~n vh
In words: two non-terminal histories are considered to be indistinguishable for the
player assigned to them, if they lead to the same subformula zli of cp and if the
associated valuations assign the same values to the variables in X,~ - Y~.
It is easy to verify that these information sets satisfy the consistency condition:
for any z(~ E S(cp), the set of actions A(h) is either pom(2l) for all h E H~ (if
~-~x~yi(~'), or {1, r} (if ~i -~1 V~Y z~2). If two histories h, h' E D are in the
same information set, they are in the same H,~, and hence A(h) - A(h').
Of course, if z~i is `not slashed', i.e. if Y~ - 0, then the equivalence classes of
the equivalence relation ~~ are singletons. This means that all histories leading
to ~ are distinguishable. In particular, if cp is a classical first order formula, o,ll
information sets in the game are singletons. Semantic games for classical first
order formulas are hence games of perfect information.
Concluding, we define the information partition U to be the set {u[h]~h E D}
of equivalence classes of ~~. The partition can be divided into partitions UE, UA
of the sets of histories DE, DA assigned to Eloïse and Abélard respectively: Ui :-
{u[h]~h E Dz}. (Note that the Uá are well defined, because for i E {A, E}: if h E D2,
then u[hJ C H,~,, C Di.)
In analogy to the correspondence we had between histories h and pairs (~h, vh),
we could characterize the information sets u[h] by the pairs ( z(~h, vh), where vh is
the restriction of vh to X,~h - Y,~ ( i.e. a valuation to all variables of X~ that do
not occur under the slash of the main quantifier or connective of the subformula
~~h of ~). In order to express this correspondence formally, we define:
Definition 4.4.2 (restricted valuations, cf. definition 4.3.6) For every ~ E
So, we define V~ to 6e set of all valuations v:(X,~ - Y~) ~ Dom(2l). Further-
more, let V`o :- U,~ES~~i ~.
We then have a one-one correspondence of the set U of information sets with the
set: {(~,v)~~ E Sp,v E V~}.
Example 4.4.1 continued: ( See figure 4.4.) The set of histories H,~~ consists of
the two histories ( O,r) and (l,r), which correspond to the pairs (z~,., ( x: 0)) and
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(zV~, (x: 1)) respectively. Because Y~~ -{x}, and the two valuations (x: 0) and
(x: 1) are both the empty valuation outside of their domain X,~~ -{x} - Y,~r,
they are in the same equivalence class of ~~~. So, the set H,~~ is one information
set, which corresponds to the pair (~r, ()).
Of course, similarly, H~, is also one information set, which corresponds to the
pair (z~il, ()). Because Y~ and YX are empty, the other information sets are the
three singletons containing the elements of H~ and Hx.
Strategies and choice functions
We claim that the 5-tuple I'(2l, cp) - (H, N, P, r, U), as defined above, captures
the semantic game G~(cp) as described by the game rules in section 2.4.1, with the
information restrictions as described in section 2.5. The components H, P and
r model the possible plays of the game with their outcomes, and the information
partition U models (some aspects of) the knowledge of the players during the play.
The main focus for semantic games however, lies in the concept of strategy.
We can now define it in terms of the 5-tuple, as in section 4.2. To find out how
game theory models strategies, was the main aim of this modeling exercise.
Following the definition of section 4.2, a strategy for a player i in game I', is
a function Fi assigning to each information set u E U~ an action a E A[u]. For
semantic games, it is natural to regard a strategy Fi for player i as a set of choice
functions f~ : ~-~ A.~, one for each subformula z~i E S(cp) that is assigned
to player i. Here A~ is either pom(2l) or {1, r}, depending on whether zli is a
quantified formula or one joining two formulas by a main connective. Profiting
from the correspondence between U and pairs (~, v) with ~ E SD, v E V~ (see the
previous subsection), the one-function approach and the `set of choice functions'
approach can be seen to be interchangeable:
. If Fi : Ui -~ A is a strategy for player i we can define the corresponding
choice functions f~ : V~ ~ A ( for all ~i assigned to player i) by
f~(v) :- F2(u),
where u is the information set corresponding to the pair (~i, v).
. If { f~~~i E SD, ~ assigned to player i} is a set of choice functions, we can
form the strategy Fi : U1 -~ A by defining for each h E D; :
F~(u[h~) - f~,,(vh)'
In semantic games, it is more natural to think of a strategy as a set of choice
functions rather than as one function. A choice function f~ prescribes a choice for
player i at formula ~i on the basis of the values previously chosen for the variables
in X~, - Y,~.
Returning to the discussion of section 3.9 in the previous chapter, we see that
the choice functions in this game-theoretic formalization correspond to Skolem
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functions as obtained by the inside-out Skolemization procedure. To obtain the
Skolem functions of Hintikka's approach, we would have to make the implicit
independences introduced by the slashing convention explicit. (Cf. the quote
from [Hin96] on page 44 in section 3.9, introducing the slashing convention. Re-
mark that the quote starts with a reference to the game-theoretic notion of in-
formation set, while otherwise Hintikka seems to carefully avoid game-theoretic
terminology. Intentionally so, as we understand from the paragraph we quoted
from [Hin02a], on page 50.) This means that the main quantifiers and connectives
of the positive subformulas ~i of a sentence cp will get extra variables under the
slash (viz. those variables in X~ that are quantified by the main quantifier of an-
other positive subformula).
Example 4.4.1 continued: We give a winning strategy for Eloïse in the game
G~(cp). The `trick' behind it, is that she will use two different choice functions
for the subformulas zG~ and zli,., even though these subformulas are syntactically
identical. In the semantic game, they each define their own subgame, and Eloïse
is of course allowed to choose a different plan to play in the one or the other, and
coordinate this with an earlier decision which of the two subgames to play.
A winning strategy consists of the following choice functions:
~ fx :{0, 1}{x} -~ {1, r} assigns 1 to the valuation ( x: 0), and r to the valuation
(x: 1).
~ f~, :{()} ~{0, 1} assigns 0(to the empty valuation).
~ f,~~ :{O} -~ {0,1} assigns 1(to the empty valuation).
This strategy is winning, because it lets the play end in either the terminal history
(0,1, 0), or the terminal history ( 1, r, l) ( depending on Abélard's initial move).
Both histories are winning for Eloïse, so these three choice functions define a
winning strategy for Eloïse.
Note that Eloïse would not have a winning strategy in the game for the formula
cp' - b'x(Sy~~ (x - y)], in the same 2-element model. This example indicates
that traditional logical laws ( from classical first order logic) may not always be
transferable to our logic `with imperfect information'. The semantic game for a
formula dx[zG] (in a given suitable model 2l) is really different from the game for
`dx[~i V~i] (in the same model): in the second case there are more decision points,
where different actions may be taken ( this is one of the observations in [Jan02];
see also [Jan97][p. 182]).
Note also that Eloïse having a winning strategy here depends on the fact that
the model has two elements. In a model with three elements, she would, with a
similar `trick', have a winning strategy for the formula dx[~il V(~2 V~3)], where for
k- 1, 2, 3: zGk - ~y~~ ( x - y), etc. By `copying' subformulas, we add moves, and
this can well be significant. Adding ( superfluous) moves is one of the topics we
discuss later, when we study the Thompson transformations on extensive games
(section 4.8).
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4.5 Some reflections on the extensive model
Let us now make some observations about the semantic games inspired by their
game-theoretic representation. Throughout this section, we let cp be an IF(G)-
sentence, and 2l a model suitable for cp. With G~(cp) we mean the semantic game
for cp in ~i, and with I'(2l, cp) its game-theoretic representation.
Negation:
In the definition of semantic games in terms of their rules (see section 2.4.1),
negation appears to be a dynamic element in the game: during the game, the roles
of the two players are reversed. But if we compare the syntactic tree of the formula
for which we play the semantic game with the game tree, we see that negation
disappears in the latter. Instead, the `meaning' of the negation signs is completely
absorbed in both the player function and the outcome function (where we used the
polarity of non-negated subformulas, which is in turn completely and exclusively
determined by the occurrence of the negation signs in the sentence).
From a logical perspective, we can observe that double negation cancels
naturally: adding any sequence of negations of even length anywhere in the IFG-
sentence cp, will leave the 5-tuple of I'(~l, cp) as defined in the previous section
unchanged. This means that for example ~~cp cannot be distinguished game-
theoretically from cp.
Hence, the sentence cp and a sentence cp' resulting from adding a sequence of
negations of even length, are (strongly) equivalent in GTS in the sense that for both
players holds: there exists a winning strategy for that player in G~ (cp) iff there
exists a winning strategy for that player in G~(cp'). Even stronger: a winning
strategy for a player in G~(cp) is a winning strategy in G~(cp'), and vice versa.
Because in the IFG-language, dx~Y is an abbreviation of ~~x~Y~ by definition,
this implies that De Morgan's laws hold (e.g. ~dx~i -~~3x~~ -~x~~). They
do so in the strongest possible sense (as we already noted after lemma 3.4.3).
It follows that every sentence cp has a strongly equivalent negation normal form
cp' (using the abbreviations d and n of course). One could say that the negation
normal form of a formula is the form in which the syntax most directly represents
the structure of the game tree.
Characteristic structure of the game tree:
The semantic games for IFG-sentences have a rather specific game tree: at every
decision point, the tree either branches twice, or with the cardinality a of Dom(~l)
(which may be infinitely, even uncountably many times). Nodes in the game tree
that correspond with nodes in the syntactic tree that do not branch, i.e. histories
h that lead to quantified subformulas, branch a times. All subtrees in the game
tree with one of the a histories ( h . a) as root, have the same structure ( as do all
the subtrees defined by the successors (h' - a) of the histories h' with z~h~ -~h).
Nodes in the game tree that correspond to nodes in the syntactic tree that branch
in two, i.e. histories h that lead to connective-subformulas, also branch in two.
The two subtrees that have either ( h - 1) or (h - r) as root, can have a different
structure. However, for all histories h' with ~h~ -~h, the subtrees defined by
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(h' -1) is of the same structure as the one defined by (h -1), and similarly for (h' - r)
and (h - r).
The structure of the game tree for the semantic game G~ (cp) is mostly deter-
mined by the syntax (syntactic tree) of the sentence. The model also influences
the game tree by determining the number of branches at histories (nodes) cor-
responding with quantified subformulas. The model is the mai~c parameter in
determining the outcome function, as it determines the interpretation of the pred-
icate symbols and thereby the evaluation of the atomic formulas. The syntax of
the sentence is still relevant for the determination of the polarity of the atomic
formulas corresponding to the terminal histories.
It does not seem easy to give a natural game-theoretic classification for this
type of game structures. The specific structure of the semantic games will be one
of the obstacles we encounter when we try to apply the Thompson transforma-
tions, in particular coalescence (in section 4.8.4).
Structure of the information sets:
In the model I'(~i,cp) for the semantic game G~(cp), the information sets are in-
duced by the equivalence relations ~,~ on the sets of valuations V~ for the non-
negated, non-atomic subformulas z~ of cp. In turn, the equivalence relations ~,~
are determined by the sets of variables Y~ occurring under the slash of the main
quantifier or connective of ~.
This results in a very specific structure of the information sets: for each non-
atomic ~ E S(cp), the equivalence classes of the ~~, divide the sets V~ in equiv-
alence classes of the same size. To be specific: the number of equivalence classes
equals the cardinality of the set of restricted valuations (Dom(~l))Xy -Yw, while
each equivalence class is of the cardinality of the set (Dom(21))rti. All histories in
one set V~ have equal length, as their length is determined by the depth of zli in the
syntactic tree of cp. Therefore, the so-called Von Neumann-Morgenstern con-
dition, viz. that all histories in one information set have equal length (cf. [SP03,
p. 29]), is automatically satisfied in semantic games for IFG-sentences.
This has to do with the fact that the only type of moves that occur under the
slash, are the quantifier moves. The only sort of imperfect information occurring
in the semantic games is lack of information about the assignments to some vari-
ables, not about which subformula one is playing (and thereby evaluating). The
latter would be the imperfect information associated with connective-moves. A
natural question to ask is what happens to the model, or more specifically, what
kind of information sets we get when we would allow connective-moves under the
slash. We will investigate this in the next section.
In the game-theoretic model, the treatment of the two players is naturally
symmetric, which corresponds nicely to the point of taking both truth and falsity
into account (cf. the previous chapter). We end this section suggesting a slightly
different way of modeling semantic games in case one wants to focus on truth only.
Truth only: semantic games as decision problems
If one chooses to disregard falsity in terms of Eloïse's opponent having a winning
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strategy, like Hintikka in general (see the previous chapter) and V~ii.nánen in the
perfect inforination semantic game (see [V~~02]: in this higher-level version, the
moves in the game are choices for choice functions), it may be more natural to
regard the semantic games as so-called decision proólems. These are games for
just one player (`Myself'), playing against `Nature' (names Hintikka also uses for
the players in his earlier work on GTS). The non-terminal histories assigned to
Nature, are modeled by chance moves. As we did not include these in the model
of section 4.2, we give a brief informal description of them here.
Chance moves are modeled as non-terminal histories that are assigned to a
non-perso~al player (player 0, or `Nature') The non-personal player does not play
with some (unknown) strategy, but according to a probability distribution which
is known to all players (it is a parameter of the game). For instance, flipping a
coin can be modeled as a chance move, with probability distribution ( 2, 2) for the
actions head and tail (if it's a fair coin).
We can transform a semantic game into a decision problem, by modeling the
non-terminal histories associated with the negative subformulas (i.e. Abélard's
decision points) as chance moves. It then becomes a game with Eloïse as single
player. We give all chance moves some probability distribution that gives all
actions a probability greater than zero (we have to note that we may have to deal
with uncountably many alternatives, e.g. if we play on the set I[~). Then there
exists a(pure) winning strategy for Eloïse in this decision game if and only if a
winning strategy exists for her in the semantic game. If truth of a sentence is
defined as Eloïse having a winning strategy in the decision problem, this coincides
with the definition of truth in terms of the semantic game.
4.6 Independence of connectives?
Like quantifiers, connectives also have a scope, which is nicely visible in the so-
called Polish notation V(~1i ~2) for zlil V z~2. This means that, in principle, we
might use the slash notation also to remove quantifiers and connectives in the
disjuncts ~2 from the scope of this disjunction. For example, the slashes in the
sentence cp - ~x~~P(~) I~ 3x~~R(x) can be interpreted: after Abélard's choice for
either the left or right conjunct, Eloïse has to choose a value for ~, but she does
not know whether she is choosing it to satisfy P(x) or R(x).
Neither the IF-language defined by Hintikka in [Hin96], nor the IFG-language
we defined, include this possibility. In this section we demonstrate by a list of
examples, adding to the discussion of [SP03] for the IF-propositional case, that
in many cases slashing for connectives cannot be interpreted game-theoretically
(i.e. in terms of information sets).
As preliminary remark, we would like to make clear that we do not consider
the possible ambiguity of reference a problem. Many coimectives of the same kind
may occur in the formula (especially if we write the formula in its unabbreviated
version, when only disjunctions occur). But this ambiguity could easily be solved
by applying some kind of labeling to the different occurrences of the respective
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connectives.
In the formula ~p we gave as example in the first paragraph of this section,
the slashes at the two quantifiers indeed make sense. But this is not always
the case, as will be demonstrated in the following series of variations of cp. The
notion of information set as defined in the standard extensive game model, helps
explain why in many situations putting a connective under a slash will not alter
the interpretation of the formula in game-theoretical semantics.
. Consider cpl -~x~~P(x)nR. After Abélard's first move, Eloïse either has to
choose a value for x ( if Abélard chose `left') or do nothing (if Abélard chose
`right'). The conjunction under the slash would, extending the interpretation
for variables under a slash, be interpreted as `when Eloïse chooses a value
for x, she does not know whether Abélard chose left or right'. But the mere
fact that she is prompted to make a move, removes this imposed ignorance.
The conjunction under the slash therefore does not alter the game.
In terms of information sets: the histories ( 1) and (r), leading to the sub-
formulas 3x~~zli and R respectively, can never be in the same information
set, because information sets never contain terminal histories (and (r) is
terminal). So, Eloïse's information set is the singleton {(1)}.
. Now let ~p2 -~x~~P(x) n ~xR(x). We give a tentative interpretation of this
formula. After Abélard's choice for left or right, Eloïse has to pick a value
for x in either case. If Abélard chose right, she knows that this value has
to satisfy R(x), otherwise she does not know whether it has to satisfy P(x)
or R(x). But in the latter case, the fact that she is ignorant tells her that
Abélard must have chosen left. We assume here that she knows the structure
of the game ( by knowing the syntax of the sentence cp2). It is then like a
game in which the opponent announces before moving: "After my move, I
will not tell you what my move was if it was `left', but I will tell you what
my move was if it was `right'." ( Note that if we could have chosen different
variables in the two conjuncts, e.g. ~x~~P(x) n~yR(y). In that case, the
name of the variable could have given Eloïse an extra signal that Abélard
chose right. But we do not think this is essential, and it does not come back
in the description of the situation in terms of information sets.)
In terms of information sets: because the information sets form a partition,
it follows from the fact that {(r)} is a singleton information set, that {(1)}
must also be a singleton ( for these two histories are the only decision points
assigned to Eloïse).
~ Similarly, consider cp3 -~x~np(x) ~ yx~nR(x). Like with cpl, the fact that
Eloïse is prompted to make a move, tells her that Abélard must have chosen
left in the first move. Similarly, even if we assume that Abélard forgets his
first move, he can reconstruct that it must have been a choice for right if he
is prompted to make another move.
In terms of information sets: an information set never contains two histories
that are assigned to different players ( for the information partition U-
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UE U UA is defined to partition the sets D~ - P-1({i}) of decision points
assigned to player i). So, Eloïse has a singleton information set {(1)}, and
Abelard a singleton information set {(r)}.
. Also, consider c~4 -~x~~P(x) n(Rl V~~ R2). After both possible choices of
Abélard, it's Eloïse's turn to make a move. But in order to make the move,
she has to know whether to choose an action from Dom(2l), or from {1, r}.
And knowing this, implies knowing in which of both possible histories she is.
In terms of information sets: because the two histories (1) and (r) define
different sets of actions (A((1)) ~ A((r))), they cannot be in the same infor-
mation set without violating the the consistency condition we imposed.
We also look at some more complicated examples, where a slash for the same
connective appears at different depths within the formula:
. First, let ~1 -~x~~P(x) n~y~x~~R(x, y). We try to interpret the slashes
for this formula. When the actual history is leading to the subformula
~x~~R(x, y), she can distinguish that history from the other histories leading
to that subformula, by the value she previously assigned to y. Does the fact
that she gets to make a second move make her aware of the fact that Abélard
chose to go `right' at the initial connective move in the game? If the actual
history is leading to the subformula ~x~~P(x), does she know she has not
assigned a value to the variable y? However, in general, we do not assume
that the players always know the number of previous moves: information
sets may in general contain histories of different length. Imposing
In terms of information sets, we get only one reasonable interpretation of ~1.
Note that the history (r) leading to the subformula ~ydx~~R(x, y) forms a
singleton information set. For the same reason as in the example cp2 above,
the history (1) is in a different information set. Because all histories (r, a)
(with a E Dom(~l)) are distinguishable for Eloïse, they each are in different
information sets. Hence, if the history (1) would not form a singleton infor-
mation set, it would form an information set together with just one history
(r, ao), while all histories (r, a) with a~ ao would form singleton informa-
tion sets. Even though this situation is technically possible (histories in one
information set are not required to be of the same length), the formula l;l
does not specify ao in any way and seems to be arbitrary. The alternative of
taking {(1) }, as all other histories for Eloïse, to be a singleton information
set is therefore the most reasonable choice.
. If we consider ~2 -~x~~P(x) n~y~x~~,yR(x, y), we see two possible inter-
pretations: either Eloïse can, or she cannot distinguish between the choice
for x in the subformula 3x~~P(x) and in the subformula ~x~~,yR(x, y). We
could argue for the first option on the basis of the assumption that she does
remember whether or not she made a previous move. But as noted in the
previous example: we do not assume in general that players count the moves.
So, let's say she cannot distinguish between the situations.
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In that case, Eloïse has two information sets: {(r) } and {(1) } U {(r, a) ~ a E
Dom(2l)}. This give us an information set that contains histories histories
of unequal length which also means that they don't all lead to the same
subformula of ~2. This is technically possible if we choose not to impose
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern condition. The consistency condition is not
violated because in this case both subformulas prompt the same kind of move
for Eloïse.
. The last variant we discuss, is ~3 -~x~~P(x) n~y~~~x~~R(x, y). This one
does have an intuitively clear interpretation: after Abélard's move, Eloïse
gets to choose a domain element, but she does not know whether it will serve
as value for x in the left conjunct, or as value for y in the right conjunct. If
she is prompted to do a second move, she now knows they are playing the
right conjunct. She then however has forgotten her previous choice for y.
So, she chooses a value for x without using the value for y she chose in the
previous move.
In terms of information sets: Eloïse has two information sets, viz. {(1), (r)}
and {(r, a)~a E Dom(2l)}.
From the last two examples (~2 and ~3), we do observe that in some cases
slashing for connectives can make sense, and that it extends the class of game
trees for semantic games. Note that if histories leading to different subformulas
are in the same information set (as was the situation with ~2), we need to review our
formalization of strategies as sets of choice functions f~, one for each z~ E S(~p)
(see the paragraph on strategies on page 65). This íllustrates that slashing for
connectives results in a different structure of the information sets, and in that
sense is of a really different nature from slashing for quantifications.
From the complete list of examples, we conclude that including the introduc-
tion of independence of connectives can lead to interpretation difficulties, and that
in many situations a connective under a slash does not add new imperfect infor-
mation (in terms of bigger information sets). We therefore choose not to extend
the language GIFG with this possibility in the remainder of this thesis.
But we do want to mention that it seems possible to model the semantic games
for formulas with slashed-out connectives by information sets, if a slashed-out
conjunction ( or disjunction) occurs at the same quantifier in both conjuncts (or
disjuncts), or at the same connective in both conjuncts ( or disjuncts). The formula
~x~nP(x) n~x~~R(x) we started this section with, is an example of the first kind,
and any formula with the four-place connective W from [SPO1], W(~p, z~, X, ~) -
(cp V~~ zli) ~(X V~~ ~), is of the second kind.
Example 5.1 of [Hod97a) uses a formula similar to ~x~~P(x) n~x~~R(x) as an
example showing that an analysis of these formulas in terms of Skolem functions
(rather than by use of information sets) is more problematic. This is due to the
fact that the connectives do not appear as arguments of the Skolem functions,
which makes it unclear how to incorporate the independence of the connectives
under the slash in the Skolemfunctions.
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In the two examples mentioned above, we can treat the connectives as bounded
quantifications, e.g. read ~x~ncpi(x) n~x~ncp2(x) as ni-i,2~x~i~Pi(x), or
(wli V~n W12) n(~21 U~n W22)
as
ni-i,2 ( V7-1,2 )~i~ij .
If we extend our valuations with assignments to the indexes of these new, finite,
quantifications, slashing for connectives becomes slashing for the indexes (just like
the slashes for the quantified variables). It then also becomes possible to include
these indices in the Skolem-functions. Indeed, this is part of the language used
in [Hod97aJ (which is otherwise the same as our language GIFG). We remark
however, that formulas like cpi, cp2i cpi, ~ij, are not part of the language, but part
of the metalanguage. The formula (Vi-i,2)cpi does not mean anything, until we
specify in the metalanguage which formulas (within the language) cpi and cp2 in
fact are. Only if our language is assumed to contain relation symbols with indexes,
we can build up formulas with indexed connectives within the language itself, e.g.
(ni-i,2)~x~jRi(x). Note that in that case, the formulas always have the symmetric
structure needed for meaningful slashing for connectives (which can be recognized
in the game tree by the fact that all subtrees under the indexed connective are the
same, except for the values of the outcoine function at the leaves).
With indexed connectives, we generalize the syntax to include n-ary connec-
tives for arbitrary n, and not just binary connectives. This influences the structure
of the corresponding game trees, in that the number of branches at decision points
can then be either n for arbitrary n, or the cardinality a of Dom(~l). We will
refer to this in section 4.8.4. (Note that, as a side-effect, the indices automatically
prevent problems with ambiguity of reference, if we want to put a conjunction
under a slash while more that one conjunction occurs in one formula.)
These observations conclude the first part of the chapter, in which we have given
a step by step translation of semantic games into the game-theoretic framework.
The rest of the chapter will have a different character. Having embedded semantic
game theory, we attempt to use off the shelf results from game theory to obtain
logical insights and~or results. In this attempt, we will be much more schematic
and less formal. We hope our informal (and visual) accounts of the definitions and
results give enough intuition to follow our argiiments.
4.7 Imperfect recall in IFG-semantic games
Perfect recall is, informally, the property of a game that "each player is allowed
by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and
all of his choices at those moves" ([Kuh53]). A commonly used reformulation is
that of [Se175] ([Kuh97, p. 319], also used in [Bno04]).
Since the introduction of the distinction between perfect and imperfect recall
for extensive games by Kuhn, "traditional game theory has excluded games with
imperfect recall from its scope" ([PR97, p. 4]). The study of games of imperfect
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recall was given new interest by the paper cited here, which gives several different
possible interpretations for information sets and strategies for decision problems
(i.e. one-player games) of imperfect recall, and shows how different interpretations
allow for different kinds of analysis.
We make some short remarks on how imperfect recall occurs in semantic games
for IFG-sentences. It is easy to see that semantic games may be of iinperfect recall:
e.g. in the formula ~x~y~x[x - y], Eloïse does not know the value for x she chose
when she has to choose a value for y. (Note that this does not prevent her from
having a winning strategy, cf. the discussion in section 3.9, p. 45.) In fact, in IF-
logic as defined by Hintikka, most semantic games are of imperfect recall because
the slashing convention makes Eloïse forget all her previous moves (cf. section 3.9).
In [Bno04], the notion of perfect recall is proved to be axiomatized by two
independent properties:
. Action Recall (AR): in every decision point, the players know what they did
before. (Formal definition: [Bno04, p. 248])
. Memory of previous Knowledge (MK): in every decision point, the players
know what they knew before. (Formal definition: [Bno04, p. 244], using KM
for "Knowledge Memory" instead of MK)
Imperfect recall can be caused by a failure of either the first or the latter, or by
both at the same time.
In semantic games for IF(G)-sentences, imperfect recall occurs in both forms.
A semantic game for the formula ~x~y~x [x - y] is an example of a failure of Action
Recall (AR), without failure of Memory of previous Knowledge (MK). In fact, the
semantic game for this formula in a two-element model is identical to the example
given in [Bno04, Fig. 2, p. 240]. The slashing convention makes AR fail in the
semantic games for most IF-sentences.
Perhaps more surprisingly, Hodges' formula `dx3z~y~x[x - y] turns out to de-
fine semantic games of imperfect recall as well.l It gives rise to failure of Memory
of previous Knowledge, without failure of AR. The failure of MK is due to the fact
that, choosing a value for y, Eloïse does not know the value of x anymore, while
she knew it before. (By the fact that AR does not fail here, she still has a winning
strategy: she does remember her own previous move.) The failure of MK can be
recognized in the structure of the information sets in the game tree for Hodges' for-
mula, which is the left game tree in figure 4.7 on page 78. The formalization of MK
says that if an initial part of a history h is in an information set u assigned to the
same player, then all histories in the information set containing h have an initial
part in u. In figure 4.7 we see that this condition fails for both information sets as-
sociated with the subformula ~y~~[x - y]. (For the same reason, our example 4.4.1
is also a game with failure of MK for Eloïse, as we can see in figure 4.2 on page 60.)
1 We realized this when studying the notion of perfect recall in [Bno04]; afterwards we found
that this observation is also made in [vB05].
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An interesting result in [Bno04] is Proposition 6: MK rules out so-called
absent-mindedness. Absent-mindedness is typical of the central example in the
article [PR97]: the absent-minded driver (Fig. 1, loc. cit.). It is characterized by
the fact that a history and some initial part of it are in the same information set
(cf. [Bno04, p. 246], definition 4).
As we saw previously, by Hodges' formula, MK can fail in semantic games for
IFG-logic. So, we may wonder whether there are semantic games with absent-
mindedness. But this possibility is easily ruled out by the fact that all histories
in one information set of a semantic game for an IFG-sentence have equal length.
Even if we would allow connectives under the slash, which would allow for histories
of different length to be in one information set (cf. section 4.6), one history in an
information set could never be an initial part of another history in the same in-
formation set: if they are of different length, then they must differ at the position
corresponding to the connective. (This demonstrates that the converse of Proposi-
tion 6 of [Bno04] does not hold: failure of MK does not imply Absent-mindedness.)
Note that we avoid imperfect recall in semantic games by switching to the team
interpretation mentioned in section 3.9, but this gives us the task of conceptualizing
game-theoretically what it means to be on the same team.
4.8 Thompson transformations for IFG-logic?
The Thompson transformations, named after F.B. Thompson who introduced
them in his paper Eqv,ivalence of games in e~tensive form [Tho52], are four trans-
formations which carry a game of imperfect information in extensive form into an
equivalent one (in a game-theoretic sense, which we explain below). In this sec-
tion, we relate these transformations on extensive games to syntactic operations on
IF-formulas, hence look for correspondences between game-theoretic and logical
equivalence schemes.
The game-theoretic sense of equivalence connected with the Thompson trans-
formations, is defined in terms of preservation of the reduced normal form. The
reduced normal form of a game in extensive form is relative to a given order of
the set of players, and has the following structural characteristics (cf. [Tho52,
Definition 12]):
. each player has just one information set;
. each player has one move in every play (i.e. each branch of the tree intersects
all information sets);
. the tree is `minimal' in the sense that no two different actions from one
information set lead to isomorphic subtrees.
A game and the result of a Thompson transformation applied to it, both have the
same reduced normal form. In fact, the main feature of these transformations is
that they can transform any game into reduced normal form (cf. [Tho52, Theorem
19]).
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Figure 4.5: different semantic games for b'x[P(x) V~x R(x)]
Semantic games for IF-logic can be formalized as extensive games of imperfect
information, as we demonstrated in section 4.4. Hence, as suggested in [vB01], a
natural question to ask is to which extent the Thompson transformations define
logical equivalence schemes for IF-logic. It turns out not to be hard to find logical
equivalence schemes that corresponded with the respective transformations. Some
of the equivalence schemes we state in this section, are results that will be for-
mally proved in chapter 6, using the semantics of [CK99] for open IFG-formulas.
The logical equivalence in the schemes is strong equivalence as we used it in the
previous chapter (cf. definition 3.3.2).
We warn the reader in advance that the correspondence between the game
transformations and the syntactic operations is not a direct one, in two ways.
First, we have to realize that a syntactic operation on a subformula may correspond
to many applications of a transformation: it has to be applied in all subtrees of
the game tree corresponding to that subformula. And second: strictly speaking,
the transformations imply equivalence only for one given game I'(21, cp), i.e. the
semantic game for a sentence cp in one given model 2l, and its transformation.
On the other hand, logical equivalence is a statement about equivalence in all
models. Even though different models 2l can give different game structures and
outcome functions for the same formula (cf. figure 4.5, which pictures the trees
for models with two, three and four elements respectively), the similarity of the
game structures in different models allow us regard a Thompson transformation
as operating on the collection of all game trees I'(2t, cp) for some given cp.
We now consider the four transformations one by one. It would go too far in
this context to give complete formal definitions of the transformations (and in fact,
the original formalizations in [Tho52] are unclear about some details). Therefore,
we copied the pictures given in Thompson's original paper in order to introduce
the transformation; we reproduced them here as figures 4.6, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. To
avoid confusion, we stress that these pictures do not correspond to the IF-examples
we give in connection with each transformation: they illustrate the transformation
in general for games in extensive form of imperfect information.
4.8.1 Inflation-deflation
The principle of inflation-deflation is demonstrated by figure 4.6: we see that two
information sets for player I are combined. It is based on the idea that a player
may be able to infer some information on the actual history on the basis of a
previous move by herself. Whether this is possible, depends on the structure of the
information partition. More specifically, two information sets for one player may
be combined, if any history in one information set can be distinguished from any
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Figure 4.6: Inflation-Deflation
history in the other, on the basis of the actions taken at one previous information
set of the same player. (In particular, a precondition for combining two information
sets by this transformation, is the existence of one information set of the same
player containing predecessors of all histories in the two information sets.) After
the combination, the player should still be able to distinguish the two original
information sets, e.g. by smartly thinking out her strategy in advance.
A clear instance of an IFG-equivalence in which this principle is reflected, is
the following (cf. [vB00b, 12.3.4]):
~x~y[x - y] - ~x3y~~ [x - y]
Of course, the left sentence is true in all models. For the right one, thís is not so
obvious: on the basis of the game tree one would expect this formula only to be true
if the model contained just one element (just as the formula dx~y~x[x - y]). But
Eloïse does have a winning strategy: she may decide in advance to play `always a'
in the first move, and also `always a' in the second move (for some a in the domain
of ~[).
In chapter 6, we will prove more generally (see lemma 6.4.7): if cp, cpl, cp2 are
IFG-formulas and Z C Y, then
~x~Y~y~z~P - ~x~Y~y~zx~G (4.1)
~x~Y(~1 V~Z ~2) - ~x~Y(~1 V~Zx ~Pa) (4.2)
The condition that Z C Y, reflects the applicability of the transformation. At her
second move, Eloïse can distinguish between the different values for x, despite the
x occurring under the slash: if the choice for x was based on the values of the
variables outside Y, and if Z C Y, then Eloïse can `recalculate' this chosen value
for x on the basis of the values of the variables outside Z U{x}.
This transformation can be seen in relation to the fact that in many cases the
extra provision of Hintikka that the players are assumed to `forget' all their pre-
vious moves (the slashing convention, see section 3.9), does not make a difference.
In Hodges' example (3.10), the slashing convention did make a difference (the
right IFG-formula reflects the reading of the left IFG-formula under the slashing
convention):
`dx~z~y~x[x - y] ~ b'x~z~y~x,Z[x - y]
This means the transformation should not be applicable in this case. And indeed,
it violates the precondition of the transformation of Inflation: there is not one
78 CHAPTER 4. GAME THEORY As FORMAL FRAMEWORK
~
Figure 4.7: Inflation-Deflation not applicable for d~~z~y~x[x - y]
a a c
Figure 4.8: Addition of a superfluous move
previous information set that contains predecessors of the information sets defined
by the independence condition of 3y~~[~ - y], and in fact already for one single
information set there are more than one (see figure 4.7). This is rather unconven-
tional for the games usually studied in game theory, as we remarked in section 4.7:
it makes this game one of imperfect recall, by a failure of inemory of previous
krcowledge (terminology from [Bno04]).
4.8.2 Addition of a superfluous move
A superfluous move may be described as an extra move in the game, the result of
which is subsequently forgotten by both players. The addition of such a move to
a game, does not alter it, according to this transformation. The transformation is
pictured in figure 4.8: a move for player II is added in the left part of the game
tree, in such way that it is superfiuous.
We like to remark that, both in the original picture [Tho52, Fig. 3], and in the
version of it in [OR94, Fig. 206.1], the extra move for player II on the left branch is
put in the same information set with the move for player II that was already there
on the right branch. However, from the formal descriptions of the transformation
we do not see where this is required (neither in [Tho52, Definition 16.2, ii], nor
in [OR94, p. 207]). This may be due to the fact that both are formulated in
the right-left direction of the picture, hence could be more appropriately called
`Removal of a superfluous move'.
From the formal description in [OR94], which is the more detailed one, we un-
derstand that the transformation of Addition is not deternunistic in the sense that
we may either let the superfluous move be a singleton information set, or put it in
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an appropriate existing information set of the same player (e.g. at least the consis-
tency condition must be satisfied). `Removal' on the other hand is deterministic
(which probably explains why this is the direction formalized).
The following equivalences are instances of this transformation (cf. [vB00b,
12.3.3] ) :
dx~y~x[x - y] - dx~z~x~y~Z,x[x - y]
b'x~y~x[x - y] - dx~z~y~z,x[x - y]
If z does not occur in ~c~i, we write ~~Z for the result of adding the independence
condition ~z to all quantifiers and connectives in ~(this is defined formally in
definition 6.2.4 in chapter 6 of this thesis). We may then generalize this to
b'x~y~x~ - dx~z~x~y~Z,x~~z
dx~y~x~ - b'xdz~y~z,x~~Z
Note that the z under the slash of the second existential quantifier is essential, as
we know from our recurring example (3.10):
dx3y~x[x - y] ~ `dx~z~y~x[x - y]
If we would add a superfluous connective move, it would give
b'x~ - dx[~~v v~x ~~v]
dx~ - dx[~~v V ~G~v]
The latter formulas are not part of our language, because we do not include the
possibility of slashing out connectives in the IFG-language, for reasons mentioned
in section 4.6. On the other hand, in this situation ( like in the formula cp in
section 4.6) the connectives under the slash can be interpreted without problem,
because both disjuncts ~w define subtrees of the game tree that have exactly the
same structure, player assignment, and outcome function.
It is clear that we cannot simply omit the connectíves under the slashes:
dx~y~x[x - y] ~ dx[~y~x(x - y) V~y~x(x - y)1 (4.3)
(Playing in a two-element model, Eloïse does not have a winning strategy for the
left formula, while she has one for the right one, as demonstrated in example 4.4.1. )
A correspondence with this transformation may be recognized in the quantifier
extraction lemma, which is part of the improved prenex normal form theorem in
chapter 6 of this thesis ( cf. lemma 6.4.5): if x does not occur in ~, then
(nwx~Y~P) V ~ - Qx~Y(~P V ~~x) (4.4)
Here the subgame for z~ becomes preceded by an extra quantifier move Qx~Y, but
this move is made `superfluous' by adding ~x to all quantifiers and connectives in
~.
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Figure 4.9: Interchange of moves
4.8.3 Interchange of moves
The principle of interchange of inoves uses the fact that the order of moves does
not matter if the original second player was not informed about the outcome of
the first player's move. In figure 4.9 we see how the moves of player II and player
I in the right part of the game tree can be interchanged.
This principle is instantiated in the following IFG-example (cf. [vB00b, 12.3.2~):
dx~y~x[x - y~ - ~ydx~y[x - ~J~
which can easily be generalized to
b'x~y~~~ - ~ydx~y~
for arbitrary IFG-formulas z~.
Note that we also witness an interchange of moves in the quantifier extraction
equivalence ( 4.4) above: in the first two stages leading to the subgame for cp,
the quantifier move (Qx~Y) is in a sense interchanged with the disjunction move.
Interchanging a connective with a quantifier in the opposite direction, like in
`dx[~PV~x ~~ - (dx~v)~PV (dx~v)~
is in principle also possible (it is clear how to interpret the connective under the
slashes here), but takes us outside the language again.
4.8.4 Coalescence of moves
The fourth and last transformation, exemplified in figure 4.10, is based on the idea
that if a player is assigned two subsequent moves, she will plan ahead and analyze
her options for both moves at the same time. In the picture, player I coalesces
her initial move and her subsequent move in the left part of the tree.
The following example, demonstrating associativity of disjunction, may be seen
as an instance of this principle, but also demonstrates a problem with it in our
IFG-syntax:
(8v~)vx-Bv(~VX)-Bvz~VX
Even though the principle seems very straightforward, strictly speaking it takes
us outside of our IFG-language! This is unavoidable as in the game trees for our
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Figure 4.10: Coalescence of moves
semantic IFG-games I'(2(, cp), the number of branches from one node is always
either two (in case of a connective), or equal to the cardinality a of Dom(2l). This
is dictated by our syntax, which gives rise to only two types of moves: a connective
move, or a quantifier move.
Coalescing of moves gives rise to many other possible numbers of branches
from one node, like three, in the example above, or ~~[~2 if we would coalesce two
quantifier moves. For connectives, the problem may be solved by extending the
language with n-ary connectives (n E I~Y, n ) 2), so that we can write 8 V~ v x for
example as V(B, ~, X). For quantifiers, we could allow quantification over tuples of
variables. It may be harder to find natural solutions for coalescence of quantifier
moves with connective moves. It is not clear to us at this point what kind of logic
we would get if we allow such extensions of the language.
4.8.5 Distribution in terms of Thompson transformations
After giving examples of logical equivalence schemes that correspond with (single)
Thompson transformations in the previous sections, we now try to see a logical
principle (Distribution) in the light of the transformations, in order to find an
IFG-version for it.
The propositional distributive law
(A n B) v C-(A v C) n(B v C) (4.5)
states "that the corresponding games are `outcome equivalent' in terms of players'
`forcing powers' "([vB00b, section 1.4]). Indeed: in both the games correspond-
ing to the left and the right formulas respectively, Abélard has the power to let
the game end with either an element of the set {A, C}, or an element of the
set {B, C}, while Eloïse can determine whether the game ends within {A, B} or
{C}. [vB00b] brings this up as an example of an "exact `correspondence' be-
tween a logical law and a game-theoretic principle" : the distributive law "may
be viewed as a transformation allowing us to interchange the order of turns for
players in a game without affecting their strategic powers concerning outcomes."
In the context of this section on the Thompson transformations, this seems to
suggest a correspondence between the (propositional) distributive law and the the
Interchange-transformation (section 4.8.3).
However, Theo M.V. Janssen proposed (in a personal correspondence) the fol-
lowing example to demonstrate that for IFG-sentences the distributive law fails.
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Figure 4.11: Distribution in terms of Addition and Interchange
Example 4.8.1: (failure of straightforward distribution) Let cp be the IFG-
sentence
dx[(E(x) n O(x)) V í3y~x[x ~ y])]
and let ~i be a model with Dom(2l) - N, the predicate symbol E interpreted by
{n E N~n is even}, and the predicate symbol O interpreted by {n E N` ~n is odd}.
It is not hard to verify that cp is not true in this model: after Abélard's choice of
a value for x, Eloïse must choose `right' at the disjunction (no value for x satisfies
the left disjunct (E(x) n O(x))). At the right disjunct she has to choose a value
for y, distinct from the value of x but also independently of x, which is impossible
(there is no constant choice that is distinct from all possible values for x). So,
Eloïse has no winning strategy in the game G~(cp), in other words: cp is not true
in ~(.
But now consider the formula cp' resulting from applying the distributive law
(4.5) to the part of cp under the scope of the universal quantifier:
dx[(E(x) ~~yi~[x ~ y]) ~(o(x) ~ 3yi~[x ~ yl )]
Now Eloïse does have a winning strategy in the game G~(cp'): if Abélard's choices
put her in the situation of the left conjunct, she can win the game by playing
`left' at the disjunction if the value of x is even, and right otherwise. At the right
disjunct ~y~~(x ~ y], she then knows that the value of x must be odd, so she can
choose any even value for y and win. Similarly for the right conjunct.
So, the result cp' of distribution applied to a subformula of cp is true in the
model 2l, while cp is not true in ~i. o
This may look puzzling, because the propositional distributive law made us
associate distribution with the Thompson transformation of Interchange. But
the exainple above shows how the distributive law for this IFG-formula results
in a second occurrence of the subformula ~y~x[x ~ y], which is associated with
Addition. As the non-equivalence (4.3) showed, it is essential that we add the
proper independence conditions to moves following an added move (in order to
guarantee it is indeed superfluous).
If we look at Propositional Distribution in terms of the Thompson transfor-
mations, it indeed turns out to be a combination of interchange and addition of
a superfluous move. This is pictured in figure 4.11 As such, the game tree for
the formula (cp n z~) V X does not allow for the Interchange-transformation, there-
fore we first transform it into a tree that does, by the Addition-transformation:
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(~P nw ~) U(X~n nw X~n). In order to get a game to which we can apply Inter-
change, we put the superfluous move by Abélard (the right conjunction) in one
information set with his original move ( the left conjunction). If we then apply In-
terchange, we get the game corresponding to the formula (cpV~n X~n) ~(~ V~n X~n).
So:
(w ~~G) ~ X - (~ ~iv ~) ~(Xin ~iv Xin)
-(~P V~n X~n) n(~ V~n X~n)
In the propositional case and if ~p, z~, X are sentences, the slashed connectives don't
seem to be crucial, and the law may be formulated as in the propositional case
(4.5): without the connectives under the slashes. (Apparently, the evaluation of
propositions and sentences is context independent.) However, the example above
demonstrates that this is not the case if we apply distribution at a deeper level in
the formula: at the level of subformulas appearing in the scope of previous quan-
tifications, and if those subformulas contain independence conditions regarding
those quantifications.
The analysis of distribution based on the Thompson transformations results in
the following equivalent for the IFG-sentence cp of example 4.8.1:
dx[(E(x) V~n ~y~x,n[x ~ y]) n(~(x) V~n ~~J~~,n[~ ~ y])],
rather than in the formula cp' of the example. We conclude that, to express a
proper distribution law for IFG-logic, the language would need to contain the pos-
sibility to slash for connectives as well as variables.
This is another example showing that we have to be very careful if we want to
generalize logical principles from classical logic to IF(G)-logic.
4.8.6 About the status of the transformations
We are aware of the fact that the Thompson transformations are not unprob-
lematic in game theory. They raise questions about the underlying conception of
rationality of the players, and the exact interpretation of the notion of information
set. In particular, they may turn games of perfect recall into games of imperfect
recall, while game theory usually restricts its scope to the first type of games only.
A detailed discussion about problems with transformations under different con-
ceptions of information set, can be found in [ER94, section 2]. Also, [OR94, p.
209] mentions that the conception of rationality underlying the transformations ig-
nores so-called "framing effects", while psychologists have found "that even minor
variations in the framing of a problem may dramatically affect the participants'
behavior (see for example Tcersky and Kahneman (1986))."
In [SPO1, p. 211], Sandu and Pietarinen argue on such grounds that the Thomp-
son transformations "cannot be taken to form a basis for a complete calculus for
IF [propositional] logic (as suggested by [vB00a])". This conclusion may be true,
but we are not sure about the arguments. On the one hand, we conjecture that
the noted strategic essentiality demonstrated in [ER94], does not occur in win-loss
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games, in which no probabilities are involved. On the other hand, irreperfect re-
call is already omnipresent in semantic games for IF(G)-logic, as we will saw in
section 4.7.
Without the expectations to find a(complete) calculus for IF-logic, we found
some clear and interesting correspondences with the transformations in our logic.
The fact that some of these corresponding logical facts are also a bit puzzling,
could even be explained through the game-theoretic discussions about the trans-
formations.
Throughout this section, we encountered several situations witnessing that the
the class of semantic games for our IFG-language is not closed under the Thompson
transformations. There were two main causes for this: on the one hand, because
we excluded independence of connective moves, as this could in general lead to
problems of interpretation (see section 4.6). On the other hand, because the game
trees corresponding with the semantic games for IFG-formulas have only two types
of branching: in two or in the cardinality c~ of the domain of the model.
The latter disqualified the transformation of coalescence in IF-logic. This trans-
formation is essential for Thompson's result that we can transforin any extensive
form game into reduced normal form by application of the right transformations
in the right order. Coalescence must be essential, because it is the only trans-
formation reducing the depth of the game tree (and a reduced normal form for a
two-player game has depth 2).
This shows that even though we found some nice correspondences between
logical equivalence schemes and the Thompson transformations, the latter can
not deliver a syntactic `reduced normal form' for IF-sentences. In that sense, the
transformations do not contribute to IF-logic what made them relevant for the
theory of games in extensive form in general. On the other hand, it does not seem
to be too difficult to be more liberal in the translation of an IFG-formula into a
game tree, e.g. by allowing a sequence of quantifiers of the same polarity to count
as one move. One could even wonder what logic we get if we used the Thompson
transformations as `axiom schemes', and designed a language that did suit them.
(This question was asked by Wilfrid Hodges at the Workshop on Knowledge and
Games in Liverpool, July 10-11, 2004. We do not have any specific directions
towards an answer yet. More generally, in in [vB01], van Benthem argues that a
dynamic epistemic language would be natural to model extensive games, at least
if analyzed on the `action level'.)
Conversely, given a logical normal form (prenex normal form, Skolem normal
form, Distributive~Conjunctive normal form), it would be interesting to see which
game-theoretic transformations correspond to the syntactic transformations used
to rewrite a formula into that normal form.
4.9 Conclusions
We introduced a generalization of the IF-language, the language G~F~. We feel
this language corresponds naturally to the semantic games as we understand them
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froin their rules: there are two types of moves (quantifier and connective), negation
determines which of the two players makes the moves.
The modeling of semantic games in game-theoretic terms, makes it possible to
characterize them as finite depth, two-player, win-loss games of imperfect infor-
mation, and possibly, of imperfect recall. Strategies can be seen as sets of choice
functions, that correspond to the `inside-out' Skolem functions of our previous
chapter.
The game trees (as constituted by the sets of histories, that are in turn de-
termined by the syntax of the formula and the domain of the model) and the
information partitions (as determined by the slash operator) have very specific
structures. However, it seems hard to give a game-theoretic characterization of
these structures. We would get a more general class of game structures and in-
formation partitions by introducing independence of connectives. But we showed
that in most cases, the interpretation of connectives under the slash operator does
not add new imperfect information. For some cases where it does, we would have
to revise the treatment of strategies as sets of choice functions.
We have pointed out that, while game theory usually presupposes the opposite,
many semantic games for IF(G)-sentences are of imperfect recall, not only in the
sense that players may forget their own previous actions, but also in the sense that
players may forget what they knew before. Hodges' example gives rise to games
of imperfect recall in the latter sense.
In the last section, we have given some equivalence schemes for IFG-sentences
that can be seen to correspond with the Thompson transformations from game
theory. We have not tried to be complete, so we expect there to be more. On the
other hand, we also noticed that the transformations also take us beyond what
is syntactically expressible in the IFG-language. In that sense, the application of
the transformations cannot be expected to bring us a normal form for IF-formulas
that corresponds with the reduced normal form of extensive games.
The observations in this chapter make us believe that semantic games are not
a natural subclass of all games in extensive form, and therefore the use of game-
theoretic results for IFG-logic is limited. But we consider the formalization of the
semantic games for IFG-formulas into the existing game-theoretic terminology as
a useful result in itself. Other than the definition of semantic games in terms of
their rules, it yields mathematical objects to interpret central concepts as imperfect




In this chapter, we present and comment on a semantics for IFG-formulas with free
variables, based on the semantics of [CK99]. We first define the game semantics,
and then a set of inductive clauses that define the same notion of satisfaction. We
show how the original existential clause needed to be improved, and prove that the
(corrected) semantics makes IFG-logic a conservative extension of first order logic
(for arbitrary formulas). Finally, we demonstrate that IF-logic (with the slashing
convention) fails to be a conservative extension of first order logic (sentences only),
if we do not require the sentences to be regular. This serves as preparation for the
type of problems we found in the prenex normal form theorem of [CK99], which
we discuss and solve in the next chapter.
The contents of both the current and the next chapter are based on joint work
with Theo M.V. Janssen and Xavier Caicedo ([JD05],[CDJ]).
5.1 Independence with free variables
While the language of IF-logic consists of sentences only, the IFG-language also
contains formulas with free variables. Nevertheless, in the previous chapter, we
only formalized semantic games for IFG-sentences (cf. section 4.4). Open IFG-
formulas only occurred as a subformula ~ of a given sentence cp. This sentence
provided a context for the subformulas, that determined the player distribution
(through the polarity of z~), and the available information ( the relative domain
X~ determined which variables have a value assigned when we reach z~ in a game
for cp).
For first order logic, it is no problem to define game theoretical semantics for a
formula z[i with free variables: just add a valuation v for the free variables as extra
parameter to the semantic game, and let the game start from the initial position
(~, v, 1) (cf. definition 2.4.1). This initial position defines a subtree of the game
for any sentence containing z~ as a subformula. Because first order formulas define
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games of perfect information, there are no information sets involved. If a player
can win from this initial position, she can win from this position in the context of
any game tree. Hence, this subtree can be regarded apart from its context without
changing `its meaning'.
But the situation is different if we want to preserve the `meaning' of the slash
operator. The meaning of the slash operator is not determined by a single position
in the game, it is determined by the subdivision of a certain set of positions into
information sets, as induced by the slash operator. To illustrate this, consider
the IFG-formula ~y~~[x - y], with x as its only free variable occurring under the
slash. Suppose we would play a semantic game for this formula, with only the
valuation (x: 0) as extra parameter. If Eloïse would choose the value 0 for y,
there would be no way of telling from the resulting valuation (xy : 00) that y was
chosen independently of x. But if we take a set of valuations to begin with, the
set {(x : 0), (x : 1) } for example, the situation becomes different: if Eloïse chooses
the value 0 from the position with (x: 0), and 1 from the position with (x: 1),
her choice obviously depends on the value assigned to x. However, if she would
choose the same value in both cases, her choice would be independent of the value
assigned to x.
The idea to use a set of valuations in order to interpret open formulas with
the independence operator, was introduced by Wilfrid Hodges' trump semantics,
in [Hod97a]. 1~ump semantics coincides with game theoretical semantics for IFG-
sentences. Hence, by presenting his semantics, Hodges challenged Hintikka's claim
that logics with the slash operator are non-compositional by nature. As mentioned
in our introductory chapter 1, the presentation of trump semantics led to inter-
esting discussions about degrees of compositionality ([SHO1],[HodOlb]), but we do
not go into that matter here.
The semantics we present and comment upon in this chapter is a variation
of Hodges' trump semantics, as formulated by Xavier Caicedo and Michal Kryn-
icki in [CK99]. Their version came into existence in an attempt to get a better
understanding of trump semantics. Their paper also demonstrates why (in some
sense) compositional semantics for open formulas are useful. Until now, we have
encountered some equivalence schemes that hold for logics with the slash operator:
the ones associated with negation (cancellation of double negation, De Morgan's
laws), and some schemes associated with the Thompson transformations (but with
all the remarks about them, one may distrust the transformations as formal jus-
tification). With a decent notion of equivalence for open formulas, and some kind
of substitution principle for equivalent subformulas, it becomes easier to formu-
late and prove general equivalence schemes, without having to rely on translation
procedures to other systems (game theory, or Ei). This is demonstrated by the
prenex normal form theorem given in [CK99] (with some interesting flaws however,
which will be the topic of our next chapter).
In this chapter, we will introduce the game semantics for open IFG-formulas as
defined in [CK99], and the (corrected) clauses for an inductive notion of satisfaction
equivalent to this game semantics. As a first exercise with this semantics, we
prove that IFG-logic with this semantics for open formulas is (in a specific sense)
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a conservative extension of first order logic.
Continuing the theme of conservative extension, and preparing for the type of
situations we will encounter in the next chapter, we pay some attention to signaling
phenomena. We do so in relation to the slashing convention of IF-logic, and show
that nested quantification over the same variable may cause first order sentences
to become undetermined by the slashing convention. Thereby, IF-logic is only a
conservative extension of what we will call regular first order sentences.
5.2 Game semantics for open formulas
The language GIFG used in [CK99] was already defined in section 4.3.
We now
give the definition of game semantics for IFG-formulas with free variables. The
definition has to account for independence of variables whose assignment was de-
termined outside the game, as in GIFC variables may occur free under the slashes
in the formula. The ingredient we have to add to the game in order to be able to
interpret this independence, is a set of valuations (rather than one single valua-
tion for Fv(cp), as we could do for first order formulas). For the rest, the games
for (open) IFG-forinulas are very similar to the semantic games as defined in
definition 2.4.1. The main aim of this section is to introduce the games in the ter-
mino}ogy of [CK99, p. 18-19], because we will adopt this terminology to comment
on the results of that paper.
We first introduce some useful notations concerning sets of valuations. Recall
that we use the letter A to denote the domain of a given model 21.
Notation 5.2.1 (sets of variants) (Cf. definition 2.3.4.) Let 2l be a model, X
a set of variables, and V C A~x. If a E A, then Vx, a:- {v(x: a)w E V}. Also,
we defene V~, A:- {v(x: a)~v E V,a E A}, i.e. the set of all x-variants (in A) of
the valuations in V C AX .
We generalize this notation to sets of variables: for a finite set of variables Y,
we write Vy: A C AX~y for the set of all Y-variants' of the elements of V. An
Y-variant of v E V C AX is a valuation w E A~`~y such that v(x) - w(x) for all
x E X`Y. We will only use this notation once (in definition 5.2.4)
Notation 5.2.2 (explicit notation for sets of valuations) (Extending nota-
tion 2.3.2.) If V C A{~' ~-~~~xk} is a finite set of valuations, say V-{vl, ..., vn}
with v~ -(xl ... xk : al~ ... ak~), we write V as
{xl . . . xk : (all . . . ak1),
. . .
, (aln . . . akn)}.
For example, we write {0, 1}{x,y} as {xy: 00, 01,10,11}.
Let us now define the semantic games for open IFG-formulas. The main ingre-
dient of a game is an IFG-formula. The aim of the game is to determine whether
a formula cp is satisfied in a given suitable model 2l, with respect to a given set
of suitable valuations V C AX (i.e. with Fv(cp) C X). As before, Eloïse tries to
confirm satisfaction, while Abélard tries to refute it. The existence of a winning
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strategy for one of the players, determines whether or not the formula is satisfied
in 2l with respect to V.
We first define how the game is played: which player has to move in a given
position, what are his~her possible moves, and what is the effect of the move.
Following the syntax of the initial IFG-formula cp, the players will encounter sub-
formulas z~ V~Y B or ~x~yt~i. The subscript indicates that the choice associated
with that quantifier or connective has to be made independently of the variables
in Y. This is a restriction on the motivation for the choice, but not on the available
choices. Therefore in the description of the plays, it makes no difference whether
~Y occurs as subscript or not. Its role will be defined in the definition of the notion
of the choice functions that constitute the strategies (ef. definition 5.2.7).
To describe the positions for a subformula zli of cp in the game G(21, cp, V), we
need to determine the domain of the valuations for z~. This is determined by the
set of variables in the scope of whose quantification z,i occurs in cp. Recall from
defiuition 4.3.5 that we denote this set of variables as X~ , which we can read as
the set of variables to which the players assign (new) values in a play of G(2l, cp, V),
before they `reach' the subformula ~i. Because every play starts with a valuation
with domain X, this makes X U X~ the domain for the valuations in the positions
for z(i.
Compared with the positions in definition 2.4.1 of semantic games for first
order sentences, we replace the parameter p by the notion of polarity, as defined
in definition 4.3.7. We use the following notation:
Notation 5.2.3 (positive and negative subformulas) Let ~p be an IFG-for-
mula. Recall that S(~p) is the set of subformvlas of cp withovt initial negation signs
(ef. notation 4.g.3). Let S}(ep) :- {~ E S(ep)~z~ is positive in cp} and S-(cp) :-
{~ E S(cp)~~i is negative in cp}.
Definition 5.2.4 (IFG-semantic games) Given an IFG-formv,la ~p, a suitable
model 2l, and a set of valuations V C Ax in 2i with Fv(cp) C X, we define the
game G(2[, :p, V) as follows: ~ -
A position in the game is a pair (zl~,v) where z~ E S(cp), and v E Vx~: A C
~ ~Axux~, A position (zli, v) is a terminal if zG is atomic.
The moves (by the players Abélard and Eloi'se) determine the transitions from a
non-te7wninal position (~, v) to the next position. The polarity of ~ in cp determines
the player assignment: if ~ is positive in cp (~ E Sf (cp)), then the position is
assigned to Eloi"se; if ~ is negative in cp (~ E S-(cp)), then it is assigned to Abélard.
. if ~r(~ -~x~y~', then the assigned player chooses an a E A, and the play
continues from position (~zG'~, v(x: a)).
~ if ~t~i -~t V~Y ~i,., then the assigned player chooses a subformv,la zG' from
{z[it, zG,.}, and the play continues from position (~~t~i'~, v)
A play of the game is a terminal root path in the game tree, i. e. a seqvence
of positions that results from subsequent moves, starting with a position (cp, v) for
some v E V, and ending with a terminal position.
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The terminal position (zv, v') of a play, determines the outcome of the play:
the play is winning for Eloïse in the following cases:
. zG E Sf(cp) and 2l ~ ~[v'], or
. z(~ E S-(cp) and 2l ~ tb[v'].
In the other two cases, Abélard wins the play.
The semantic game G(2l, cp, V) is the collection of all plays starting from a
position ( cp, v) with v E V, together with the player assignment to all non-terminal
positions and the outcome function for all terminal positions.
Now we know how the game is played, we can define the central notion of
(winning) strategy. We do so in terms of choice functions. A choice function f~
is a function that describes which choice the assigned player makes at ~ in any
of the positions (z~, v) ( where v E Vx~ : A). The requirement that a choice may
not depend on the variables in a set Y appearing under the slash, is formalized by
requiring that f.~ yields the same choice for two valuations that `coincide out of
r:
Definition 5.2.5 (to coincide out of Y) Let v, w E Ax be two valuations of a
set of variables X in a model 2[, and Y an arbitraryset of variables. We then say
that v, w coincide out of Y(v ~Y w) if and only if v(x) - w(x) for all x E X`Y.
(Note that ~Y defines an equivalence relation on V.)
Definition 5.2.6 (independence of Y) If V C Ax and f is a function with
domain V, then f is independent of Y(or f is Y-independent) (on its domain
V) if for all v, w E V: v~Y w implies f(v) - f(w).
Note that any function is independent of the empty set of variables.
Definition 5.2.7 (choice functions) Let z[i E S(cp) be a subforrrtula of cp. A
choice function f,~ in the game G(2l, cp, V) is a function s.t.
. if ~-~x~yy~', then f~ : A-xuxy -, A is Y-independent; or
. if ~-~I V~Y ~r, then f~ ; Axux,~ --~ {l, r} is Y-independent
Definition 5.2.8 (strategies) A strategy for Eloïse in the game G(2(, cp, V) is a
set of choice functions { f~}~ESt~~i, one for each positive non-atomic subformula
zv. Similarly, a strategy for Abélard is a set of choice functions f,~, one for each
negative non-atomic subformula zG E S-(cp).
A strategy is called a winning strategy in game G(2l, cp, V) if playing in ac-
cordance with that strategy guarantees the owner of the strategy to win the game
from all starting positions (cp, v) (v E V).
Definition 5.2.9 (game satisfaction) Let cp 6e an IFG-formula, 2l a suitable
model, and V C Ax a set of suitable valuations for cp in 2l (i.e. with Fv(cp) C X).
We then define positive and negative game satisfaction as follows:
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2l ~~ cp[V] ( `cp is trae in '1l with respect to V')
i,f,f there e~ists a winning strategy for Eloi'se in G(21, cp, V)
2i ~c cp[V] ( `cp is false in ~1 with respect to V')
ifj' there exists a winning strategy for Abélard in G(2l, cp, V).
5.3 Inductive clauses for satisfaction
The game theoretic definition for positive and negative satisfaction (in other words:
truth and falsity) of IFG-formulas is one in terms of the existence of a set of
functions that satisfy independence conditions determined by the slash operator,
as we saw in the previous section. Hence, if we want to show that a given formula
is true or false with respect to a certain model ~l and set of valuations V, we have
to come up with a set of functions that witnesses this.
However, the definition given above does not yet give us a mathematically pre-
cise account of what it means that some strategy is applied by a player, and how
to verify that it is winning. This makes it hard to formally prove statements on
the evaluation of formulas, particularly if they claim that no winning strategies
exist.
In this section we give a set of clauses that enables us to read game satisfac-
tion for IFG as an inductive notion of satisfaction. We first present them as an
alternative satisfaction definition ~Í and then prove that the notions of ~Í and
[-~ coincide.
The inductive clauses are a useful tool in proving equivalence schemes for IFG-
logic. In this form, our semantics resembles the classical Tarskian definition of
satisfiability for first order logic, except that we have to work with sets of valua-
tions rather than single valuations. The clauses given here are an improved version
of the clauses given in lenuna 1.1 of [CK99, p. 21].
We will use the notion of Y-saturatedness for sets of valuations (from [CK99])
as the counterpart of the notion of independence for choice functions.
Definition 5.3.1 (Y-saturatedness) If V C AX is a set of valuations, and V' C
V a subset of V that is closed under the equivalence relation ~y on V(i.e. if v E V'
then for any w E V with v~y w: w E V'), we say that V' is Y-saturated in V.
Note that the Y-saturated subsets of V C AX are unions of equivalence classes of
the relation ~y on V. -
It is easy to verify that if Vl and V2 are Y-saturated subsets of V, then Vl U V2,
Vl f1 V2, and Vl `V2 are also Y-saturated subsets of V.
Definition 5.3.2 The partition V~ti,, of V into its ~y equivalence classes is called
the Y-saturated partition of V.
We are now prepared to define an inductive notion of satisfaction for IFG,
based on Lemma 1.1 in [CK99, p. 21]:
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Definition 5.3.3 (inductive satisfaction) Let cp be an IFG-formula, 2l a suit-
able model with domain A, and V C A~ a set of suitable valuations (i.e. Fv(cp) C
X). Then ~1 ~Í cp[V] is defined inductively as follows:
(At) If cp is atomic, then
2l ~i cp[V] af,j'~l ~ cp[v] for all v E V.
~l [-I cp[V] i,f~j"2l ~ cp[v] for all v E V.
(~) ~ ~i ~~[V] Z.ff`~ ~r ~[V]
~ ~i ~~[V] ~.f.f~ ~i ~[V]
(V, f) 2( [-Í (~ V~Y B)[V] if,f ~l [-Í z~[Vi] and ~l [-Í B[V2] for some Vl, V2 C V,
both Y-saturated in V, with V- Vi U V2.
(V,-) ~ ~i (~V~YB)[V] i.~~ ~i ~[v] and ~l ~ Í e[V] .
(~, f) ~1 ~Í ~x~y~[V] if and only if there is a partition V- UiEIVi into Y-
saturated subsets V of V, and there is for each i E I an ai E A, such that
~ ~I ~[ViEl(V )x: at]
(~, -) ~ ~i ~x~Y~[V] iÁ`~ ~i ~[Vx: a]
Before we prove this notion of satisfaction to coincide with game satisfaction,
we make some remarks:
1. Note that the right hand side of the atomic clauses uses the classical (Tarski)
definition of satisfaction.
2. Note that if we let V-~ C AX be the empty set of valuations, this inductive
definition of satisfaction yields:
~l ~i cp[0], for any IFG-formula cp
This might look anomalous, but it is actually necessary for the situation
with disjunction, where the empty sets of valuations can occur if V is split
into V and 0. (We remark that Hodges' trump semantics shares this feature,
cf. [Hod97c, p. 57].) Be aware that this is different from saying that formulas
are always satisfied by the singleton set A0 - {~}: this is not the case. In
fact, satisfaction with respect to A0 is only defined for formulas with no free
variables, i.e. sentences.
3. Compare the requirements for the positive clauses for disjunction and exis-
tential quantification. In the case of disjunction, we do not require the Vi to
be disjoint, while a choice function f: V-~ {l, r} would divide V into two
disjoint sets: f-1({l}) and f-1({r}). It follows from the next lemma, that
requiring disjointness here does not make a difference.
In the case of quantification, we do require disjointness as we partition V
into Y-saturated subsets. Note that if we take the Y-saturated partition of
V, this can be seen to correspond to the information partition of the nodes
in the extensive game tree that are associated with ~x~y~ (if we see ~x~yr~i
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as subformula of some sentence cp, and if V is the set of all valuations at
the nodes associated with ~x~ytli). For each i, a2 is then the unique action
prescribed by a strategy for all elements in the information set Vi. We come
back to the existential clause in section 5.4.
We now prove that satisfaction as defined in definition 5.3.3 coincides with
game satisfaction ( as in [JD05]). The proof may also explain the intuitions behind
the inductive clauses in terms of the games. In this respect, the following definition
(extending notation 5.2.1) is useful:
Definition 5.3.4 (x-variations) Let V C A~ be a set of valuations and x a
variable. A subset V~ of Vx; A is called an x-variation of V if Vx contains at
least one x-variant for every v E V. If f: V-r A, we define the x-variation of
V by f as follows:
V~; f:- {v(x: f(v))~v E V}.
A set V,~; f can be seen as the set of all possible valuations the game continues
with if Eloïse applies the choice function f to choose x in the game G(2l, ~x~YCp, V).
Notice that x may or may not be in X- dom(V).
Theorem 5.3.5 (game- and inductive satisfaction coincide) Suppose cp is
an IFG-formula and ~l a suitable model. Then for any set V C AX of valua-
tions for cp E 2l: -
~ ~~ ~[Vl i.tT ~ ~~ ~[vl
Proof.~ By induction on the syntax of cp:
(At) If cp is atomic, the semantic game G(21, cp, V) is the collection of one-position
plays consisting only of a terminal position (cp, v) with v E V. Because
strategies in such a game are empty for both players, it follows that Eloïse
has a winning strategy (2l ~~ cp[V]) if and only if ~1 [- cp[v] for all v E V(see
the definition of the outcome of a play in definition 5.2.4), i.e. 2l ~Í cp[V].
Similarly, ~ll [-~ cp[V] if and only if ~l [~ cp[v] for all v E V, i.e. 2l ~Í cp[V].
(~) Suppose ~p -~~. G(2l, ~~, V) is the same game as G(2i, ~,, V), except that
the polarity of the subformulas is reversed: S}(~~) - S-(~) and S-(~z~) -
S}(~~). It follows that any winning strategy for Eloïse in G(~l, ~z(i, V) is a
winning strategy for Abélard in G(21, zli, V) and conversely. Hence:
~ ~G ~y'[V] lff
iff (by induction)
iff (by definition)
Similarly, t11 ~~ ~z~[V] iff ~! [-Í ~zG[V].
(V) Suppose cp - z~ V~y 6.
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(~) First, suppose 2i ~~ z~i V~y e[V] and let f- f~ be the `first' choice
function of a winning strategy F~ for Eloïse in G(~l, cp, V). Now define
Vl - f-1({l}) and V2 - f-1({r}). Then 2( ~~ z~i[Vi], ~l ~c B[V2], and
V - Vl U V2. It ís easy to verify that because f is independent of Y,
both V are Y-saturated in V: if v ~y w, then f(v) - f(w), hence v, w
are in the same U. By induction hypothesis we have 2l ~Í ~(Vl] and
`.2t ~i B[Va], hence 2l ~i cp[V].
Conversely, suppose 21 ~Í cp[V] and determine Vl, V2i Y-saturated in V
with Vl U V2 - V such that ~i ~Í ~[Vl] and ~( ~Í 8[V2]. By induction
hypothesis we have winning strategies F~, for Eloïse in G(~l, ~, Vl) and
FB for G(~l, 9, V2). Now define f,~ : V-~ {l, r} by f,~(v) - l if v E Vi and
f~(v) - r otherwise (i.e. if v E V`Vl). Then F~ - F~ U FB U{ f~} is a
winning strategy for Eloïse in the game G(2l,cp,V), hence ~l ~~ cp[V].
(-) The following are equivalent:
~ ~l ~c ~ V~y B[V].
~ Zl ~c ~[V] and 21 ~~ B[V] (a winning strategy for Abélard in
G(21, cp, V) does not contain a choice function for cp, so ít must be a
winning strategy in both G(2l, ~, V) and G(2l, B, V)).
~ 2t ~Í z~i[V] and ~l ~Í B[V] (by induction hypothesis)
~ ~l ~Í ~i V~yB[V] (by definition)
Suppose cp - 3x~yt~i.
(~) First, suppose ~l ~~ ~x~yz~[V] and let f- f~ be the `first' choice
function of a winning strategy F~ for Eloïse in G(2[, cp, V ). Let Vy ; f be
the x-variation of V by f, as in definition 5.3.4. Then SZl ~~ ~[V~: f]
by the strategy F~ - F,~ ` { f}. By induction we then also have 2l ~Í
~[V~: f].
Now let V- U2Vti be the Y-saturated partition of V, then, because f is
independent of Y, f (v) - f(w) for all v, w in the same U. So, we can
define ai to be f(v) for an arbitrary v E Vi, and then: Ui(V )y: a; -
V~; f. Because ~l ~Í z~[V~; f ] we may now conclude 2[ ~Í 3x~yc~[V].
Conversely, assume ~l ~Í 3x~y~i[V], and determine a Y-saturated par-
tition UiV2 of V and ai E A such that ~l ~Í zli[U~(V)x: a;]. By in-
duction: ti1i ~~ z~ [U~ ( Vi )x ; a; ], so determine a winning strategy F,~ for
Eloïse in G(~l, ~, Ui(Vi)y: Q;). Now define f: V -~ A such that for each
v E[2 f( v) - a2. The fact that the V2 form a partition, makes f well-
defined on V, and because the Vi are Y-saturated, f is automatically Y-
independent. Fhrthermore, Vx ; f - U~ (V )x : a; . Thus, F~ - F,~ U{ f} is
a winning strategy for Eloïse in the game G(~1, cp, V), hence 2t ~~ cp[V].
The following are equivalent:
~ ~1 ~~ ~x~Y~[V].
~ 2l ~c ~[Vx; A ] (a winning strategy for Abélard in G(2t, cp, V) does
not contain a choice function for cp, it must be a winning strategy
for all possible assignments to x chosen by Eloïse)
(-)
96 CHAPTER 5. SATISFACTION FOR OPEN IFG-FORMULAS
~ 2l ~Í ~[Vx: A ] (by induction hypothesis)
~ 2( ~Í ~x~yt~[V] ( by definition)
In a sense, the definition of ~Í makes the effect of the application of one choice
function in a(winning) strategy explicit in terms of sets of valuations. This will
be very useful when we want to prove general equivalence schemes, like in the
case of the improved prenex normal form theorem we discuss in the next chapter.
In the rest of this thesis, we will always write ~~ , but reason in terms of sets
of valuations according to the definition of ~ Í whenever this helps making the
argument more precise.
For closed formulas, i.e. sentences, we introduce the following abbreviation.
Definition 5.3.6 (satisfaction for sentences) If cp is an IFG-sentence and 2l
a suitable model, we define:
`~ ~c ~P i"~P is true in 2l") t-d-~ ~i ~c cp[{~}]
~~c ~P i "~P is false in 2l") t~ ~l ~c cp[{~}]
We will prove in the next chapter ( corollary 6.2.3) that for sentences
any set of valuations V C Ax : 2[ ~G cp[V] iff 21 ~~ cp.
cp and for
5.4 On the positive existential clause
In definition 5.3.3 we gave a positive existential clause that was formulated in
terms of Y-saturation of subsets V of V. Because we require the UY in the clause
to form a partition (whereby they are disjoint), and we pick one domain element
ai for each V, it is not hard to see that this implicitly defines a Y-independent
function f: V-r A. The clause (~, f) of Definition 5.3.3 can thus easily be seen
to have an alternative formulation making this function explicit:
Lemma 5.4.1 (alternative existential clause) 2l ~Í 3x~~.~p[V] if and only if
S?.l ~Í cp[Vx: f ] for some f: V-~ A that is independent of Y.
The alternative formulation of the positive existential clause as in lemma 5.4.1,
will be used in most of our arguments and proofs, as it combines well with our
game theoretic intuitions.
As a side remark, we mention that if in the original clause of definition 5.3.3,
we loosen the requirement of the V to be a partition, and instead let them just be
a collection of subsets that together cover V, the clause can be seen to correspond
to the strategies as relations approach, briefly mentioned at the end of section 2.4.
This loosened version is equivalent to the partition-version by the axiom of choice,
hence it would require the axiom of choice to prove the corresponding version of
theorem 5.3.5. Choosing for the loosened version would avoid incorporating the
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axiom of choice in the inductive notion of satisfaction, and thereby make it pos-
sible to prove the conservative extension lemma in the next section without the
axiom of choice. However, some of the results in the next chapter cannot (easily?)
be generalized to a strategies-as-relations approach, so we stay with the strategy-
as-function approach.
The inductive notion of satisfaction of definition 5.3.3 is based on Lemma 1.1 of
[CK99]. However, we defined our existential clause differently, because we found a
problem in the corresponding clause of that lemma. We will explain the problem,
and how our alternative solves this problem.
Quote 5.4.2 (Lemma 1.1(e), [CK99, p. 21]) 2l ~~ ~x~Ycp[V] if and only if
21 ~c cp[Vx] for some set V~ C V~; A that is indePendent of Y for x.
The condition "V~ is inde7~endent of Y for x" is defined as follows ([CK99, p. 20]):
whenever v, w E V~ coincide out of YU {x}, then v(x) - w(x). This is intended
to correspond with the condition of Game Satisfaction that the strategy function
f3x~,,~ should be independent of Y.
This part of the lemma is incorrect at two points. First, we obviously need to
add the condition that Vx is an x-variation of V, i.e. that V~ contains at least one
x-variant of each v E V (cf. definition 5.3.4). Otherwise, any singleton V~ C Vy; A
satisfies the condition that Vx is Y-independent for x, thereby unintendedly making
the inductive clause much weaker than game satisfaction. (Indeed, the condition
that there is at least one x-variant for each v E V, is needed to make f in the
proof of this clause of [CK99] well-defined.)
But more subtly, the following example shows that in certain situations game
satisfaction allows for signaling that is prohibited under the inductive clause of
Lemma 1.1 (e).
Example 5.4.3: (Counterexample to [CK99], Lemma 1.1(e)) First, con-
sider the formula z~ :- ~x~y[x - y] in a model 2l with domain A- {0, 1}, and let
V be the set of valuations { yz : 00, 11 }. This situation could typically occur in the
third stage of the game on the sentence dy~z~x~~[x - y].
It is easy to check that 2l ~~ ~[V]: the function f: V~ {0,1} with f(v) -
v(z) is a winning strategy for Eloïse. The cited clause of Lemma 1.1(e) is also
satisfied, by the set Vx -{xyz: 000,111}. In both cases, signaling the value of y
through the value of z is apparently allowed.
Now consider the same formula, in the same model, but with the slightly
different set of valuations V' - {xy: 00, 11}. One could consider this situation as
third stage of the game on the sentence dy3x~x~y[x - y].
Again, 2l ~~ z~[V'] because f' : V' -~ {0,1} with f'(v) - v(x) is as valid a
winning strategy for Eloïse as f in the previous case. On the other hand, the only
x-variation of V' to satisfy the remaining atomic formula (x - y) would be V'
itself. But V' is not independent of y for x: the elements of V' coincide out of xy
(where they are the empty valuation), which means that for independence they
should assign the same value to x. They obviously don't.
Apparently the condition of Y-independence-for-x on the x-variation of V' is
stricter than the condition of Y-independence on the function f'. o
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Note that an ~-variation Vx of V that is independent of Yfor ~, contains exactly
one ~-variant for every v E V. This means that in that case there is a function
f: V-~ A such that
Vx -{v(~: f(v))~v E V} - Vx; f
and from the Y-independence of Vy for ~, we can deduce that this f is independent
of Y. In the example above, we have seen that the converse is not necessarily true:
there the set V' was also of the form
Vx, f, -{v(~: f'(v))~v E V'}
(with f' the winning strategy of Eloïse), but V' was not independent of Y for x.
In the example, we stumbled upon a subtle asymmetry between the definitions
of independence for functions (as used in Game Satisfaction) and independence-
for-~ for sets of valuations (as used in Lemma 1.1(e) of [CK99J). The latter implied
independence of the variable bound by the quantification, whereas the first doesn't
do so. Note that this difference only occurs in situations where the quantified
variable -x in the examples and definitions above- happens to be an element of
the domain X of V.
To repair the difference, we had the choice to either include the implicit inde-
pendence in a stricter notion of independence for functions, or to loosen up the
notion of independence for sets of valuations. With the main argument that we
like our language to be as general as possible with as little implicit conventions as
possible, we chose the latter. This can easily be recognized in the formulation of
clause (~, -F) in Lemma 5.4.1, which shows a direct correspondence of the condition
in the inductive notion of satisfaction and the conditions in game satisfaction.
It is the equivalent, alternative clause of lemma 5.4.1 that we will mostly use,
because of its direct correspondence to the application of choice functions. We
also wanted to introduce the existential clause of definition 5.3.3, because it makes
the definition of inductive satisfaction purely in terms of sets of valuations and Y-
saturatedness: hence, the condition `independence of Y' used for choice functions
has its counterpart in `Y-saturatedness' for sets of valuations. But from now on,
we will use the clause that works best in our proofs and arguments.
In the rest of this thesis we will no longer distinguish between the two notions
of satisfaction, as they were proved to coincide. The general notation we will use
for satisfaction is ~~ , which will be interpreted both in terms of strategies (mostly
in the explanation of the examples) and inductively (in formal proofs).
5.5 Conservative extension of first order logic
As a first exercise for the semantics for open formulas defined in the previous
section, we will prove explicitly that IFG-logic can be seen to be a conservative
extension of first order logic. We have to explain what we mean by this, because
IFG-formulas (whether or not their connectives and quantifiers are slashed), are
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evaluated with respect to a set of valuations, while first order formulas are evalu-
ated only with respect to one valuation.
The reader should be aware that, as we explained in the introductory section
of this chapter, it is not the case for IFG-formulas ~ in general that
2l ~~ z~[V] iff 2l ~~ z~i[{v}J for all v E V (5.1)
because the independence conditions in ~ will lose their meaning if we evaluate
the formula with respect to only one valuation. E.g. 2( ~~ ~y~~ [x - y] [{x : 0}]
and 2l ~~ 3y~x[x - y][{x: 1}], while not S11 [-~ ~y~~[x - y][{x: 0, 1}]. (Formulas
that have the property ( 5.1) are called ,fdat in [Hod97c].)
If an IFG-formula ~ contains no slashes, or more precisely: the sets of variables
under the slashes in z~i are all empty, we say that ~ is a first order formula.
We will see that ( 5.1) does hold for first order formulas. This follows from the
next lemma, proving that our semantics for IFG-formulas is in a certain sense, a
conservative extension of first order logic with classical semantics:
Lemma 5.5.1 ( [CK99], Lemma 1.2, p. 22) For every first order formnla cp,
structvre ~1 and set of valu~ations V C AX with Fv(cp) C X:
21~c cp[V] i,f,f2l~cp[v] forallvEV.
Similarly, 2l ]-~ cp[V] i,fJ'2( ~ cp[v] for all v E V.
Proof.. First, we give the special cases of of definition 5.3.3 and lemma 5.4.1 in the
case that Y- 0(which is the case for all quantifiers and connectives in first order
formulas):
(V, f) 2[ ~~ [zli v B][V] iff 2l ~~ zV[Vl] and Zl ~~ B[V2], for some Vi and V2 such
thatV-VlUVZ
(V, -) 2l ~c [~ V B][V] iff ~l ~c z~[V] and 2l ~~ B[V].
(3, ~) ~[ ~c ~xzG[V] iff there is an f: V-~ A such that'Zl ~~ ~[V~; f]
(~, -) ~ ~c ~xz~[V] iff ~l ~c ~[V~: n]
We prove the lemma by induction on the structure of the first order formula cp:
(At) Immediate: by the definition of the atomic case in the definition of ~~ .
(~) The following are equivalent:
- 2l ~~ ~~P[V]
- ~l ~c ~p[V] ( by definition 5.3.3)
- 2l ~ cp[v] for all v E V (by induction hypothesis)
-~l ~~~p[v] for all v E V.
Similarly (by the same arguments):
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- ~l ~c ~~P[V]
- 2l ~~ cp[V] (by definition 5.3.3)
- 2i ~ cp[v] for all v E V (by induction hypothesis)
-~[ ~~cp[v] for all v E V.
(V,-~) If 2l ~~ [?IiVB][V], let V1iV2 be such that V- Vl UV2 and 2l ~~ z~[Vl] and
21 ~~ B[V2]. By induction hypothesis: 2l ]- zli[v] for all v E Vi and 2t ~ B[v]
for all v E V2. Hence: ~i ~[~ v B][v] for all v E Vl U V2 - V.
Conversely, if ~[ ~ [~i V 9][v] for all v E V, we can let Vl :- {v E V~21 ~
~[v]}, and V2 :- {v E V~21 ~ B[v]}. Then, Vl U VZ - V, and by induction
hypothesis: 2l ~~ z~[Vi] and 2[ ~~ 8[V2]. Hence: ~l ~~ [~iV e][V].
(V, -) The following are equivalent:
- 21 ~c [~ V e][V]
- 2l ~c ~[V] and 2l ~~ B[V] (by definition 5.3.3)
- 2l ~ zG[v] and 2! ~ B[v], for all v E V ( by induction hypothesis)
- 2l [~ [z~i V B][v] for all v E V.
(~, f) Suppose 2l ~~ ~xz~[V]. Let f: V~ A be a function such that 21 ~~
z~[V~: f ]. By induction hypothesis: 2( ~~[v(x: f(v))] for all v E V, but this
implies 2( ]- ~x~[v] for all v E V.
Conversely, suppose t11 ~ ~x~[v] for each v E V. This means that for each v,
there is an a such that ~l ~~[v(x: a)]. Due to the axiom of choice, there is
then an f : V-~ A such that 21 ~~[v(x: f( v))] for each v E V. By induction
hypothesis, it then follows that ~ll ~~ ~[V~: f], hence ~l ~~ ~x~[V].
(~, -) The following are equivalent:
- 2i ~~ ~xz,i[V]
- `~ ~c ~[Vx: A ] (by definition 5.3.3)
- 2l (~ ~[v(x: a)] for all v E V and a E A (by induction hypothesis)
- SZl ~~x~ [v] for all v E V.
a
In particular, we have for first order sentences cp (cf. definition 5.3.6):
~~c 4~ iff 21~~P
21 ~c ~P iff 2t ~ ~P
But more generally, it immediately follows from the previous lemma, that for an
arbitrary first order formula ~ and a suitable valuation v for ~i in 2l:
2l ~ ~[v] iff 2[ ~c zli[{v}] (5.2)
21 ~ ~[v] iff 2l ~c zv[{v}] (5.3)
(Note that these equivalences, in combination with the lemma, imply that (5.1)
holds for first order formulas.) In this sense, IFG-logic and its semantics are a
conservative extension of classical first order logic.
5.6 SIGNALING, IF-LOGIC AND REGULARITY 101
5.6 Signaling, IF-logic and regularity
In the previous section, using the inductive definition of satisfaction for IFG-
formulas, we proved step-by-step that this notion of satisfaction coincides with
Tarski semantics for first order formulas (in the sense of (5.2) and (5.3) above).
In this section we will return shortly to Hintikka's IF-language, which con-
sisted of all first order sentences in negation normal form and the sentences result-
ing from them by application of the slash operator (according to some restricted
rules, cf. definition 2.5.1). Because game theoretical semantics for first order sen-
tences coincides with Tarski semantics, as noted at the end of section 2.4, it seems
to follow easily that IF-logic is a conservative extension of first order logic (if we
restrict the latter to sentences).
However, in chapter 3 we argued that Hintikka seems to take the syntactical
procedure of Skolemization ( in the usual outside-in order) as primitive rather than
the game theoretical semantics he advocates. In section 3.9, we saw how this led
Hintikka to introduce the slashing convention: the assumption that, in the seman-
tic games, Eloïse always forgets her own previous moves. The introduction of this
convention lets strategies in the semantics games consist of the intended Skolem
functions (cf. also section 4.4), but it also turns semantic games for first order for-
mulas into games of imperfect information ( even: imperfect recall, cf. section 4.7).
This means that it is no longer straightforward that the law of the excluded middle
should hold, as the game-theoretical argument for this relies on the fact that these
games are of perfect information. And if the law of the excluded middle would fail
for first order sentences, this would compromise the conservative extension claim
for IF-logic.
On the other hand, the combination of theorem 3.2.2 with Hintikka's ap-
proach 3.2.5 seems to show that, even under the slashing convention, a first order
sentence is classically true in a suitable model (~l ~ ~p) if and only if it is true
under game theoretical semantics (2l ~~t cp).
So, all seems to be well. But that we should never feel too safe too quickly, is
demonstrated by the many examples given by Theo M.V. Janssen of unexpected
signaling phenomena that surprise our classically trained minds (cf. e.g. [Jan02]).
The value assigned to a`forbidden' variable, may in some cases be signaled to
a player by a strategically made earlier choice. The typical example of this phe-
nomenon is Hodges' formula (3.10): dx~z~y~x[x - y]. Eloïse may choose the value
for z equal to x, and subsequently, the value for y equal to z. This way, she ensures
x- y without violating the condition that her strategy for y may not depend on x.
(It is also problematic to interpret this epistemically -which may be accounted for
by general conceptual problems with imperfect recall, cf. section 4.7: while Eloïse
is supposed not to know the value of x, she apparently does know that the value
of z is equal to the value of x.) Hintikka excluded the `forbidden' dependencies
in this example by the introduction of the slashing convention (cf. the quote on
page 44 of this thesis).
But the slashing convention itself gives rise to new violations of our epistemic
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intuitions: how can Eloïse be supposed to forget all her own previous moves while
she may be capable of remembering the earlier moves of her opponent? For exam-
ple, compare the IF-formulas dx~y[x - y] and 3x~y[x - y]. In a semantic game
for the first formula, Eloïse's winning strategy for the choice of y can (and must)
use the value of x. However, she cannot copy this idea to get a winning strategy
in a semantic game for the second formula. Making the implicit independence in
the second formula explicit, it is equivalent to the IFG-formula: ~x~y~x[x - y].
In a game for that formula, she may not use the value of x. But she still has a
winning strategy: she may coordinate her choice for x with her choice for y, by
choosing them both by the same (constant) choice function.
We see that the slashing convention blocks the signaling possibility in formulas
like Hodges' example, but that at the same time, it makes signaling an essential
part of IF-logic. This is also demonstrated in the following similar, but a bit more
complicated example:
b'x~y[x - y n ~z[y - z]] (5.4)
This first order sentence is classically true in all suitable models. As an IF-sentence,
with the slashing convention, ( 5.4) translates into the IFG-sentence
dx3y[x - y n ~z~y[y - z]] (5.5)
In order to choose z equal to y, Eloïse may not use the value of y itself. However,
she can use the value of x to signal the value of y, by the fact that she must have
chosen y like that in order to satisfy the left conjunct (x - y). By this `trick',
(5.4) turns out to be valid as an IF-sentence as well. But things go wrong if the
crucial signal of x is blocked:
Example 5.6.1: (IF-logic may differ on first order sentences with nested
quantification over the same variable) This example is a variation on forinula
(21) in [JD05]. Consider the first order sentence:
dx~y[x - y n dx~z[y - z]]. (5.6)
Like (5.4), this sentence is classically true in all models: the second quantification
b'x is empty (i.e. the variable x does not occur in its scope), and may therefore be
ignored.
If we read the first order sentence (5.6) as an IF-sentence, Hintikka's slashing
convention applies to it (cf. section 3.9). This means that the inner existential
quantification ~z is taken to be implicitly independent of the outer existential
quantification 3y. We make this implicit independence explicit in the following
IFGformula, that thereby has the same meaning as the IF-sentence (5.6):
`dx~y[x - y n b'x~zlv[y - z]]. (5.7)
In comparison with (5.5), Eloïse now has a problem: even if the variable x does
not occur in ~z~y[y - z], Abélard did choose a possibly different value for x before
Eloïse gets to choose z. So, she can no longer trust the value of x as a signal for
the value of y, hence: she has no winning strategy!
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This is supported by a step-by-step analysis of the IFG-sentence by the induc-
tive definition of satisfaction. Consider this sentence in a model 2l with domain
{0, 1}. We then have:
~l ~~ dx~y[x - y n b'x~zlv[y - z]], iff
~[ ~~ b'x~y[x - y n dx3zly[y - z]][{~}], iff
2l ~c 3y[x - y n dx3zly[y - z]][{x: 0, 1}], iff
`~ ~c (x - y) ndx3zl~[y - z][{x: 0, 1}y: f]
for some f:{x: 0, 1} --~ {0, 1}. In order to let the y-variants of (x: 0) and (x: 1)
both to satisfy the left conjunct (x - y), there is no other option than to let
f(x: 0) - 0 and f(x: 1) - 1. We then need to verify:
~l ~G dx~zly[y - z][{xy: 00,11}], hence if
~~~ ~zl~[y - z][{xy: oo, lo, ol, ll}]
In order to verify the latter, we need a function g: {xy: 00, 10, 01,11} --~ {0, 1}
that is constant on the equivalence classes {xy : 00, O1 } and {xy : 10,11} of the
relation ~y. But let's say that g(v) - c for both elements in the first set, then
one of the z-variants in {xyz : OOc, Olc} fails to satisfy the atomic formula (y - z).
(Similarly for the second equivalence class.) Hence:
2l [~~ b'x~y[x - y ndx~zly[y - z]].
To see the problem from a different angle, let's look at the truth condition of
the first order sentence (5.6) by Skolemization:
~f3gdx[x - f(x) n dx[f (x) - 9(x)]].
We observe that the argument x of the Skolem function f falls under two differ-
ent quantifications over x. This makes the replacement of y within the scope of
the inner quantification over x u~csound: the occurrences of y would always get
the same value assigned, while the term f(x), by which y is replaced, may have
different values at different places in the formula. We conclude from this exam-
ple that apparently, an implicit precondition for Skolemization is that no nested
quantification over the same variable occurs in the formula. o
We conclude that the evaluation of unslashed IF-sentences (i.e. first order sen-
tences with the slashing convention) is not always the same as their classical evalu-
ation as first order formula. In fact, we have shown an unslashed IF-sentence that
is undecided. Apparently, the slashing convention can let the law of the excluded
middle fail for first order sentences. It all depends on the occurrence of nested
quantification over the same variable. We will call this syntactic phenomenon ir-
regularity (and its opposite regularity). We will encounter it many times in the
next chapter as the cause of more problems.
With regular first order sentences, problems as in the example above do not
occur: we can then safely apply the Skolemization procedure and use the a.rgument
that we gave at the end of the second paragraph of this section. So:
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Theorem 5.6.2 (conservative extension theorem for IF-logic) IF-logic is
a conseroative e~tension of the classical evalnation forregular first order sentences.
Proof.. For the Skolemization procedure to be sound, we need the first order sen-
tences to be regular. The theorem then follows from theorem 3.2.2 and Hintikka's
approach 3.2.5. a
In [HA59, p. 74], Hilbert and Ackermann defined the language of first order
predicate logic in such a way that the formulas never contain nested quantification
over the same variable (nor do variables occur both free and bound in one for-
mula).1 Nowadays, it is rather common to define the first order language without
these restrictions. Our example above indicates that for the interpretation of first
order sentences as IF-sentences, it is important to adhere to these restrictions.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced and explained the game semantics for open
IFG-formulas as given by [CK99]. We also gave an alternative, inductive, definition
of satisfaction for IFG-formulas that is entirely in terms of sets of valuations. We
proved the two notion of satisfaction to be equivalent. Moreover, we gave an
alternative existential clause for the inductive definition of satisfaction, in terms
of functions, equivalent to the one we gave in terms of sets of valuations. Because
of its close conceptual correspondence with the game theoretic terminology we use
informally, it is tliis clause that we will mostly use.
We used the semantics for open IFG-formulas to prove how IFG-logic is a con-
servative extension of first order logic.
Our inductive definition of satisfaction was based on [CK99, Lemma 1.1]. How-
ever, we demonstrated a problem with the original existential clause. This problem
occurred if the variable bound by the existential quantifier, was already in the do-
main X of the set of valuations with which the formula was evaluated. We also
demonstrated how the slashing convention challenges the claim that IF-logic is
a conservative extension of classical logic: if an unslashed IF-sentence contains
nested quantification over the same variable, signals that are crucial to overcome
Eloïse's imperfect recall (induced by the slashing convention), may be lost. IF-
logic therefore only extends the regular first order sentences: sentences in which
nested quantification over the same variable does not occur.
Similar situations cause problems for the steps leading to the prenex normal
form theorem of [CK99]. We will show this in the next chapter, where we also
introduce the solutions to recover the prenex normal form theorem for regular
IFG-sentences.
1 Our attention was drawn to this fact at a course taught by Saul Kripke in Utrecht in January
2001, which started with a long and energetic defence of what Kripke referred to as the Hilbert-
Ackermann conventions.
Chapter 6
The prenex normal form
theorem
In this chapter, we critically study the equivalence schemes of [CK99], used to
prove a prenex normal form theorem for IFG-formulas. The proof of this result
goes along the same type of equivalence schemes as in classical first order logic:
renaming of bound variables, quantifier extraction, and substitution of equivalents.
Lifting these schemes to logic with imperfect information turns out to be even
less straightforward than described in [CK99]. Independence conditions make the
formulas sensitive for signaling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification
over the same variable and related situations are shown to cause problems, by the
fact that in those cases signaling can be blocked unexpectedly.
We show that the notion of equivalence used in the equivalence schemes, is too
strict for renaming of bound variables. We prove a couple of general lemmas, refine
definitions and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore (a restricted version
of) the prenex normal form theorem. We also prove how slashed connectives can
be eliminated. All these results are proved for a strong notion of equivalence, and
the arguments stay within the language and semantics of IFG-logic, i.e. without
using translations to other, `meta'-systems (like Ei).
The results presented in this chapter are joint work with Xavier Caicedo and
Theo M.V. Janssen ([CDJ]).
6.1 Introduction
Recall that a formula is in prenex form if it consists of a(possibly empty) sequence
of quantifiers, followed by a quantifier-free formula ~:
Q2~1Q2~2 . . . QkxkW(xi, x2, . . . , 2k).
It is a well known fact that every first order formula can be transformed into an
equivalent formula in prenex form. We call this result the prenex normal form
theorem for first order logic.
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The prenex normal form theorem for IFG-formulas presented in [CK99], gen-
eralizes the first order prenex normal form theorem. It is obtained following the
same steps: if necessary, quantified variables are renamed, then quantifiers are
`pulled over connectives' to move them to the front of the formula. All steps are
proved for IFG-formulas in terms of the semantics presented in the previous chap-
ter. (This means that our prenex normal form theorem does not depend on a
similar result for some classical logic, as would for example be the case if we would
transform the sentences into Ei-sentences, transform these into prenex form, and
then translate the result back into slashed sentences. ) Moreover, the prenex nor-
mal form theorem for IFG-formulas is valid in a strong sense of equivalence (which
is, for example, not the case for the generalized Skolem form mentioned in [Hin96,
p. 60] ) .
But as the list of counterexamples in this chapter indicates, the original result
of [CK99] was not immune for the traps of signaling, that always lurk in the
background of our logic with imperfect information. In section 5.6, we described
signaling as a situation in which information is conveyed, that was not (supposed
to be) available to a player in a game. With signaling in IFG-logic, we mean
situations in which the imperfect information requirements (induced by the slash
operator) can be overcome through values assigned to other variables. These may
tell a player something about the value of the variable she is not allowed to use
(or at least: not explicitly).
We discover situations in which signaling either becomes possible or blocked
by subtle changes in either the IFG-formula or the domain of the valuations with
which it is evaluated. These situations make it necessary to reformulate a num-
ber of the results from [CK99], and inspire us to formulate and prove some new
insights. Most of the problematic situations were presented (but not yet solved)
in the paper [JD05]. Solving them turned out to be far from straightforward, as
demonstrated in the course of this chapter.
Histories vs valuations
To clarify the nature of the problems, we point out that they are a consequence
of the fact that we model the semantic games using valuations. In the logical
context that we are working in, this is the natural option. But when we stated in
chapter 4 that there is a correspondence between histories and pairs of subformulas
with valuations, we implicitly used the assumption made on page 57 that no nested
quantification over the same variable occurs in the sentence for which the game is
modeled.
We needed the assumption that the sentence is regular, because there is a
difference between histories and valuations that occurs if we play semantic games
for irregular formulas: where in a history every choice for a domain element is
stored at the `chronological' point where the choice was made (with no reference
to the quantified variable giving rise to the move), in a valuation it is stored as
the assignment for the specific bound variable. This means that, if in one run of a
game a second value must be chosen for the same variable, the first value chosen
for that variable will be overwritten in the valuation, while in the corresponding
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history, the two values are still available (we could refer to the first and the second
value chosen for the variable).
Working with open formulas, the same type of problem can also occur if a
formula contains one variable both free and bound, or even if it is evaluated with
respect to valuations whose domain contain variables that occur bound in the
formula. We will show how these technical problems can be solved.
A short comparison with trump semantics
We remark that most counterexamples and results in this chapter can easily be
transferred (in some form) to Hodges' trump semantics (as defined in [Hod97a]).
The main difference between trump semantics and the semantics of [CK99] (which
we presented in the previous chapter), is that Hodges acknowledges the non-trivial
role of the domains of the valuations by considering formulas only in combination
with a fixed set of variables. These variables are all to be treated as free variables
of the formula, even if they do not occur in the formula itself. The trumps of
a formula(-combination) ~(X) in a model 2l are the sets V C AX for which
21 ~c ~[V] (in our terminology). The set of trumps of a formula(-combination)
~(X) in a model constitute its meaning in that model. An immediate consequence
is that a formula ~(x) has a different meaning than a formula ~(x, z) even if z does
not occur in z~i; that this is not so strange in the context of logic with imperfect
information may be demonstrated by the comparison of the sentences `dx[~t~i(x)]
and dx~z[~i(x, z)] where ~- ~y~x[x - y] (the latter sentence is then Hodges'
formula (3.10)).
Unfortunately, we have not yet finished a full account of how the results in this
chapter translate to trump semantics, but in some remarks in the next section we
indicate the noted relations to Hodges' work. The next section proves results that
in Hodges' terms are of the form: "If V is a trump for the formula cp(X), then V'
is a trump for the formula cp'(X')".
6.2 Some monotonicity results
For later use, we will now state soine facts on satisfaction for IFG-formulas with
respect to different sets of valuations: we prove that taking subsets preserves
satisfaction, and that under certain circumstances the domain of the valuations
can be extended by new variables. This corresponds to proposition 2 of [Hod97c].
Lemma 6.2.1 (Downward monotonicity) Let cp be an IFG-formula, and 2l a
suitable model for cp. Then for any set of valuations V C AX urith Fv(cp) C X,
and for any W C V: 21 ]-~ cp[V] implies Zl ~~ cp[W].
Proof.. We use induction on the complexity of cp. The atomic case and induction
for ~ are immediate.
(V, f) 2L ~~ (cpl V~Y cp2)[VJ means the existence of subsets Vl and VZ of V, both
Y-saturated in V with Vi U V2 - V, such that 2l ~~ cpi[Vi]. Define Wz :-
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V n W(i - 1, 2). Then the Wi are Y-saturated in W, Wl U WZ - W,
and by induction hypothesis: 2[ ]-~ cpi[Wi] for i- 1, 2. Hence: 2l ~~
(~Pi ~~Y~Pa)[W]
(u, -) 2l ~~ (cplV~~.cp2)[V] means 2l ~~ cpt[V] for i- 1, 2. By induction hypothesis
this implies 2( ~~ cp2[W], hence: 2l ~~ (cpl V~ycp2)[W].
(~, -~) 2l ~~ ~x~Ycp[V] means 2l ~~ cp[V~: f ] for some Y-independent f: V-~
A. Obviously, the restriction of f to W is also independent of Y, and by
induction: 2l [-~ cp[W~: f ]. Thus: 2l ~~ ~x~Ycp[W].
(~, -) 2I ~~ ~x~Ycp[V] means 2( ~~ cp[Vx: A]. By induction, this implies ~[ ~~
cp[W~: A], and hence: 21 ~~ ~x~Ycp[W].
Note that, of course, "upward monotonicity" is more problematic. For example,
if ~l ~~ cp[V] and 2l ~~ cp[W] for some V,W C AX with Fv(cp) C X, then not
necessarily 2l ~~ cp[V U W]. (Take for example: ~p -~y~~[x - y~, V-{x: 0},
and W - {x: 1}.)
From the previous lemma, it follows that the sets Vi, V2 in the clause for dis-
junction of inductive satisfaction (item (V, f) of definition 5.3.3) may be taken to
be disjoint. (To check Y-saturatedness: the intersection of two Y-saturated sets
Vi, V2 is easily seen to be Y-saturated in V, and therefore: Vi `(Vl f1 VZ) is also
Y-saturated in V. So, if we have Y-saturated U in V with non-empty intersection,
we can equivalently take the disjoint sets Vi `(Vl n VZ) and V2.)
An iinplicit parameter in the evaluation of a formula with a set of valuations
V C AX , is the domain X of the valuations. (This is a difference with trump
semantics, where the domains are explicit parameters with the formula.) In IFG-
logic, the values assigned to variables that do not occur in the formula could make a
difference in the evaluation. For example, take 2l a model with domain A-{0,1},
let cp be the formula ~y~Z [z - y], and let V:- {z : 0,1 } and Vx :- {xz : 00, 11}.
The valuations in Vy assign the same values to the variables occurring in cp (only
z in this case), but 21 ~~ cp[V], while f?.l ~~ cp[V~]. The values assigned to x in
V~ make that the two valuations in Vx do not coincide out of {z}, hence make the
independence condition vacuous for this situation.
We now prove two general lemmas that compare the evaluation of a formula
with respect to a given set of valuations V, and sets of extensions of these valua-
tions to a larger domain of variables. First we show that the evaluation will not
change as long as we extend all the valuations in V with the same combinations of
values for the new variables, i.e. if we take a Cartesian product (this result seems
to be a more general case of Proposition 3 of [Hod97c, p. 57]):
Lemma 6.2.2 (Expansion by Cartesian products) If c~ is an IFG-formula,
and V, W sets of valuatioas that satisfy
1. V C Ax with Fv(c~) C X, arcd
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2. 0~ W C AZ witia Z~1 X- 0
then:
2l ~c cp[V] if and only if ~l ~~ cp[V x W]
Proof.. We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of cp. To start the
induction: let cp be atomic, and V, W sets of valuations satisfying conditions 1-2
for cp. It classically holds for all v E V, w E W that ~l ~ cp[v] if and only if ~i ~
cp[(v, w)], and 2l ~ cp[v] if and only if 2[ ~ cp[(v, w)]. It follows by definition 5.3.3
and theorem 5.3.5 that: ~( ~~ cp[V] iff 2[ ~~ cp[V x W]. Note that from right to
left we need that W ~ 0(otherwise V x W would be empty, hence 21 ~~ cp[V x W]
regardless of V).
For the induction step, assume that cp is non-atomic, that V, W are sets of val-
uations satisfying the condition 1-2 for cp, and that for all ~ with lower complexity
than cp, we have proved:
~[ ]-~ ~[V'] if and only if ~l ~~ z~i[V' x W']
for any V' C AY~, W' C AZ~ that satisfy the conditions 1-2 with respect to ~i (i.e.
Fv(~i) C X', W' ~ 0 and X' f1 Z' - 0). We prove that
`~ ~c ~P[V] iff 2l ~c ~P[V x W]
by distinction of the following cases:
(~) If cp - ~~, the result for cp follows immediately from the induction hypothesis
applied to zli with V, W.
(V) Suppose cp - ~1 V~Y~2.
(-}) From left to right: suppose that ~l ~~ (zGl V~YZ~2)[V]. We can then
determine V1iV2 C V with Vl UV2 - V, both Y-saturated in V, such
that ~Zl ~~ ~Z [V ] for i - 1, 2.. Then the sets Vi x W, V2 x W are Y-
saturated in V x W, (Vl x W) U(V2 x W) - V x W, and by induction
hypothesis, 2! ~~ ~i2[[i x W] for both i. Hence: 21 ~~ (~1 V~Y~2)[V x
W].
To prove the converse, suppose 2i ~~ (zlil V~Y ~ia)[V x W]. We pick
some w E W(W ~ 0), then by lemma 6.2.1: ~i ~~ (z~I V~Y~i2)[V x{w}]
We can then determine Vi,V2 C V such that ~1! ~~ ~i[Vi x{w}] and
~l ~c z~i2[V2 x{w}] with U x{w} Y-saturated in V x {w} for both i
and Vl UV2 - V. V1iV2 are clearly Y-saturated in V, and 2l ~~ ~1[Vi]
for both i by induction hypothesis. Hence: 2l ~~ (~I V~YZV2)[V].
(-) This follows inunediately from the induction hypothesis applied to zGl
and zG2 with V, W.
(~) Suppose cp - 3x~yzli. In the evaluation of cp, a value will be assigned to
the variable x. We have not excluded (and do not want to exclude) the
possibility that x is in the domain Z of W. In order to make sure that
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we can validly apply the induction hypothesis, we will use the set W-x CAz-{x} of the restrictions of the elements of W to all variables in Z except
x: W-x :- {w j(Z -{x})~w E W}. Note that if x~ Z, we have W-x - W.
F~om left to right: 2l ~~ 3x~y~i[V] implies 2l [-~ zli[Vx: f] for some Y-
independent f: V-~ A, and by induction hypothesis: 2l ~~ ~[Vx, f x
W-x]; we use W-x instead of W, because x might be in Z- dom(W),
in which case the domains of Vx : f and W violate the requirement of
being disjoint. Note that Vx; f x W-x -(V x W)x: 9 for the function
g: V x W-~ A defined by g(v, w) - f(v). So: 2l ~~ z~[(V x W)x; y],
and because g inherits Y-independence from f: 2l ~~ ~x~yzli[V x W].
Conversely, if ~l ~~ ~x~y~[V x W], then by lemma 6.2.1, for any
arbitrary w E W: 2l ~~ z~(V x{w}]. Pick a w E W(W ~ 0), and
let f: V x{w} ~ A be a Y-independent function such that 2! ~~
~i[(V x{w})x; f]. Define g : V---~ A by g(v) - f(v, w) and let w-x :-
w~(Z -{x}). Then: (V x{w})x; f- Vx: y x{w-x}, hence: 2l ~~
~i[Vx. y x {w-x}]. Applying the induction hypothesis, we may infer
that 2l ~~ ~[Vx: y], and because g inherits Y-independence from f:
~ ~c ~x~Y~[V].
The following statements are equivalent:
~ 2l ~c ~x~Y~(V]
~ 2l ~G ~[Vx: A]
~~( ~c ~[Vx: A x W-x] (by induction hypothesis)
~ 21 ~~ ~[(V x W)x: ,y] (because (V x W)x: A- Vx: A x W-x)
~ 21 [-c ~x~~(V x W].
a
This lemma has a reassuring and important corollary for sentences cp, justifying
the abbreviation we introduced in definition 5.3.6:
Corollary 6.2.3 (Evaluation of sentences) Given an IFGsentence cp, and a
suitable model 2l, then for any non-emyty sets of valuations V C AX of some set
of variables X in 2l: -
2l ~~ cp(V] if and only if 2l ~~ cp[{~}]
Proof.- Let V and X play the role of W and Z in the previous lemma. a
Lemma 6.2.2 implies that if x does not occur in cp nor in X- dom(V), and
Vx C Vx: A is an x-variation of V of the form V x W with W C A{x}, then
2l ~~ cp[V] if and only if ~1 ~~ ~p[Vx].
This observation will be useful in several of the proofs later in the chapter. The sit-
uation of our example on page 108, just before lemma 6.2.2, was different however:
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it showed us that values assigned to variables that do not occur in the formula
could influence its evaluation (they could signal the values of forbidden variables
to the player).
The next result shows that if Vx is an arbitrary x-variation of V C AX (with x
not occttrring in cp or X) , then we should make the quantifiers and connectives in cp
independent of x to guarantee the same evaluation. It corresponds to Proposition
8 in [Hod97c]. We will use the following notation:
Definition 6.2.4 (Slashed formulas) For any IFG-formula cp and any variable
x that does not occur bound in cp, the formula cp~x is defined inductively as follows:
(At) for atomic cp: cp~x :- cp
(~) zf cP - -~cP', then cp~x :- ~(~p'~x)
(V) if ~P - ~Pi V~Y~a, then ~P~x -- (~Pt~x) VIY,x (~Pa~x)
(~) iÏ ~G - ~z~Ycp', then cp~x :- Sz~Y,x(~P~~x)
Lemma 6.2.5 (Adding mute variables) For all IFG-formulas cp: if V C AX
is a set of valuations for cp, and x is a variable that does not occur in cp or X,
then for any x-variation Vx of V(cf. definition 5.3.4):
2l ~c cp[V] if and only if 21 ~c cp~x[Vx]
Proof.. We use induction on the complexity of cp. The atomic case is immediate.
So, let cp be a non-atomic IFG-formula, V C AX a set of valuations for cp, and x a
variable that does not occur in cp or X. Also, suppose we have proved the lemma
for all IFG-formulas of lower complexity than cp.
For v E V, let vx denote an arbitrary x-variant of v. Observe that because
x~ X, we have for all v, w E V: vx ~Y,x wx if and only if v~Y w.
(~) Suppose cp ---~z~. This case follows easily from the induction hypothesis.
(V) Suppose cp - z~t V~Y zli2.
(-F) From the observation above, it follows easily that if V~ C V is Y-
saturated in V, then (Vi)x: A :- {vx E Vxw E[i} is (YU {x})-
saturated in Vx, and if Vi U VZ - V, then also (Vt)x: A U(V2)2: A- Vx.
These observations together with the induction hypothesis prove that
~ ~c (~i V~Y~2)[V] implies 2l ~G (~1 V~Y~2)Ix[Vx]
Conversely, if W2 C Vx is (YU {x})-saturated in Vx, then (Wz)X :-
{v E V~vx E W2} is Y-saturated in V. Also, if Wt U W2 - Vx, then
(Wl)X U(W2)X - V. These observations together with the induction
hypothesis prove that 2l ~~ (~il V~Y~2)~x[Vx] implies 2l ~~ (zlil V~Y
~2)[V]
(-) 2l ~~ (z~l V~YZ~2)[V] if and only if 2l ~~ ~i[V] (z - 1,2), if and
only if 2l ~~ ~:~~[Vx] (by induction hypothesis) if and only if 2l ~~
(~l~x V~Y,x W2~x)[Vx]
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Suppose cp - ~u~y~i.
(~)
(-)
Suppose 2[ ~~ ~u~ytli[V], then 2i ~~ z,i[Vu; f ] for some Y-indepen-
dent f: V-ti A. Let g: Vx -~ A be defined by g(vx) - f(v),
then g is independent of YU {x}. Note that the set ( V~)u; 9 is an
x-variation of Vu, f, so that we can apply the induction hypothesis
to get 2l ~c ~~~[(Vx)u; y]. Then, by (YU {x})-independence of g:
~ ~c (~u~Ytl~)~x[Vx]
Conversely, if 2l ~~ (~u~y~)~x[Vx], then 2l ~c ~~x[(Vx)u; y] for some
g: Vx -~ A independent of YU {x}. Note that if v E V, then g assigns
the same value to all vx E Vx. This makes f: V--~ A with f(v) - g(vx)
for any v~ E Vx a well-defined function, that is independent of Y. Note
that the set ( Vx)u; 9 is again an x-variation of Vu; f so that we can
apply the induction hypothesis to get 21 ~~ z~[Vu; p], from which we
conclude: 2l ~~ ~u~yi(~[V].
~l ~~ ~u~y~[V] if and only if 2[ ~~ z~i[V~], if and only if 2l ~~
~~~[(Vu)x] (by induction hypothesis). Any x-variation (Vu)x of Vu
can be seen as the set (Vx)u for some x-variation V~ of V, and vice
versa. So, the latter is equivalent to 21 ~~ 3u~Y,y~~x[V~].
In Example 2.4 of [CK99, p. 25], it is shown that even if the variable x does
not occur in cp, the formula ~xcp can have a different evaluation than cp: consider
cp -~z~y[z - y], a model2l with domain {0, 1}, and V- {z: 0, 1}; then 2l ~~ 3xcp
while 2i ~~ cp. (Note that this is a reformulation in terms of open formulas of
Hodges' example, as it corresponds to the fact that dy~z~y [y - z] is not equivalent
to dy~x~z~~[y - z].) A consequence of the previous lemma is that we do have
that ~p always has the same evaluation as ~xcp~x.
We will prove a counterpart to this result, in the sense that it puts independence
conditions on the added quantifier instead of on the formula. This counterpart is
a corollary (corollary 6.2.7) to the following lemma:
Lemma 6.2.6 (Monotonicity under x-variations) For auy IFG-formula cp,
and suitable ~nodel 2l: if V C AX is a set of suitable valuations, x a variable
that does not occur ire cp nor in X, and Z the set of all free variables of cp that
occur under the slashes in cp; then for av,y Z-independerct function f: V~ A:
~ ~G ~P[V] ZJJ ~ ~G ~[Vx: Í]
Proof.. By induction on the structure of ~p. The start of the induction, for
atomic cp, is immediate. So, suppose ~p is non-atomic, and that for all ~ of lower
complexity, we have proved that if W C AY is a set of valuations for ~ in 2l, y
a variable that does not occur in z~i nor in Y, and g : W-~ A a Z'-independent
function (with Z' the set of free variables of zL~ occurring under the slashes), then
2l ~~ zí'[W] if and only if fZ( ~~ ~I[W~; 9].
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Let 2l be a suitable model, V C AX , x a variable that does not occur in cp nor
in X, and f: V-~ A a function that is independent of Z, the set of free variables
of cp that occur under the slashes. We distinguish the following cases:
(~, ~)
(v)
If c~ - ~~i, then the claim for ~p follows immediately from the induction
hypothesis.
If ~P - (~i ~~Y ~a):
(f) From left to right: suppose 2l ~~ (z~l V~y~2)[V], so pick Vl, V2 C V that
are Y-saturated in V with s?.l ~~ z~2[V]. By the induction hypothesis,
the latter is equivalent to ~l ~~ z~ii[(Vi)x: f ] (which is applicable because
x does not occur in X, zlil or ~2; for f, independence of Z implies
independence of the free variables under the slashes in the subformulas
~1 and zj~2). As we will prove later, the sets (Vz)x: f are Y-saturated in
Vx: f and Vx; f-(Vi)x: f U (V2)x; f, so: 2l ~c (~i V~Y~a)[Vx: f]-
The argument from right to left is similar: we use that by definition
of Vx; f , any subset (Vx; f)i of Vy; f is of the form (VZ)x: f for some
U C V. This U is unique because x~ X.
We will now prove that for every W C V: W is Y-saturated in V if
and only if Wx: f is Y-saturated in Vx; f , in other words: W C V is
closed under the relation ~Y on V if and only if Wx, f C Vx; f is closed
under the relation ~Y on Vx; f. This follows easily from the fact that
v~Y w iff v(x: f(v)) ~Y w(x: f( w)): if v, w E V coincide out of Y,
then they also coincide out of Z(because Y C Z by definition of Z),
so by Z-independence of f: f( v) - f(w), and hence: v(x: f (v)) and
w(x: f(w)) coincide out of Y; the converse follows from x~ X.
(-) This follows directly from the induction hypothesis applied to the ~i
and (with V, x, and f as for cp).
Suppose cp - ~z~y~. We will use the function f' : VZ: A~ A defined by
f'(v(z: a)) :- f(v) for all v E V, a E A(then f' is independent of Z U{z}).
(-~) If 2i ~~ ~z~ytli[V], pick a Y-independent function g: V-~ A such
that 2l ~~ ~[Vz; y]. By induction ~l ~~ ~[(VZ: y)x: f. ]. It is easily
verified (because x and z are distinct by the assumption that x does
not occur in cp) that (VZ: 9)x: f- -(Vx; f)Z; y- with g' : Vx: A---~ A
defined by g'(v(x: a)) :- g(v) for all v E V,a E A. Therefore: ~l ~~
~[(Vx: f)Z: 9.], and hence (because g' inherits Y-independence from g):
~ ~G ~z~Yw[Vx: f]-
Conversely, if 2l ~~ ~z~y~[Vx; f ], then there is a Y-independent g:
Vx; f--~ A such that 2t ~~ ~i[(Vx: f)Z: y]. Define g' : V--~ A by
g'(v) - g(v(x: f(v))) for all v E V. Then g' is independent of Y,
because g is independent of Y and f is independent of Z ~ Y. Because
x and z are distinct, we have: (Vx : p) Z: y-( VZ : y. )x : p~ . Therefore:
~l ~~ z~((VZ: 9.)~: f-], and by induction: 2l ~~ ~i[VZ: 9. ] (because f` is
independent of ZU{z}), so (by Y-independence of g'): 21 ~~ ~z~ysli[V].
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The following are equivalent:
~ 2l ~c ~z~Y~[Vx: f]
~ 2l ~c ~[(Vi: f)z: A]
~~~c ~[(VZ: A)x: f~] (note that (V~: f)z; A-(VZ; A)x: f. because
x and z are distinct, which follows from the assumption that x does
not occur in cp.)
~` ~ ~G ~[Vz: A] by induction hypothesis
(because f" is independent of Z U {z}, the case that z occurs free
under the slashes of zli is covered)
~ ~l ~G ~z~Y~[V]
Corollary 6.2.7 (Adding mute quantifiers) For any IFG-formula cp: let ~( be
a suitable model, V C AX a set of valuations for cp in 2l. If x is a variable that
does not occur in cp nor in X, and Z the set of all free variables of cp that occur
under the slashes in cp, then:
`~ ~c ~P[V] ifÍ ~ ~c ~x~z~P[V] z.f.Í ~ ~c dx~z~P[V]
Proof.. It follows from lemma 6.2.2 that 2l ~~ cp[V] iff 21 ~~ cp[V~: A]. Together
with lemma 6.2.6 this proves the corollary. a
Note that for sentences, the set of variables Z is empty, so we may add empty
unslashed quantifications (~x, b'x, where x as in the corollary).
6.3 Equivalence and Substitution
The definition of the semantics and the results of the previous section all concern
the evaluation of an IFG-formula in a given model with a given set of valuations.
In this section we move up to a higher level and deal with the question: when are
two IFG-formulas equivalent? For example, one would be inclined to interpret the
last result of the previous section (corollary 6.2.7) as: cp is equivalent to 3x~zcp, if
we take x and Z as required. We will come back to this.
In [CK99], a natural notion of equivalence for IFG-formulas, G-equivalence, is
defined as follows ( where the `G' stands for `Game'):
Definition 6.3.1 (G-equivalence, [CK99, p. 24]) Two IFG-formulas cp and
~ are G-equivalent, notation: cp -G ~cj~, if and only if for any suitable model
2l and any set of valuations V C AX with domain X~ Fv(cp) U Fv(z~) we have
both - -
`~ ~c ~P[V] ~ `~ ~c ~[V], and ~l ~c ~P[V] ~ ~ ~c ~G[V].
6.3 EQUIVALENCE AND SUBSTITUTION 115
We would like to remark that this notion of equivalence is stronger than the
notion of equivalence used by Hintikka ( in [Hin96] and other work), where it is
defined as having the same positive evaluation only: see the discussion of truth
equivalence versus strong equivalence in section 3.3 of this thesis. (We note that
Hodges also uses the word equivalence in a weak sense on page 57 of [Hod97c]:
he calls two formulas logically equivalent if they have the same trumps. To make
this equivalence strong, one would also have to require that the formulas have the
same co-trumPs.)
G-equivalence allows us to formally express that double negation cancels (we
can now say: ~~~p -c cp), and this immediately gives us De Morgan's laws (e.g.
~~x~yt~I -G Vx~y~~) by the fact that universal quantification and conjunction
are defined in terms of their duals and negation. These facts will be used in some
of our proofs.
One of the elementary properties of first order logic is the fact that the names
of the bound variables are not instrumental for the truth or falsity of a formula:
e.g. if ~ is a first order formula in which the variable z does not occur, then
~xz~i(x) -~z~(z). One would expect this to hold for IFG-formulas as well, and
indeed Lemma 3.1(a) of [CK99, p. 26] claims such a result for IFG-formulas, using
the straightforward notion of G-equivalence in order to formalize this.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the claim is invalidated by two types of coun-
terexamples: the `new' variable may introduce or disturb signaling possibilities.
This can occur in those situations where the formula and its renamed version are
evaluated with valuations whose domain contain the old or the new variable.
The first example will show that the natural notion of G-equivalence is stricter
than expected. In fact it invalidates the following claim:
Quote 6.3.2 ([CK99], Lemma 3.1(a)) For every IFG-formvla ~x~ycp(x) and
any variable z that does not occur in ~x~ycp(x), the following holds:
~x~y~P(x) -G ~z~Y~P(z).
The following example demonstrates one problem with this claim:
Example 6.3.3: (Outside signals can be blocked) Let cp(x) be the formula
~y~u[t - x n u- y]. Note that the variable z doesn't occur in cp, so we let cp(z)
be the formula ~y~u[t - z n u- y]. According to the claim quoted above, the
formulas ~xcp(x) and ~zcp(z) should be equivalent:
~x~y~u[t - x n u- y] c~z~y~u[t - z n u- y]
This would mean that their evaluation is the same for all models ~l and sets of
valuations V whose domains contain the free variables u and t.
However, let 21 be a model with domain A- {0,1} and let V be the set of
valuations {utz : 000, 010, 101, 111 }. This situation could occur e.g. in the games
for the sentences:
`dub't~z[u - z n 3x~y~u[t - x n u- y]] (6.1)
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and
b'udt3z[u - z n dz~y~„[t - z n u- y]] (6.2)
respectively. We note that in the second sentence, the quantification ~z of ~p(z)
variable z occurs nested in the scope of a previous quantification ~z. We will
re-encounter this several times in the rest of this cliapter.
We will now verify that 2l ~~ ~xcp(x)[V], but 21 ~G 3zcp(z)[V]:
~ 2l ~~ ~xcp(x)[V]: Eloïse will obviously use the function f: V~ A with
f(v) - v(t) to choose a value for x. Continuing the game with
V~;f - {utzx:0000,0101,1010,1111},
she might use g: V~; p --~ A with g(w) - w(u)(- w(z)) to choose a value
for y. As there are no two valuations in V~; f that coincide out of {u}, any
function and in particular g is independent of {u}! The functions f g can
easily be seen to be a winning strategy for Eloïse in G(21, ~xcp(x), V).
~~[ ~~ ~zcp(z)[V]: Again, Eloïse has no choice but to use the function f:
V--~ A with f(v) - v(t) in order to satisfy the atomic formula (t - z).
Because z was already in the domain of V, we have to overwrite the old
value of z and continue the game with
VZ; f-{utz: 000, 011, 100, 111}.
Now, when choosing a value for y, the original value of z is no longer available
to signal the value of u. Any function g: Vz; f-~ A that is independent of
u has to assign the same value to the valuations (utz : 000) and (utz : 100),
and therefore cannot guarantee that g(v) - v(u). So s1i ~~ ~zcp(z)[V].
This example is a counterexample to the Lemma 3.1(a) of [CK99] quoted above.
The example shows that it is sometimes possible to signal with the values of
variables that don't occur in the formula (z did not occur in ~x~p(x)), but do
occur in the domain of the set of valuations X. This signaling opportunity can
disappear if we rename a bound variable by an element of X that did not occur
in the formula before.
It follows that we cannot rename bound variables just with any variable that
does not occur in our formula. We have to make sure that this new variable does
not occur in the domain X of the set of valuations V `under consideration'. But this
shows the notion of G-equivalence of definition 6.3.1 to be more tricky than it might
have looked at first glance: it contains a quantification over all sets of variables V,
hence implicitly over all possible domains X containing the free variables of the
formulas. With the quantification over all such V, the notion of equivalence has
become too strict, at least to allow for renaming of bound variables. The example
above indicates the general problem: whatever `new' variable we choose, there is
always a set of valuations whose domain contains it. A similar problem holds for
a formulation of corollary 6.2.7 in terms of G-equivalence: the variable x in that
result is to be chosen given a certain domain X of variables.
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To clear the way for renaming of bound variables, we define an alternative,
weaker notion of equivalence, by restricting the quantification over sets of valua-
tions in the definition of Game equivalence (definition 6.3.1). We will declare two
formulas cp and z~~ equivalent, if they evaluate identically only with respect to sets
of valuations whose domains are in a certain sense safe for cp and ~c(~:
Definition 6.3.4 (Safe sets of valuations) Let ~p be an IFG-formula. A set of
valv,ations V C A~ is safe for ~p if Fv(cp) C X and Bv(cp) n X-~.
Safeness is a condition on the domains X of the sets of valuations V in terms
of the free and bound variables of the formula that is evaluated. We would like
to loosen the notion of equivalence by only taking safe sets of valuations into
account. This means: if we compare two formulas cp, zG, we restrict the comparison
to sets of valuations V C A~ that are safe for both cp and ~, implying that
Fv(cp) U Fv(z(i) C X and (Bv(cp) U Bv(~)) n X- 0. But suppose for example
that a free variable of cp occurs bound in z~i, then no sets of valuations can be safe
for both formulas! A naive restriction to sets of valuations that are safe for both
formulas would then make such formulas trivially equivalent, on the basis of the
rather arbitrary choice of variables. For example, it would make cp :- (z - z)
equivalent to ~ :- t1z[z ~ z], which is clearly not what we would intend.
We will define our new notion of `S-equivalence' (with the `S' for safe) only
for pairs of formulas for which safe sets of valuations exist. We call these pairs
S-compatible. Note that Fv(cp) U Fv(zli) can be abbreviated by Fv(cp n~), and
Bv(~p) u Bv(~) by Bv(~p n~).
Definition 6.3.5 (S-compatibility) Two IFG-formalas cp, z~ are called S-com-
patible if they satisfy the condition that Fv(cp n z~) n Bv(cp n~i) -~.
The following abbreviation will be useful. We will define `full' regnlarity later, in
definition 6.3.15, but semi-regularity plays a role in the domain of the notion of
S-equivalence we define here.
Definition 6.3.6 (semi-regularity) An IFG-formula cp will be called semi-reg-
ular if no variable occurs both free and bov,nd in cp (Fv(cp) n Bv(cp) -~).
Note that an IFG-formula is S-compatible with itself precisely if it is semi-regular.
Definition 6.3.7 (S-equivalence) Two S-compatible IFG-formulas cp, ~ are S-
equivalent, notation: cp -s z~, if and only if for any suitable model ~i and any
safe set of valuations V C AX for cp and ~, we have both
`~ ~c ~P[V] ~ ~ ~c ~[V], and ~l ~c ~P[V] ~ ~ ~c ~[V].
S-equivalence is only defined for pairs of formulas that are S-compatible. By
this choice, we avoid the situation that S-incompatible pairs of formulas would be
trivially S-equivalent, for no sets of valuations V satisfy the precondition in the
definition. As a consequence however, S-equivalence is not total, and in particular:
cp -s cp holds only for IFG-formulas cp that are semi-regular. So, we only have
restricted reflexivity. It is easy to verify that S-equivalence is symmetric. We
now prove that we also have (restricted) transitivity for S-equivalence, viz. for
S-compatible pairs of formulas:
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Lemma 6.3.8 (Transitivity of S-equivalence) Let cp, ~i and X be IFG-forrriu-
las such that all three ~airs {cp, ~i}, {z~, X} and {X, cp} are S-compatible. Then: if
~P -s ~ and zG -s X, then also cp -s X.
Proof.~ Let ~l be a suitable model (for all three formulas). We will first show
that any V C AX that is safe for cp and X(i.e. Fv(cp)UFv(X) C X- dom(V), and
(Bv(cp) U Bv(X)) n X- 0) can be transformed into a set V' C AX~ such that:
1. V' is safe for cp, X and ~ (i.e. Fv(cp) U Fv(X) U Fv(~) C X' - dom(V') and
(Bv(cp) U Bv(X) U Bv(zli)) fl X`-(~);
2. 2l ~c ~P[V] iff ~l ~c ~P[V']
3. 2l ~c X[V] iff 21 ~c X[V']
First step is to make sure that any bound variable of ~ that occurs in X, no longer
occurs in X'. So, suppose there is a variable z E X that occurs bound in z~. By
safeness of V, we know that z does not occur bound in either cp or X. Also, by
S-compatibility of cp, z(i, and of ~i, X respectively, we know that the bound variables
of ~ do not occur free in cp or X either. So: z does not occur in cp nor X. In that
case, we can safely `rename' the variable z in the domain X of V by a variable z'
that does not occur in any of the formulas cp, z~ or X: let X' :- (X -{z}) U{z'},
and make V' C AX~ the set of all v' defined from some v E V by v'(x) :- v(x) for
all x E X-{z} and v'(z') :- v(z). Then V' is still safe for cp, X and we claim:
~ ~G ~[V'] lff ~ ~G ~[V~]
`~ ~c X[V'] iff 21 ~c X[V~]
This is an elementary insight: if there happens to be some kind of signaling possible
through values assigned to a variable that does not occur in the formulas, the name
of that variable is irrelevant. We don't think the formal proof contributes to the
understanding of it, so we omit it here. We repeat this operation until all bound
variables of ~ that occurred in X- dom(V) are renamed. Let's call the result V"
and its domain X".
Second step is to make sure that X' - dom,(V') will contain all free variables
of zG. Let Z :- Fv(zG) - X" be the set of free variables of z~ that are not yet
in the domain X" of V". Define X' :- X" U Z and let V' :- V" x AZ. Then
V` is safe for z(~, and because the free variables of ~ do not occur bound in cp
or X(by S-compatibility of both formulas with ~): V' is also safe for cp and zG.
Furthermore, by lemma 6.2.2:
~ ~c ~P[V~~] iff ~lt ~c ~P[V `]
`~ ~c X[V~~] iff 2[ ~c X[V`]
So, for every V that is safe for cp and X, we can construct a V' that satisfies the
requirements 1-3 above.
Now suppose that y~ -s z(i and ~-s X, and that V C AX is safe for cp, X.
Then the following are equivalent: -
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. ~ ~~ ~v[Vl
. 2l [-c cp[V'] (by construction)
. ~ ~~ ~[V'1 (bY ~ -s ~)
' `~ ~c X[V'] (bY ~G -s X)
' `~ ~c X[V] (by construction)
Hence: cp -s X. a
Despite the restrictions on reflexivity and transitivity, we call the relation -s
`S-equivalence'. We made this choice, because apart from its mathematical conno-
tations, the word equi-valence, `the same values', expresses best what the relation
means (with the subscript `S' indicating the restriction to safe models).
Note that for S-compatible pairs of formulas, G-equivalence implies S-equi-
valence. In particular, all pairs of IFG-sentences are naturally S-compatible, and
due to corollary 6.2.3, we have
Lemma 6.3.9 For all IFG-sentences ~p, z~: cp -c ~ if and only if cp -s zli.
In Example 6.3.3, which proved that G-equivalence is too strong to allow for
renaming of bound variables, the fact that the `new' bound variable z occurred
in the domain X of V was crucial. This situation will no longer occur if we only
consider safe V, i.e. if we compare (S-compatible) formulas by S-equivalence.
Also, we can now indeed state corollary 6.2.7 in terms of S-equivalence:
Corollary 6.3.10 (Addition of mute quantifiers reformulated) For every
semi-regular IFG-formula cp: if x is a variable that does not occur in cp, and Z is
the set of all free variables of cp that occur under the slashes in cp, then
~P -s ~x~z~P and ~P -s dx~z~P
The introduction of S-equivalence solved the first problem with renaming of
bound variables, but there is a second obstacle we have to deal with. The situation
of example 6.3.3 was related to the occurrence of a quantification Qx within the
scope of another quantification Q'x, as can be recognized in the sentence (6.2) in
the example. We call this nested quantification over x. The following variation of
our previous example shows how this can be a problem by itself:
Example 6.3.11: (Inside signals can be unblocked) Let cp be the formula
~x~y~u[t - x n u - y] (this is the formula ~xcp(x) from Example 6.3.3). Now
consider the formula ~xcp. Suppose we want to replace the first (vacuous) quan-
tification over x in ~xcp by a quantification over z to get ~zcp. These formulas are
S-compatible, hence we can ask whether they are S-equivalent:
~
~x~P -s ~zCP
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Let 2t be any model with domain A- {0, 1}, and let V be the set of valuations
{ut: O1, 11}. This situation could occur in games on the sentences ~tdu~xcp and
~tdu~zcp. Note that V is safe for ~xcp and ~zcp.
Now consider first ~zcp. Informally, by choosing the value of u for z(continue
with {utz: 010, 111}), the value of t for x (continue with {utxz: 0110, 1111}) and
the value of z for y respectively, Eloïse has a winning strategy: the resulting set of
valuations {utxyz : 01100, 11111 } satisfies the propositional part [t - x n u- y].
In this case, she can use the empty quantification over z to signal the value of u
to y. So, 2l ~~ ~zcp[V].
In the case of the formula 3xcp, Eloïse's best choice is to play the same strategy
as in the previous case. Again, Eloïse can try to signal the value of u by the
first, empty quantification ~x (and continue with {utx: 010, 111}). But at the
second quantification 3x, a new value is chosen for x. In order to satisfy the
atomic formula t- x, Eloïse has to continue with V' :- {utx: 011, 111}, thereby
overwriting the attempted signal. As the last choice has to be independent of u,
and both valuations in V' coincide out of u, a u-independent function f has to
assign the same value to both valuations. This means that one valuation in the
resulting set V~: f will not satisfy the atomic formula u- y. So, 2l ~~ 3xcp[V].
The renaming of the (first occurrence of the) variable x into the new variable z
has changed the formula ~xcp from not-true into true, even with respect to a safe
set of valuations. o
Whereas in Example 6.3.3 the new variable z blocked signaling, we see in Ex-
ample 6.3.11 that it can also allow for new signaling possibilities. The first example
asked for conditions on the implicit domains X of the sets of valuations V in the
definition of equivalence, the latter can be solved by a syntactical condition on the
formulas involved, viz. an extra condition on the variable that is to be replaced.
These considerations lead to the following theorem, which replaces Lemma 3.1(a)
of [CK99, p. 26]:
Lemma 6.3.12 (Renaming of Bound Variables) If cp(x) is an IFG-formula
in which the variable x does not occur bound, then for every variable z that does
not occur in 3x~Ycp(x):
~x~r`P(x) -s ~z~~P(z)
Proof.- Note that ~x~Ycp(x) and 3z~Ycp(z) are S-compatible because z does not
occur free in ~x~YCp(x). Let 2t be a suitable model for cp and V C AX be a set of
valuations that is safe for ~x~~np(x) and ~z~~.~p(z). Then: -
(~-) t2l ~c ~x~~.cp(x)[V] iff 2l ~~ cp(x)[Vx: f] for some f : V-; A independent
of Y. Because x does not occur bound in cp(x) and because z does not
occur in cp(x) nor in X, we have for any such f: 21 ~~ cp(x)[Vx: f] iff
2l ~~ cp(z)[VZ: f ]. The last clause is equivalent to f2i ~~ ~z~Ycp(z)[V].
(-) 2! ~c ~x~Ycp(x)[V] iff 2l ~c cp(x)[Vx: a] iff 2l ~c ~p(z)[Vz: A] (because
neither x nor z are in X) iff 2[ ~~ ~z~Ycp(z)[V]
a
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Technically, this proves only that variables that are bound by a formula-initial
quantification may be renamed. In order to generalize this to arbitrary bound
variables (occurring deeper in the formula), we need a substitution principle. In
fact, the substitution principle Theorem 2.2 of [CK99, p. 24] for G-equivalent
formulas - "substituting G-equivalent formulas in a given IFG-formula yields G-
equivalent formulas" - is correct. But G-equivalence was too strict for renaming
of bound variables, so we are looking for a similar substitution principle for S-
equivalence: if cp occurs as subformula of B, and if cp is equivalent to ~, under
which conditions is the result B[z~i~cp] of replacing the occurrence of cp in B by zV
S-equivalent to B?
The following example, very similar to our previous one, shows that substitu-
tion for S-equivalence is not trivial:
Example 6.3.13: (Substitution may block signals) Elaborating on Exam-
ple 6.3.11, let B :- ~zcp where cp is again the formula ~x~y~~,[t - x n u- y]. Let
~i :- ~z~y~~[t - z n u- y]. Then cp -s ~ by lemma 6.3.12.
Now consider B[~~y~] -~z~ -~z~z~y~~,[t - z~~ - y]. By taking any model2l
with domain {0, 1}, and V:- {ut: O1, 11}, we see that 2l ~~ ~zcp ( because z can
be used to signal the value of u to y), but 2l ~~ ~z~i (because the quantification
over z in zli blocks the signal).
So: B ~s e[~~~P]. o
In the result of the substitution, a signaling possibility is blocked because the
quantification over z in zli comes to fall within the scope of another quantification
over z. We also have another problem: the result of a substitution may be S-
incompatible with the original:
Example 6.3.14: (S-incompatibility by substitution) Let cP and ~ be as in
the previous example, and let B' be the formula (z - z) n cp. Then B'[~~cp] :- (z -
z) n z~. Because in the latter formula the variable z occurs both free and bound,
the pair {B',B'[~i~cp]} is not S-compatible. o
The S-incompatibility in the example is more a problem of the formula 8'[~i~cp]
by itself than of the pair B', 9'[~~cp].
These two examples motivate the following definition:
Definition 6.3.15 (Regularity) An IFG-formv,la cp is called regular if
. no variable occurs both free a~d bound in cp (i.e. cp is semi-regular), and
. within the scope of a quantification there is no other qua~ctification over the
same variable.
Let's make some clarifying remarks on this definition.
The first clause in the definition ensures that safe sets of valuations exist for
regular formulas, and the second clause ensures that if we start evaluating a regular
IFG-formula with a safe set of valuations V, then all sets of valuations in the
ínductive evaluation steps are safe for the corresponding subformulas. This will be
needed for the safe application of our induction hypotheses in some of our proofs.
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Regular formulas are the formulas that can safely be evaluated inductively using
safe sets of valuations.
Note that the second clause does not exclude formulas in which disjoint quan-
tification over the same variable occurs, as for example: `dxP(x) V~`dxP(x). These
formulas don't cause the type of problems we have pointed out in our exam-
ples: only with nested quantification are earlier assignments to a variable over-
written, thereby possibly blocking signals. Furthermore, the second clause not
only implies that the first clause holds for any of the subformulas, but it also ex-
cludes nested quantification if one of the quantifiers is empty, like in the formula
9[z~~~p] - ~z3z~y~u[t - z n u- y] of Example 6.3.13. We exclude this type of
situation for the reason mentioned above: we want to guarantee for our induction
arguments, that all sets of valuations encountered in the inductive evaluation of
a regular formula with respect to a safe set of valuations, are safe for the cor-
responding subformulas. This would not be the case in the second step of the
evaluation of the formula B[z(i~cp]: we then evaluate ~ :- ~z~y~u[t - z n u- y]
with a z-variation VZ of V C Ax. VZ C,qxu{Z} has the bound variable z of z,i in
its domain, hence is not safe for z~ even if V was safe for B[~~cp].
It follows easily from the definition of regularity, that any subformula of a
regular formula is regular. For sentences, regularity reduces to just the second
clause of this definition. Regularity of a single formula can be seen in relation to
S-compatibility of pairs in the following manner:
. By the first clause of the definition, regularity of an IFG-formula cp implies
that the pair {c~, cp} is S-compatible (hence: reflexivity of S-equivalence holds
for regular formulas).
. If cpnzG is a regular formula, then so are cp and zli, and the pair {cp, zli} is then
S-compatible. Note that regularity of cp n zli is stronger than S-compatibility
of the pair {cp, z~} by the second clause of the definition of regularity: this
requires that neither cp nor zli contain nested quantification over the same
variable, which is no requirement for S-compatibility of {cp, z(i}.
The notion of regularity enables us to state the following substitution principle
for S-equivalence:
Theorem 6.3.16 (Substitution of S-equivalents) For every regular IFG-for-
mula B, and S-compatible formulas cp, ~: if the result B[z~i~cp] of replacing an oc-
currence of cp in B by z(i is regular, then
~p -S ~i implies B -S B[z~~cp]
Proof.. Let cp, ~ be S-compatible formulas such that cp -S zy. Let B[~~cp] denote
(ambiguously) the result of substituting either one, several, or no occurrences of
cp in ~.
First, we ensure in general that from the regularity assumptions on B and
B[~~cp], and the fact that cp, ~ are S-compatible, it follows that B, B[~~cp] are S-
compatible: In case of no substitutions, this follows by regularity of 6. Otherwise,
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suppose they are not S-compatible. Then there would be a variable x in the
intersection of Fv(B n B[z~i~cp]) and Bv(B ~ B[z~~cp]). Because of the regularity
assumptions on B and B[z~~cp], it then follows that this can only be the case if
either x E Fv(cp) f1 Bv(zli) or x E Fv(~i) fl Bv(~p). Both are impossible by the
assumption that ~p, z~ are S-compatible. So, B and B[~~cp] are S-compatible.
We now prove the claim by induction on the structure of B. For regular B in
which cp does not occur, we have 8[~~cp] - B and B-S B by regularity of B. For
regular B in which cp occurs ( this implies regularity of cp), start the induction with
B- cp. Then B[z~i~cp] -~i or B[~~~p] - cp (in case of no substitutions). In the
first case, we have B -S B[~i~cp] by assumption, in the second case it follows from
regularity of cp.
Now assume that B is regular, that cp is a ( real) subformula of B, and that
B[~~cp] is regular.
For the induction, assume that for all regular formulas B' of complexity smaller
than the complexity of B we have: B' -S B'[z~~cp] if B'[z~~cp] is regular. Note that
regularity of B and B[~~cp] imply regularity of all their subformulas. This is used
(but not stated explicitly) in the following cases:
(~) B--~B': this case follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
(V) B- Bl V~Y B2: then B[~~cp] - Bi[~~cp] V~Y B2[~~cp]. By induction: Bi -S
Bi[z~~cp] for both i- 1, 2. From this it easily follows that B-S B[~~cp].
(~) B- 3x~YB': then B[~~cp] -~x~YB'[zli~cp]. Note that x nor the variables in Y
occur bound in B nor in B[~~cp] by regularity. Now, let ~( be a suitable model
and V a safe set of valuations for B, B[zli~cp] (such V exists by S-compatibility
of B,B[~~cp]).
(-~) The following are equivalent:
~ 2l ~~ ~x~YB'[V]
~ 2l ~~ B'[Vx: f] for some Y-independent f: V---~ A. (by definition)
Note that Vx: f is safe for both B' and B'[~i~cp] since x occurs bound
in neither cp nor ~ by regularity of B and B[~i~cp].
~ 2l ~c B'[z~~cp][Vx; f ] (by induction hypothesis)
~ 2l ~c ~x~~~[~~~P][V].
(-) The following are equivalent:
~ 2i ~c ~x~~~[V]
~ 2l ~~ B'[Vx; A ] (by definition)
Note that Vx; A is again safe for both B' and B'[z~i~cp]
~ 2l ~c B'[z~~cp][V~; ,y] (by induction hypothesis)
~ 2l ~c ~x~~~[~~~P][V]-
This means that B-S B[~t~i~cp].
VVith this substitution result, we can generalize lemma 6.3.12:
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Theorem 6.3.17 (Renaming of bound variables) If cp' is a regular IFG-for-
mula obtained from a regular IFG-formula cp by renaming of bound variables, then
~P -s ~P~.
Proof.. Let cp be a regular IFG-sentence, and let ~c~i' be the result of application
of renaming of bound variables ( lemma 6.3.12) to a subformula ~ of cp. Then
~-S zj~', and if cp' - cp[zG'~~] is regular, then by the Substitution Principle 6.3.16:
~P -s ~P'- a
Corollary 6.3.18 If cp' is a regular IFG-sentence obtained from a regular IFG-
sentence cp by renaming of bound variables, then cp -G cp'.
Proof.. By the previous theorem and by the fact that G-equivalence and S-
equivalence coincide for sentences (lemma 6.3.9). a
The substitution principle for S-equivalence is a crucial component of the proof
of the prenex normal form that we will prove (theorem 6.5.1). In the next section
we will study another important component of this theorem: quantifier extraction.
6.4 Quantifier extraction
Whereas most of our previous examples focused on the interpretation of the slashed
quantifiers in IFG, we will now show how similar signaling situations can occur
with connectives. The results of this section are all inspired by a detailed study
of `quantifier extraction'. In [CK99], quantifier extraction for IFG-formulas is
phrased as follows ( with Qd meaning the dual of the quantifier Q, e.g. Qd -~ if
Q - b') :
Quote 6.4.1 (Lemma 3.1(b)-(d), [CK99, p. 26]) For any IFG-formula cp
~b~ ~Qx~Y~P -G Qdx~Y~~P
Let z~i~x denote the result of adding to all quantifiers in ~ the independence condi-
tion ~x. Then:
(eI [Qx~Y~ V W] -G Qx~Y[~ V~Ix]
~dI [Qx~~ ~ ~] -G Qx~Y[~ n ~~x]
Part (b) of this lemma follows easily from our definition of b' in terms of ~, and
the fact that double negation naturally cancels.
In parts ( c) and (d), zG~x is defined to be the formula resulting from making
all quantifiers in zG independent of x. Note that we introduced the notation ~i~y
to denote the formula resulting from making all quantifiers and connectives in zG
independent of x, see definition 6.2.4.
After all examples with signaling of values from quantifiers to quantifiers, one
becomes suspicious: could the extracted quantifier Qx~Y under whose scope ~~x
6.4 QUANTIFIER EXTRACTION 125
comes to fall, not signal values to the connectives in zG~x? And, could the extracted
quantifier not signal values to the main connective of the formula (Qx~YCp V zU)?
After all, by the extraction of the quantifier, the order of the moves in the game
changes and thereby the available information at these moves.
Example 6.4.2: (Extracted quantifier may produce inside signal) Con-
sider the following instance of Lemma 3.1(c) of [CK99], where the quantifier b'x is
extracted from
dx[x ~ z] v~u~Z[~ - z ~iz u~ zl.
We take a model 2! with domain A-{0, 1} and V:- {z: 0,1}. One can easily
verify that
2l ~~ (`dx[x ~ z] V~u~Z[u - z V~Z u~ z])[V].
The left disjunct is not made true by any valuation, so Eloïse has to choose the
right disjunct for all valuations in V. For ~u~zi a valid strategy must extend
both valuations in V with the assignment of the same c E{0, 1} to u, so that we
continue with Vu -{zu: Oc, lc}. A valid choice for the disjunction V~Z has to pick
the same disjunct for both valuations in Vu, but each disjunct is only satisfied by
one of the valuations. So, Eloïse does not have a winning strategy.
After extraction of the quantifier b'x by the quoted Lemma 3.1(c), we get the
formula
Vx([x ~ z] V~u~zx[u - z Vlz u~ z]).
Because Abélard now chooses the value for x before Eloïse makes her choices, she
now has more information (while he has less). And indeed, the extracted formula
can be seen to be true: Eloïse can choose the left disjunct for the valuations in
V~: A that satisfy (x ~ z) (Vl -{xz: 01,10}), and the right disjunct for the rest
(V2 -{xz: 00, 11}). At ~u~xZ she extends both valuations with the assignment
of (e.g.) 0 to u: (V2)u -{xzu: 000,110}. At V~Z she can now signal the value of
z by the value of x and choose the left disjunct if (u - z), and right otherwise.
Together, these choices are a winning strategy for Eloïse:
21 ~~ dx([x ~ z] V~u~Zx[u - z VIZ u~ z]).
If we compare the game on the original formula with the extracted one, there
were two points in the latter game where Eloïse profited from the availability of
the value assigned to x: at the main disjunction V, and at the slashed disjunction
in the right subformula V~Z.
To be safe, we could solve this new information flow, by slashing all disjunctions
that come to fall under the scope of the extracted quantifier to get the equivalent
formula:
b'x([x ~ z] V~x ~u~Zy[u - z V~Zx u~ z]).
But, in this particular case, adding a slash to just one of them, turns out to give
equivalent formulas too:
`dx([x ~ z] V 3u~Z~[u - z V~zx u~ z]) and also:
b'x([x ~ z] V~2 ~u~Zx[u - z VIZ u~ z]).
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The example above contradicts the quoted lemma 3.1(c)-(d) in [CK99]. But a
closer look at the proof given in [CK99] learns that in fact, in zV~x the connectives
are meant to be made independent of x, just like the quantifiers. (This can be
recognized in the "Reciprocally"-parts of the proofs of (c) and (d), [CK99, p. 27]:
the definition of the ge(w) as fe~y(w, c) for arbitrary c is not sound unless we make
the connectives independent of x as well.)
So, this suggests that we could restore lemma 3.1(c) from [CK99] by redefin-
ing ~]x as our ~~2. But observe that this result is formulated in terms of G-
equivalence. And like in the case of Renaming of bound variables, which we
discussed in the previous section, it turns out that this notion of equivalence is
too strict:
Example 6.4.3: (Extracted quantifier may block outside signals) If 2l is
a model with dotnain {0, 1}, then
21 ~c b'x[x ~ x] V~y~Z[y - z] [{zx: 00, 11}]
because Eloïse may use the strategy to play `always right' at the main disjunction,
and use the value of x to signal the value of z, in order to ensure satisfaction of
the atomic formula y- z.
However: ~l [~~ b'x[(x ~ x) V~y~z[y - z]] [{zx: 00, 11}]. To see this, suppose:
`Z[ ~c `dx[(x ~ x) V ~y~Z[y - z]] [{zx: 00, 11}].
This would respectively imply
21 ~~ (x ~ x) V~y~z[y - z] [{zx: 00, O1, 10, 11}]
and (because no valuation can satisfy the atomic formula x~ x):
~~~ ~y~~[y - z] [{zx: oo, ol, lo, ll}],
The latter is not the case, because the independence restriction on the choice of y
requires the valuations (zx : 00) and (zx : 10) to be extended with the same value
of z. These extensions can then not all satisfy the atomic formula y- z.
Note that we did not even add the extra independence condition with respect
to x to the quantification ~y~zi as would be prescribed by the quoted theorem
3.1(c) of [CK99]. That would be to prevent new signaling possibilities. We see
here however that old possibilities can also be disturbed. By extracting the quan-
tification b'x over the disjunction, the signal provided to the right disjunct by the
initial value of x is overwritten. o
This example shows that G-equivalence is too strict a notion of equivalence
for quantifier extraction. Just like in example 6.3.3, it is crucial that the variable
x, bound by the extracted quantifier, happened to be in the doinain of the set of
valuations we started the evaluation with: the set of valuations was not safe for
the formulas in the example.
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Example 6.3.3 gave rise to the weaker alternative of S-equivalence to replace
G-equivalence in the original formulation of renaming of bound variables. We will
use this solution again in the case of quantifier extraction.
Before we formulate and prove a restored version of Quantifier Extraction for
IFG-formulas, we raise two new questions. First, in the original formulation of
Quote 6.4.1, the main connective of the formula does not get a slash for x after
the extraction. Neither did we find examples where this would be necessary. Why
not? And second, can we then generalize the lemma to formulas with a slashed
main connective, i.e.
~
Qx~l'cP V~Z ~G -F Qx~Y(~P U~Z ~G~x)
~
Qx~Y~P ~~Z ~ -F Qx~Y(~P n~Z ~G~x)
The answer to this latter question may seem to be an easy `yes', but the
following counterexample shows again that we should be careful not to judge too
fast:
Example 6.4.4: ( Slash at main connective) Let ~l again be a model with
domain {0, 1}, and V-{z: 0,1}. Then we have
~ ~c ~x[z - q] V~Z [z ~ fi][V]
but if we extract the empty quantifier ~x:
2l ~~ ~x(z - 0 V~Z z~ 0)[V].
In the latter case Eloïse wins by choosing the value for x equal to the value of z,
followed by signaling the value of z by x at the main connective V~Z. Of course:
2l [~~ ~x(z - 0 V~Zx z~ ~)[V].
0
Apparently, if the main disjunction of the formula is slashed, we need to add
x under the slash after the extraction of ~x~Y. Our first question, why this is
not necessary if the main connective isn't slashed, will be answered after we have
proven the following corrected and generalized version of the quantifier extraction
lemma 3.1(b)-(d) of [CK99].
Lemma 6.4.5 (Quantifier Extraction over V) For any semi-regular IFG-for-
mula of the form Qx~Ycp V~Z ~, where x does not occur in zli, we have:
(c') (~x~~p V ~z ~) -s ~x~Y(~G V~zx ~~x)
(d~J (Vx~YcP V~Z ~G) -S dx~Y(~P V~Zx ~~x)
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Proof.~ For both (c') and (d'), assume that the left formula e - Qx~YCpV~z z~ is
semi-regular, and that x does not occur in zG. Let B' - Qx~Y(cp V~zx z~~x) denote
the right formula. Because B' has the same free variables and the same bound
variables as B, it follows immediately that the pair {B, B'} is S-compatible.
From the fact that B is semi-regular, it already follows that x does not occur
free in z~. But we still need to require that x does not occur (bound) in zli, if only
because otherwise the subformula z(~~x of B' would not be well-defined.
Now let 21 be a suitable model and V C AX safe for Qx~Ycp V~z z~. Note that
this implies that x~ X, which is used in every application of lemma 6.2.5, and
when taking projections to X.
(c', -~) From left to right: ~l ~c (~x~Ycp V~z ~)[V] iff 2l ~c ~x~YCp[Vi] and 2l ~c
~[V2] for U Z-saturated in V and Vi U VZ - V. By lemma 6.2.1, we may
take the V to be disjoint.
Now let f: Vl -~ A be Y-independent such that 2l ~~ cp[(Vi)x: f]. We
make a function g: V2 --~ A that is Y-independent, and such that g(v) -
f(w) if v ~Y w for v E V2 and w E Vl. Lemma 6.2.5 implies then that
~~c ~~~[(V2)x: 9]. Let h:- f U g: V--~ A, then h is Y-independent,
(Vi)~: n. -(Vi)x: f, (Vz)2: n -(Vi)x; y, and V~: n -(VI)2; f U(VZ)~; 9.
To prove that the (V )x; h are Zx-saturated in V~: h: suppose v(x: h(v))
coincides with w(x: h(w)) out of Zx, and that v(x: h(v)) E(V1)x; h. Then
v E[2 and v~z w, hence, by Z-saturation of V: w E [i, so: w(x : h(w)) E
(V )T, h. From this we may conclude 2t ~c (~G V~zx ~~x)[Vx; h], and there-
fore: 2l ~c ~x~Y(4~V~z~ ~~x)[V]
Conversely: assume 2[ ~~ 3xfY(cp Vfzx zli~x)[V], and let f: V-~ A be
Y-independent such that 2l ~~ (cp V~zy z,i~~)[Vx; f]. Let (Vx: f)1, (Vx: f)2
be Zx-saturated subsets of Vx; f, such that V~: f-(Vy; f)1 U(Vx: f)2 and
~~c ~P[(Vy: f)1]~ ~~c ~~x[(Vx: f)2]. Nowdefine U :- {v E V~v(x~f(v)) E
(Vy; f)2} for i- l, 2(V contains the projections of the elements of (Vx: f)i
to X) It is easily verified that Vi U V2 - V and that (Vx ; f)i -(v )x ; f.
Hence: 2l ~c ~P[(Vi)~: f] and 2l ~c ~~x[(Va)y: f]. So: 2l ~c ~x~Y~P[Vi]
(because f is Y-independent), and: 2l ~~ ~i[VZ] (by lemma 6.2.5).
To prove that the Vi are Z-saturated in V: if v~z w for some v E V, w E
V, then v(x: f(v)) E( Vx: f)2 and v(x: f(v)) ~z~ w(x: f(w)). By Zx-
saturation of (Vx; f)i, it follows that w(x: f(w)) E ( V~: f)2, and hence w E
V. We may now conclude: 2l ~~ (~x~YcpV~z z(i)[V]
(c~~ -) ~ ~c (~x~~P V~z ~)[V] iff 2l ~c ~x~~P[V] and 21 ~c ~[V], iff 2l ~c
cp[Vx: A] and 2l ]-~ zlify[V2; A] (by lemma 6.2.5). This is equivalent to:
~~c (~P V fz2 ~~x)[Vx: a], and equivalently: 2l ~c 3x~Y(cp Vfz~ z~~x)[V].
(d~, f) `~ ~c (dx~~P V~z ~)[VJ, iff 2( ~c dx~Y~P[Vi] and ~l ~c ~[V2] with V
Z-saturated in V and Vl U VZ - V. Equivalently: 2l ~~ cp[(Vi)x: A] and
~~c ~~y[(V2)~: a] (by lemma 6.2.5). The sets (Vi)~; A are Z-saturated
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in Vy ; A, hence Zx-saturated, and (Vl )x ; A U(V2 )~ ; A- Vx : A, so: `~ ~c
(~PV~zx ~~~)[Vx: A ] and 2! ~~ dx~Y(~PV~zx ~~~)[Vl.
Conversely, suppose 2l ~~ dx~y(cp V~zy zli)[V], so that ~1 ~G (cp V~zx
z(~~~)[V~: A ]. Then 2( [-~ cp[(Vx; A)1] and 2l ~~ z~i~x[(Vx; a)2] for Zx-satura-
ted subsets (Vx; A)i of V~; A with Vy; A-(V~; A)1 U(Vx: A)2.
Let Vi be the projection of (Vx: A)i to X. By Zx-saturation of (Vx; A)ti, we
know that any x-variant of v E (V~: A)i is also in (V~; A) ti, so that (V2)~: ,a -
(Vx; A)i. Therefore, on the one hand: 2l ~~ cp[(Vi)x: A ], which implies
2l [-c dx~YCp[Vi]; and on the other hand: 21 ~~ z(i~x[(V2)y: A] which implies
~( [-c ~[V2] ( by lemma 6.2.5). Moreover, it is easily verified that the V2 are
Z-saturated in V, and that V- Vl U V2. Thus: ~l ~~ (dx~YcpV~z ~i)[V].
(d~, -) ~ ~c (dx~~``~ V lz ~)[V] iff '11 ~~ b'x~Y`P[V] and 2l ~c ~[V], iff 2l ~c
cp[Vx; f] for some Y-independent f: V-~ A, and 2[ ~G ~~x[Vy: f] (by
lemma 6.2.5). Equivalently, 21 [-~ (cp V~zx z~~~)[V~; f], which is in turn
equivalent to: 2l [-~ b'x~Y(cpV~zx z~i~~)[V]
a
Extraction of quantifiers over conjunctions now follows easily:
Corollary 6.4.6 (Quantifier extraction over n) If Qx~Ycpn~zz~ is semi-regu-
lar and if x does not occur in ~i, then:
~c„~ (yx~Y~P ~~z ~G) -s dx~r(~P ~~z~ ~~x)
~d„~ (~x~Y~ n~z ~) -s ~x~Y(~ n~zx ~~x)
Proof.~ Apply De Morgan's laws to lemma 6.4.5 (c') and (d') respectively. a
We now prove two lemmas that show that in some cases adding the indepen-
dence of x at the main connective isn't necessary. In particular, they show that a
slash for x at the main connective can always be omitted if the main connective
isn't slashed for other variables.
Lemma 6.4.7 (Omitting variables, part I) If ~x~Y(cpl V~zx cp2) is a senzi-
regular IFG-for~nula, and if Z C Y, then
~x~Y(~PI V~zx ~Ga) -s ~x~r(~PI V~z ~Pa)
In particular, it always holds that ~x~Y(cp V~2 cp2) -s ~x~Y(~p V cp2).
Informally, we can explain this as follows. In the situation of the lemma, Eloïse
gets to make two subsequent moves: the first for the quantification ~x~Y, the next
for the disjunction V~z~~i. A choice function f for the quantification assigns a
value to x on the basis of the values assigned to the variables in X- Y. If she
has to disregard the value assigned to x through f when making her choice at the
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disjunction, she can recalculate this value on the basis of the values assigned to
the variables in X- Z, because X- Y C X- Z by Z C Y. So, it does not matter
whether we add the x to the slash of the main disjunction or not.
Note that the fact that the second move is a disjunction move, is not relevant
to this argument: it holds as well for subsequent existential quantifiers:
Lemma 6.4.8 If ~x~Y3y~z~cp is semi-regnlar, and if Z C Y, then:
~x~Y~y~z~~P -s 3x~Y~y~z~P.
Neither is it relevant that the two moves are subsequent: as long a no assignments
to variables are overwritten (which can be guaranteed by safeness and regularity),
the same informal argument holds for Eloïse's moves deeper in the formula.
This (informal) generalization sheds some light on the issue of the `slashing
convention', i.e. the assumption that existential quantifiers are always independent
of each other. This assumption is one of the features of Hintikka's IF-logic ([Hin96],
point (vii) on p. 63); see e.g. [Jan02] for a discussion of this convention. The general
version of this lemma learns us for which formulas the evaluation could alter by
imposing the convention: e.g. for the typical example dz~x~y~Z [y - z], which does
not satisfy the condition that Z C Y(in this case: Z-{z} while Y- 0). (We
could see the general version of this lemma as an instance of the game-theoretic
Thompson transformation of Inflation-Deflation; see section 4.8.1 of this thesis.)
We now only prove the special case of lemma 6.4.7 formally, in terms of the
inductive clauses for satisfaction:
Proof.~ (of lemma 6.4.7) Suppose that the left formula, ~x~Y(cpl V~zx cp2), is
semi-regular. Because the right formula has the same free and bound variables, it
follows that the left and right formula are S-compatible.
In all cases, let 2l be a suitable model, and V C AX a safe set of valuations for
the given formulas. Then x~ X. Suppose Z C Y.
(f) We will prove for any Y-independent f: V---~ A that elements of Vx; f
coincide out of Zx if and only if they coincide out of Z. It follows then for
any subset W of Vx; f: W is Zx-saturated in V2: f if and only if W is Z-
saturated in V~: f. From the satisfaction condition for disjunction, it easily
follows that
`~ ~c (~Pi v~zx ~Pa)[V~: f] if and only if 2l ~c (~Pi V~z ~Pz)[Vx: f]
and hence (because this holds for any Y-independent f):
~~c ~x~Y(~Pi V~z~ ~P2)[V] if and only if 2l ~c ~x~Y(~Pi U~z ~P2)[V]
So let f: V-~ A be Y-independent and v, w E V. We show that v(x: f(v))
and w(x: f(w)) E Vx: f coincide out of Zx iff they coincide out of Z.
F~om right to left, this inunediate. F~om left to right: if v(x: f(v)) ~z~
w(x: f(w)), then v~z w(we use that x ~ X), and hence v~Y w by the
assumption that Z C Y. Then f(v) - f(w), so: v(x: f(v)) ~z w(x: f(w)).
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(-) The equivalence of SZl ~~ ~x~Y(cpl V~zx cp2) and 2l ~~ ~x~Y(cpl V~z cp2) is im-
mediate: if we write out the satisfaction conditions given by definition 5.3.3,
the independence conditions for ~ and V disappear.
a
If we extract a universal quantifier Vx~Y over a disjunction V~zi the addition
of x under the slash of the main disjunction is never necessary, provided that the
`right disjunct' (z~ in lemma 6.4.5) is slashed for x ( cf. Example 6.4.2):
Lemma 6.4.9 (Omitting variables, part II) If Vx~Y(cp V~zx ~i~x) is a semi-
regular IFG-formula, and if x does not occur in ~, then
b'x~Y(~P V~Zx ~~x) -S dx~Y(~PV~z ~~x)
Proof.~ Again, assuming that the left formula is semi-regular, it easily follows
that the left and right formula are S-compatible. Let 2l be a suitable model, and
V C AX a safe set of valuations for the given formulas. Then x~ X.
(~)
(-)
We prove that 2l ~~ (cp V~zx ~~x)[Vx: A ], is equivalent to 2l ~~ (cp V~z
~~x)[Vx: A ]. From left to right this follows easily from the fact that Zx-
saturation of a W C Vx ; A implies Z-saturation.
For the converse, assume we have 2l ~~ (cpV~z zG~x)[Vx; A]. Pick W1,W2 C
Vx: A that are Z-saturated in Vx; A with Wl U WZ - Vx: A, such that 2l ~~
cp[Wl] and 2t ~~ ~~x[14'2]. By lemma 6.2.1, we may take the Wi to be
disjoint. From Wi, W2i we will construct sets Wi, W2 that are Zx-saturated
in Vx; A with Wi U W2 - Vx; A and 2l [-~ cp[Wi] and 2[ ~c ~~x[Wz].
First, let V2 be the projection of W2 to X, so: VZ :- {v E Vw(x: a) E
W2 for some a E A}. Then ~l ~~ z~[VZ] by lemma 6.2.5, and again by
lemma 6.2.5, this implies 2l ~~ ~~x[(V2)x: A]. We prove that (V2)x; A is
Zx-saturated in Vx; A: if v E V2,w E V, and v(x: a) ~zx w(x: b), then
v~z w (because x~ X); pick c E A such that v(x: c) E W2 (such c exists
because v E V2), then w(x: c) E W2 by Z-saturation of W2 in Vx; A, and
hence w(x: b) E (V2)x: a.
Now let Vl :- V- V2, then (Vl)x; A- Vx: A-(V2)x: A, hence Vx: A-
(Vi)x; A U(V2)x; A, and because Wz C(V2)x; A we have: (Vl)x; A- Vx; a`
( V2 ) x: A C(Vx ; A` W2 )- WI (for this last equality we use that the W2
were chosen to be disjoint). Therefore, 21 ~~ cp[(Vi)x; A ] by lemma 6.2.1.
Moreover, ( Vl )x : A is Zx-saturated in Vx ; A since it is the complement of the
Zx-saturated (V2 )x ; A.
We have shown that the sets Wi :- (Vi)x; A and W2 :- (V2)x: A satisfy our
requirements. Hence: 2l ~~ (cp V~zx ~~x)[Vx; a]
Because the negative evaluation of a disjunction, the variables under the
slash don't play a role, we have for any f: V-~ A:
~~c (~PVIz ~~x)[Vx: f] if and only if 2l ~c (~PV~zx ~~x)[Vx: f].
It easily follows that 2i ~~ dx~Y(cpV~z~~x)[V] iff 2l ~~ dx~Y(cpV~zx~~x)[V].
132 CHAPTER 6. THE PRENEX NORMAL FORM THEOREM
4
Combining results, we can now state the following equivalences with respect
to quantifier extraction:
Theorem 6.4.10 (Quantifier extraction over connectives) Given an IFG-
formula of the form Qx~Ycp v~Z ~ that is semi-regular, and such that x does not
occur in ~i, then:
(~, ~) ~x~~P ~~z ~ -s ~x~Y(~ ~~z~ ~G~~)
and, under the condition that Z C Y..
~x~~.~p v~z ~ -s ~x~Y(~G V~z ~~x)-
(d,V) dx~r~PV~z ~G -s-s dx~Y(~P V~z ?!~~s)
In particular:
Qx~Y`G V ~ -S Qx~Y(~P V ~~~)
The cases ( d, n) and (~, n) correspond to the cases ( ~, V) and ( d, v) respectively
(by De Morgan's laws).
Corollary 6.4.11 If B' is an IFG-sentence obtained from a regular IFG-sentence
8 by application of quantifcer extraction to one of its subformulas, then B-G B'.
Note that regularity of B implies that no subformula contains a variable both
free and bound ( semi-regularity), but to apply quantifier extraction to a subfor-
mula of the form Qx~Ycp V~Z ~, we still need to make sure that x does not occur
(bound) in zU. When we say `application of quantifier extraction', we imply that
this is precondition is satisfied.
Proof.. By the previous theorem, the substitution principle 6.3.16 ( here we need
the regularity of B) and by the fact that G-equivalence and S-equivalence coincide
on sentences ( lerruna 6.3.9). a
6.5 Prenex normal form
In the previous sections, we have reconstructed all building blocks necessary to
support a prenex normal form theorem for IFG-formulas. Among the improve-
ments made to the original system of [CK99], which allowed for some unexpected
and disturbing signaling phenomena, were a correction to the existential clause
of the inductive notion of satisfaction (Definition 5.3.3) and the introduction of a
new notion of equivalence (Definition 6.3.7). These allowed us to prove new ver-
sions of Renaming of bound variables (theorem 6.3.17), Substitution of equivalents
(theorem 6.3.16), and Quantifier extraction (theorem 6.4.10) in terms of these new
notions.
We have to be careful that these results require regularity of the formulas
involved, and S-compatibility of all formulas as precondition for (the transitivity
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of) S-equivalence. Fortunately, in the chain of formulas we get in the proof of our
prenex normal form theorem, all formulas will have the same free variables, while
the sets of bound variables increase monotonously. This ensures that lemma 6.3.8
is applicable for transitivity.
Theorem 6.5.1 (Prenex Form) Auy regular IFG-formula B is S-equivalent to
an IFG-formula iv, prenex form, with the same free variables as B.
Proof.. Even if B is regular, the same variable can occur bound by two or more
quantifiers (if they have mutually disjoint scopes). By repeated application of theo-
rems 6.3.17 (Change of Bound Variables) and 6.3.16 (Substitution of Equivalents),
we obtain a chain of equivalent formulas
e-eo-sel-s...-se~-8~
such in B' no two quantifiers bind the same variable. Regularity is preserved,
because for each i E {0, ..., k-1}, Fv(Bi) - Fv(Bifl) and Bv(B2t1) - Bv(9i)U{u2}
for some variable u~ ~ Fv(Bi) U Bv(Bi).
By repeated application of theorem 6.4.10 (Quantifier Extraction) and again
theorem 6.3.16, we obtain a further chain of equivalent formulas
~ ~ ~ - ~ ~~
B -Bo-sB1-s...-sB~-9
all with the same free and bound variables, such that e" is in prenex form. By
transitivity of -s on the formulas involved: B-s B". a
In the prenex normal form that we get from this theorem, slashed connectives
may still occur. To eliminate these, and get a stronger normal form result, we
need a result like Theorem 2.3 from [CK99]: elimination of `imperfect information
connectives'. In the next section, we will discuss this theorem, point out how
this theorem suffers from similar problems as the ones encountered before, and we
prove an alternative formulation for it.
6.6 Elimination of slashed connectives
In this section, we check whether it is possible to eliminate slashes that occur at
connectives. In other words: we check if any IFG-formula is equivalent to an IFG-
formula in which no slashed disjunctions ( or conjunctions) occur. Theorem 2.3
in [CK99, p. 24], `Elimination of imperfect information connectives', claims this
is the case ( for G-equivalence). The main part of this theorem amounts to the
following:
Quote 6.6.1 (Theorem 2.3 [CK99, p. 24] ) If S1l is a suitable model containing
at least two elements, V C A~ is safe for cp V~Y zli, and s, t~ X, the~n
~ ~G ~P U~Y~[V]
Z~ s-tn~p)v(s~tn~)][V]~ ~G ~S~Y~t~Y[(
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(By lemma 6.4.8, we may omit the s in the second quantifier ~t~Y,s of the original
formulation)
Again, we can give two kinds of counterexamples to this claim. As before, the
introduction of the new quantifiers may block signals from `outside' (signals for
cp V~Y z~i through the variables s, t may be overwritten if we evaluate the formulas
with respect to a set of valuations V C AX with s, t E X). We do not give
an explicit counterexample for this problem. Reformulating the general claim of
Theorem 2.3 of [CK99] in terms of S-equivalence rather than G-equivalence, will
solve this problem.
A counterexample of a second kind shows how the new quantifiers may intro-
duce new signaling possibilities inside the formula:
Example 6.6.2: (Quantifiers vs connectives) Consider the formula
~x~u[x - 2G] V~y ~x~u[x - u]
(so, in terms of the theorem: cp -~-~x~u[x - u] and Y-{y}). Let 2[ be
a model containing 3 elements, say A- {0, 1, 2}, and take V- A{~~y}. It is
straightforward to verify that
~ ~G ~x~u [x - 2G] U~y 3x~u [x - ~] [V] ~
This situation is part of the evaluation of the sentence dudy(~x~u[x - u] V~y
~x~~[x - u]) in 2l. This sentence is only true in models containing at most two
elements: the two different values Eloïse can choose for x(at the quantification
over x in cp, and at the quantification over x in zli), are not enough to cover the
three possible values Abélard can choose for u.
According to the claim above, the chosen formula should be equivalent to:
~s~y~t~b[(S - t n ~x~u[x - u]) v (s ~ t n ~x~u[x - ul )]
But the existential quantifier(s) create new possibilities for Eloïse: in her first
move, she can assign the value of u to s, then choose t equal to s, and satisfy cp
(the left copy of ~x~u[x - u]) by choosing the value of s for x. Note that this
strategy does not violate any of the independence conditions.
(A careful reader may have noticed that the fact that the main disjunction
is slashed for y, plays no role of importance in this example. Indeed, taking
Y- 0 would have been a counterexample to the claim as well, but arguably a less
convincing one, as there would be no slashed connectives to eliminate.) o
This example shows a fundamental difference between quantifiers and connec-
tives: connectives can make a binary case distinction, but cannot really signal
values. Existential quantifiers can do so.
A way to avoid this discrepancy, would be to require the models to interpret
two distinct constants, 0 and 1 say, by two distinct domain elements (thereby
excluding one-element models). Instead of the double existential quantification,
the case distinction can then be made by just one existential quantifier:
`~ ~c ~PV~Y~[V]
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~ ~~ ~S~Y[(S - o n ~v) v (S - 1 n ~)] [u]
Note that requiring one special constant would not be enough: consider the
following variant of the example above (for simplicity, we now take Y- 0)
~ ~~ ~s[(s - o n ~x~u[x - ul ) v (s ~ o n ~x~u[x - ~l )l [V]-
Eloïse could still choose the value of s equal to the value of u. At the disjunction,
Vs: f -{us: 00, 11, 22} can be split in Wl -{us: 00} and Wz -{us: 11, 22}. In
both cases, Eloïse wins by choosing the value of s for x.
It is interesting to see that even though Hintikka does not prove an elimination
theorem like Theorem 2.3 of [CK99], the slashed connectives in IF-logic are elim-
inated in the translation procedure from IF-logic to Ei (see e.g. [Hin96], formula
(3.16) on page 52). There, the constant 0 is used as special constant, and implic-
itly, it is assumed that the models contain at least two elements. If we translate
the sentence
`dudy(~x~u[x - u] ~ly ~xlu[x - u])
from our Example 6.6.2 above, according to the procedure described (loc. cit.), it
suffers from the same difference between connective and quantifier demonstrated
by the Example 6.6.2. Because of the already present assumption that models
contain at least two elements, the problem can easily be avoided by assuming two
distinct special constants.
The previous observations suggest the following alternative for the part of
Theorem 2.3 of [CK99] as quoted in Quote 6.6.1:
Lemma 6.6.3 (Elimination of slashed connectives) Let cp,~ 6e IFG-formu-
las. Then for any suitaóle ~reodel 2l with distinct interpretations for the constants
0 and 1, V C AX safe for cp V~Y ~i, and s~ X:
~ ~~ ~v v~Y ~G[V]
iff
~~c ~s~r[(s - 0 n cp) v(s - 1 n zG)][V].
Proof.- Let co, cl E A be the interpretations of 0 and 1 in 2! respectively. We
divide the proof in three cases:
(-~, ~) First, suppose ~1 ~~ cp V~Y z~i[V]. Determine disjoint Vi, Vz C V such
that V- Vi U Vz, Vl, Vz Y-saturated in V and 2l ~~ cp[Vl] and 2l ~~ ~[Vz]. Let
f: V-~ A be the characteristic function of Vz:
f(v) r~ if v E Vl
- cl if v E Vz
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Then f is Y-independent by Y-saturation in V of V2 and Vl. Furthermore, because
([i)s: f is of the form U x{c}{s} (where c is co for Vl and cl for V2), we can use
lemma 6.2.2 to show that
~ ~c ~P[(Vi)s: f] and 2( ~c ~[(Va)s: f].
It follows easily that
`~ ~c (s - 0 n ~P)[(Vi)9: f] and 21 ~c (s - 1 n ~i)[(Vz)s: f],
and thus: 2[ ~~ (s - 0 n cp) V(s - 1 n~)[Vs: f]. By definition, it follows that:
~c ~~ ~s~,.[(s - o n ~) v (s - )t n zG)][V].
(f, ~) Conversely, assume that ~1 ~G ~s~Y[(s - 0 n cp) V (s - 1 n~i)] [V]. Let
f: V-~ A be independent of Ysuch that 2t ~~ (s - 0 n cp) v(s - 0 n~)[V3; f].Determine Wl, WZ C Vs: f such that Wl U WZ - VS; f, and
2i ~~ (s - 0 h cp)[Wl] and 2l ~~ (s - 1 n z~)[W2].
For any v E V, we write vs for the valuation v(s: f(v)) E Vg; f. Because
vs E Wl iff vs satisfies s- 0, we have Wl -{vs E V9; f~vs(s) - f(v) - co}.
Siinilarly: W2 -{vs E Vs: f ~ f(v) - cl }.
Now define Vl :- {v E V ~ f(v) - co} and VZ :- {v E V ~ f(v) - cl }. By
the fact that f is independent of Y, the U are Y-saturated in V. Furthermore,
Wl UW2 - Vs; f implies that f(v) E{co, cl } for all v E V, and hence: Vl UV2 - V.
The one issue left to check is whether 2( ~~ cp[Vl] and 2l ~~ z,i[V2]. For cp this
holds by the fact that 21 ~~ cp[Wl], that Wl - Vi x{co}{9} and by lemma 6.2.2.
Similarly for zli and V2.
This verifies that ~( ~~ cp V~Y zG[V].
(-, ~) We will use following s-variation of V:
Vs: o:- {v(s~co)~v E V} - V x{co}{s}.
Vs: i-- {v(s~cl)w E V} - V x{cl}{s}
The following are then equivalent:
. 2[ ~c ~GV~Y~[V]
. 2l ~~ cp[V] and ~l ~~ ~[V] (by definition)
. 21 ~c ~P[V9: o] and ~[ ~c ~i[V3: 1] (by lemma 6.2.2)
' (~ ~c (s - 0)[Vs: ,a `Vs: o] and 21 ~c ~P[Vs: o]) and
(~ ~c (s - 1)[V3: ,a `V3: i] and 2l ~c ~[Vs: i])
. ~l ~~ (s - 0 n cp)[Vs; A] and ~l ~~ (s - 1 n ~)[VS: A] (by definition)
. 2[ ~~ (s - 0 n cp) V(s - 1 n z(~)[Vs: A] (by definition)
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. 2l ~~ ~s~Y[(s - 0 n cp) V(s - 1 n~)(V] (by definition)
This result, however straightforward, is not a satisfactory replacement for The-
orem 2.3 of [CK99]. In fact, it only works for models that have distinct inter-
pretations for the constants 0,1, and thereby excludes one-element models. This
restriction is similar to the restriction to IF-safe models which was necessary to en-
sure soundness of the translation procedures from IF-logic to Ei and back, which,
by the way, also eliminates slashed disjunctions (cf. section3.2 of this thesis).
The following alternative is more complex in terms of the number of extra
quantifiers needed, but solves all problems with Theorem 2.3 of [CK99] without
imposing extra requirements on the models:
Theorem 6.6.4 (Elimination of slashed connectives) Let s, t and v be dis-
tinct variables that don't occ~ar in the IFG-formula B- cpV~Y~, and let Z C Fv(B)
be the set of all free variables occurring under the slashes in cp. If B is semi-regular,
then:
(w v~Y~) -s (dsdt[s - t] n (~ v ~G))v
(~s~t[s ~ t] n b's~Zdt~Z[s - t v~u~Y[(u - s n~p) v(u - t n~)]])
Proof.. Denote the right formula in the equivalence by B'. Note that B, B' are
S-compatible by the requirement that no variables occur both free and bound in
e, and the requirement that the extra bound variables s, t, w in e' don't occur in
B. Let 2( be a suitable model for 8, and let V C A~ be a safe set of valuations for
B and B'.
We must prove:
~l ~~ B[V] iff 2l ~~ B'[V] (6.3)
We distinguish two main cases:
1. ~A~ - 1(i.e. A-{a}), or
2. ~A~ ) 2
In the first case, we either have V- 0-in which case the equivalence ( 6.3) is trivial
by first remark made directly after definition 5.3.3- or V is the singleton set {v},
where v is the valuation with v(x) - a for all x E X. (Note that for singleton sets
of valuations, all independence conditions are vacuous.)
For positive satisfaction: suppose 2l ~~ (cp V~Y ~)[V]. Because the indepen-
dence condition for the disjunction is vacuous on V, it follows that ~l ~~ (cpV~)[V].
Furthermore, it's easy to see that ~2l [-~ dsb't(s - t)[V], so the first main disjunct
of 9' is satisfied in ~2l by V, hence: 2( ~~ B'[V]. The converse holds because 21 and
V can impossibly satisfy Ss~t(s ~ t), so, from ~l ~~ 6'[V], it follows that ~l and
V must satisfy the first main disjunct of B'. This implies ~l ~~ (~pV zli)[V], which
implies ~l ~~ (c~ V~Y ~i)[V] because the independence conditions are vacuous for
V.
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For negative satisfaction: suppose fZl ~~ (cp V~Y ~)[V]. Then also S?l ~~
cp V~i[V], so 2l and V satisfy the left disjunct of B' negatively. Furthermore,
21 ~~ ~s~t(s ~ t)[V], so 2l and V also satisfy the right disjunct of B' negatively.
Hence: 2l ~~ B'[V]. The converse holds, because it follows from 2( ~~ B'[V]
that 2l ~~ (cp V z~i)[V], and hence 2l ~~ (cp b~Y~)[V] (because the independence
conditions play no role in the negative clause for satisfaction for disjunction).
Now for the case that ~A~ 1 2. It is easy to see that then: 2l ~~ b'sbt(s - t)[V]
and 2l ~~ ~s3t(s ~ t)[V]. -
For positive satisfaction, from left to right: suppose 2l ~~ cpV~y~i. Determine
disjoint Vl, V2 C V that are Y-saturated in V such that V - Vl U V2, ~t ~~
cp[Vl] and 2( ~~ ~t~i[V2]. Because V is safe for B', we can define sets of valuations
Wl, W2 C Vst; A by Wl :- V x {(st: aa)~a E A}, W2 :- {(st: ab)~a, b E A, a~ b}.
Let f: W2 -~ A be defined by
f(v(st: ab)) :
a if v E Vl
- b ifvE V2
Then f is independent of Y by the fact that the U are Y-saturated, (WZ)u; f-
Vi x{(stu: aba)~a,b E A,a ~ b} U V2 x {(stu: abb)~a,b E A,a ~ b}, while by
lemma 6.2.2:
2l ~~ cp[Vi x{(stu: aba)~a, b E A,a ~ b}], and:
2l ~~ z(i[VZ x{(stu: abb)~a, b E A, a~ b})
Hence, respectively:
. 2l ~c (u - s n cp) v(u - t n~)[(Wa)u: f],
. 2l ~c ~u~r[(u - s n cp) v(u - t n z~)][W2],
~~~~ (s - t) v~u~,,[(u - s n~) v(u - t n zG)][V9t; a]
(because 2l ~~ (s - t)[Wl] and Wl UW2 - Vst; A),
. ~ ~~ bs~zbt~z[(S - t) v ~u~Y[(u - s n ~) v (u - t n ~)ll [u]
(the independence of Z of the universal quantifiers plays no role in the pos-
itive evaluation)
~ 21 ~~ 3s~t(s ~ t) n bs~zbt~z[(s - t) v~u~,.[(u - s n~) v(u - t n~)]][V]
. zl ]-~ 9'(jr]
Conversely, suppose 2l ~~ 9'(V]. Then respectively:
~~t ~~ s- t V~u~Y[(u - s I~ cp) b(u - t n zG)][Vst; A] (because no valuations
in V satisfy the left disjunct of e')
~ 2l ~~ ~u~Y((u - s n cp) V (u - t n~)][V x{(st: ab)~a, b E A, a~ b}]
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. 21 ~~ 3u~Y[(u - s n ~p) v(u - t n~)][V x {(st: aobo)}]
if we fix any ao, bo E A with ao ~ bo, by lemma 6.2.1
. ~ ~c (u - s n ~) v (u - t n ~)[(V x {(st: aobc)})u: f]
for some f: V x {(st: aoóo)} -~ A that is Y-independent
. 2l ]-c (u - s n cp)[(Vl x{(st: aobo)})u; f] and 2l ]-c (u - t n~)[(V2 x
{(st: aobo)})u: f] for some V1iV2 C V with Vl U V2 - V. Then necessarily
f(v) - ao iff v E Vl, and f(v) - bo iff v E VZ (so the VZ are automatically
disjoint, and Y-saturated by Y-independence of f). Hence:
. 2l ~c cp[Vi x{(stu: aoboao}] and 2l ~~ cp[VZ x{(stu: aobobo}]. Then:
.~~c ~p[Vi], `~ ~c ~[V2] by lemma 6.2.2. Because the V~ are Y-saturated:
. 2l ~c ~PV~Y~[V]
Hence: ~l ~~ B[V] iff 2l ]-~ B'[V].
For negative satisfaction, it is enough to prove that the following are equivalent:
`~ ~c (~~P n ~~)[V] (6.4)
~ ~~ ~SiZ~tiZ[s ~ t n du[(u ~ S ~ ,~) n (u ~ t ~ ,~)]][~l (s.5)
Assume ( 6.4). Fix a, b E A with a ~ b, then 2[ ]-~ (-~cp n~~)[Vu: A x {(st: ab)}]
by lemma 6.2.2. It then follows that:
2l ~~ (u ~ s V~cp) n(u ~ t v ~~i)[Vu: A x {(st: ab)}]
(take the empty set of valuations for the left disjuncts), and:
~1 ~~ s~ t n du[(u ~ s v ,~p) n(u ~ t v,~i)][V x{(st: ab)}].
Using two constant ( hence Z-independent) functions that assign a and b respec-
tively to all valuations, (6.5) follows easily.
Conversely, assume (6.5). Then
~t ~~ s~ t n du[(u ~ s v,~p) n(u ~ t v ,~)l [(Vs: f)t: gl
for some f: V--~ A and g: V3: f -~ A that are both Z-independent. Necessarily,
f(v) ~ g(v(s: f(v))) for all v E V. Also, both:
~ ~G (u ~ S V ~~)[((Vs: f)t: g)u: A]
~~C (~ ~ t V~w)[((Vs: f)t: 9)u: A]
By lemma 6.2.1, it follows that
~~c (u ~ S V~~P)[((Vs: f)t: g)u: f']
~ ~G (u ~ tV ~V')[((Vs: f)t: g)u: g']
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where f',g' :(Vs; f)t; g --~ A are defined by f`(w) - w(s) and g'(w) - w(t) re-
spectively. Then all valuations in ((Vs: f)t; g)u; f. satisfy u- s, hence necessarily:
`~ ~c ~~P[((Vs: f)t: g)u: f~]
and similarly
~ ~G ~W[((Vs: f)t: g)u: g~]
Note that because s, t~ Z C X, the functions f', g` are Z-independent, as were
f,g. By lemma 6.2.6, it follows that 21 ~~ ~cp[V] and 2l ~~ ~~[V], hence (6.4).
So, we also have: 2l ~~ B[V] iff 2l ~~ B'[V]. a
With this result, we now have:
Corollary 6.6.5 Every regular IFG-formula is S-equivalent to a regular IFG-
formula without slashed connectives.
Proof.. This follows from repeated application of theorem 6.6.4, the substitution
principle theorem 6.3.16 ( this requires regularity), following a similar chain of
arguments to those in the prenex normal form theorem 6.5.1. a
Corollary 6.6.6 Every regular IFG-formula is S-equivalent to a regular IFG-
formula without slashed connectives which is in prenex form.
Proof.. First apply the previous corollary, then the prenex normal form theo-
rem 6.5.1. It follows from the Quantifier Extraction theorem 6.4.10 that if a
formula contains no slashed connectives before quantifier extraction, then neither
does the result of the quantifier extraction. a
Corollary 6.6.7 Every regular IFG-sentence is G-equivalent to a regular IFG-
sentence without slashed connectives which is in prenex form.
Proof.~ By lemma 6.3.9 and the previous corollary. a
With this last result, we may conclude that the main result from [CK99] holds
indeed for (the restricted class of) regular IFG-sentences, despite all the nuances
we had to introduce in the steps that lead to it.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have proved some general properties of satisfaction for IFG-
formulas, and several equivalence schemes for IFG-formulas, leading to a prenex
normal form theorem for regular IFG-sentences. In this normal form, no slashed
connectives occur.
In comparison with results for IF-logic, these results are symmetric in their
treatment of truth and falsity, while both language and semantics are designed
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with as little implicit rules as possible on the application and interpretation of the
slash operator (e.g. no slashing convention).
We have demonstrated several signaling phenomena related to situations that
from a classical viewpoint seem unproblematic. They occur if a variable occurs in
some sense douóle: both free and bound in one formula, in a nested quantification,
or both bound in the formula and in the domain of the set of valuations with
which the formula is evaluated. We showed how these situations invalidate many
results claimed in [CK99]. It motivated us to introduce the notions of S-equivalence
and regularity, which prove to enable reformulations and proofs of the invalidated
claims of [CK99].
We think that similar precautions are needed to prove equivalence schemes
using Hodges' trump semantics, although formulating them will be easier by the
fact that the domains of the valuations are a fixed parameter with the formula




In this final chapter, we look back on the work of the previous chapters and
highlight some conclusions. We also list a number of open issues as inspiration for
future researc.h.
7.1 Hintikka's approach
We started this thesis by giving a general introduction to the basic ideas behind
Independence Friendly logic (IF-logic) and game theoretical semantics as they were
presented and advocated by Hintikka, in particular in his book The Principles of
Mathematics Revisited ([Hin96J).
In chapter three, we gave a formal account of the Skolemization procedure
used by Hintikka to obtain Ei-truth conditions for IF-sentences. These Ei-truth
conditions, and the fact that every Ei-sentence may be viewed as a truth condi-
tion for some IF-sentence, make it easy to infer properties for IF-logic from the
properties of Ei. In fact, we feel that the Skolemization procedure (based on the
usual Skolemization procedures for first order logic and partially ordered quan-
tification) constitutes Hintikka's basic interpretation of IF-sentences, and not the
game theoretic concepts of game theoretical semantics.
There are two kinds of observations that support this.
First, we have shown that Hintikka's approach to IF-logic focuses on truth only
(recognizably so in the definition of the syntax and the notion of equivalence he
uses). This corresponds to the fact that Skolemization delivers truth-conditions
only. A game theoretic approach would have included falsity as second dimension.
It treats both players equally in the defïnition of the semantic games, and truth
and falsity correspond to the separate questions under which conditions each of
them has a winning strategy. That in semantic games for IF-sentences these are
truly separate questions is demonstrated by the result of Burgess [Bur03J. To
ignore falsity is a non-trivial choice from a game-theoretic perspective.
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Second, a game theoretic analysis of some formulas (most notably Hodges' ex-
ample (3.10)), gives different evaluations than the Ei-truth condition obtained by
Hintikka's Skolenuzation procedure. F~om a game-theoretic perspective, we would
need a Skolemization procedure that also takes previous existential quantifiers into
account (while the traditional procedure only takes universal quantifications into
account). But Hintikka, probably when realizing this, did not repair the Skolem-
ization procedure. Instead, he introduces a game-theoretically counterintuitive
provision, the slashircg convention, in order for the Skolemization procedure to re-
main unchanged.
Taking the Skolemization procedure as primitive, it is still possible to also
include falsity aspects. For this, we generalized the original IF-syntax to its sym-
metric extension GIFS, which allowed us to obtain the falsity condition of an
IF-sentence as the truth condition of the negation of the sentence.
In the rest of the thesis, we have left what we called `Hintikka's approach'.
We did not take the Skolemization procedure as primitive (and did not adopt
the slashing convention), and defined strategies for both players in terms of the
semantic games (and not by a syntactic procedure). We switched to the IFG-
language, which is built up from first order atomic formulas rather than first order
sentences in negation normal form; it generalizes the IF-language in the following
respects: it includes open formulas, negation may occur in front of any subformula,
and any variable may occur under a slash of any quantifier or connective.
7.2 Game theory as framework for logic
In chapter 4 we have taken the `game theoretical' in game theoretical semantics
seriously, and actually formalized semantic gaines for IFG-sentences into the game-
theoretic standard model of games in extensive form. In the game-theoretic model,
strategies in semantic games can be taken to be sets of choice functions. These
choice functions in turn, can be viewed as Skolem functions of the type that also
takes existential quantifications into account.
Furthermore, we noted that the structure of the game trees for semantic games
was rather specific, and so is the structure of the information sets, the component
modeling the imperfect information induced by the slash operator. We investi-
gated to which extent allowing connectives under the slash would extend the class
of game trees corresponding to semantic games, but only in a restricted number
of cases did we find a sensible interpretation.
Having a game-theoretic formalization of semantic games, we can study game-
theoretic notions and results in order to find their counterparts for IFG-logic.
F;"om this perspective, we studied the Thompson transformations. These allowed
us to formulate some equivalence schemes for IFG-sentences, but they also showed
us that -without the possibility of putting connectives under the slash, and with
the specific structure of the semantic games- the applicability of the transforma-
tions is restricted. Therefore, the main result associated with the transforinations,
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viz. that they can bring any game in extensive form into redu~ced normal form,
does not directly transfer to IFG-logic. It was interesting to note that games of
imperfect recall, which are usually avoided in game theory, are omnipresent in se-
mantic games for IF-logic (in almost all cases, by the slashing convention) and in
IFG-logic.
In the line of looking for relations between logical and game-theoretical notions
and results, there are many open questions and issues. We list some of them below
(when we say `semantic games', we mean semantic games for IFG-sentences):
. Semantic games have a specific structure, so not every arbitrary game in
extensive form is a semantic game. For example, a game resulting from the
application of the Thompson transformation coalescence to a semantic game,
is no longer a semantic game. But the result is equivalent to a semantic
game. We wonder: is every arbitrary game equivalent (by Thompson or
other transformations) to a semantic game? In other words: would there
be a procedure that transforms an arbitrary game into a game that has the
structure of a semantic game?
. Related to the previous question: could there exist a logic (logical language
with game semantics) which is characterized by the Thompson transfor-
mations as axioms? (Question suggested by Wilfrid Hodges in relation
to [Dec04].)
. Already mentioned in correlation to the Thompson transformations is the
game-theoretic reduced normal forrrt. On the logical side we have several
normal forms, which we could try to relate to game-theoretic ones: negation
normal form (which is not noticeable game-theoretically, cf. section 4.5),
prenex normal form (which could be seen as the result of Thompson trans-
formations), the Skolem normal form (which we automatically get for IF-
sentences after application of the translation into Ei and back, cf. [Hin96,
p. 60]; it seems related to the reduced normal form although it only preserves
trath, or in other words: Eloïse's powers), or the distributive normal form
(cf. [V~íi02], this also only preserves truth).
. There seems to be an essential difference between quantifiers and connec-
tives if it comes to independence. Independence of the value of a certain
variable can easily be expressed in terms of (sets of) valuations, but our dis-
cussion of section 4.6 shows that it is harder to grasp what independence of
a connective would mean in general. Maybe we could explain the difference
between the two types of logical constants (or: two types of moves?) in game
theoretic terms. We could attempt (as suggested by Eric Pacuit) to use the
game-theoretic distinction between imperfect information and incomplete in-
formation (where the latter means uncertainty about some part of the game
structz~re).
. Games (in extensive form) are in a natural manner related to processes
(cf. [vB02a]). The game theoretic approach to logic with the independence
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operator may lead to applications in the theory of parallel processing, as
demonstrated by [Bra00].
7.3 The slash operator and its interpretations
With the previous two sections in mind, let's look at the two main interpretations
of the slash operator in IF(G)-logic. One could say that in Hintikka's approach, the
interpretation of the slash operator is principally in terms of independence, while,
in the game-theoretic context, the slash operator is interpreted by imperfect in-
formation. In this thesis we have encountered some examples for IF(G)-sentences
that have (in some sense) surprising evaluations.
An example that incorporates several elements of `surprise' is Hodges' formula
b'x3z~y~~[x - y]. This formula evaluates differently under Hintikka's approach
(making it true only in one-element models) than under a game theoretic inter-
pretation (making it logically valid).
As noted in section 3.9, the dependence relation of the quantifiers in this
formula is not transitive: while y may depend on z and z may depend on x, y is
not allowed to depend on x. (This example thereby shows that the linear notation
with the slash operator can express more dependence patterns than partially or-
dered quantification.) Even though a relation (as mathematical notion) need not
be transitive, the term dependence (in general) usually implies transitivity. We
therefore get conceptual conflicts when we try to interpret this formula.
Hintikka solves the counterintuitive situation by introducing the slashing con-
vention. At least, this resolves the specific intransitivity of dependence in Hodges'
example by making y independent of z as well. But in game-theoretic terms, this
convention is very counterintuitive: why would Eloïse forget all her own moves,
while she may remember previous ones of the opponent. The slashing convention
introduces imperfect recall into many formulas. On the other hand, in sec-
tion 4.7 we noted that, even without the slashing convention, the semantic games
for Hodges' formula are of imperfect recall (because Eloïse forgets knowledge she
previously had, viz. the value of x). Eloïse overcomes this however by a`trick' we
call signaling. Whether or not this trick can be considered as cheating, depends
on how we take the interpretation of the concept of imperfect recall. In our for-
malization of the semantic games, the trick corresponds to a legal winning strategy.
Note that the slashing convention does not exclude all types of intransitivity
of the dependence relation between quantifiers: in b'xdz~y~2z~ the dependence
relation is just as intransitive as in Hodges' example. But this intransitivity causes
no problems, because Eloïse has no control over the value of z, so she can no longer
use the intransitivity for signaling.
Furthermore, while the slashing convention solves the problem of unwanted
intransitivity of tlie dependence relation, it does not get rid of conceptual problems
surrounding the interpretation of independence: with the slashing convention, the
IF-formula 3x~y[x - y] is still logically valid even while y is not allowed to depend
7.4 SEMANTICS FOR OPEN FORMULAS 147
on x.
These examples make us ask fundamental and difficult questions like what the
notion of dependence of quantifiers really means. Valuable work in this respect
has been done in [Jan02], which works towards a formalization of independence of
quantifiers (and choices) that is in accordance with our intuitions.
7.4 Semantics for open formulas
After the first chapters, in which only sentences were evaluated, we introduced the
semantics of [CK99] for open IFG-formulas in chapter 5. We presented the seman-
tics by giving a game theoretic definition first, followed by an inductive definition
using the same parameters. The game theoretic notion of satisfaction allows for
a good comparison with the game theoretical semantics defined by Hintikka (for
sentences only), and the inductive notion is useful for proving equivalence schemes
without using translations to other logical systems (as we demonstrate in chap-
ter 6). We proved that these two notions of satisfaction coincide, and also used
the inductive version to prove explicitly that IFG-logic with this semantics extends
classical first order logic.
A closer study of the following issues would help us to get a better understand-
ing of the semantics for open IFG-formulas:
. In a certain sense, the sets of valuations code a context for an open formula
that is evaluated. In the (counter-)examples we gave in chapters 5 and 6,
we could always find a sentence cp such that the open formula ~ and set of
valuations V of the examples could be seen as part of the (positive) inductive
evaluation of cp. A natural question to ask is: given a model2l and a formula
z~, can we construct such a sentence for any arbitrary set of valuations V C
AX? -
If the answer is `yes' (which we would expect on the basis of our expe-
rience), such a sentence need not be unique (e.g. if ~i :- ~y~x[x - y],
~[ :- ({0,1}, ... ) and V:- {xz: 00,11}, then cp could be dx~z~y~x[x - y],
but also: b'z~x~y~x[x - y]).
Note also that if we find such cp, it only holds for positive evaluation: 2l ~~
zli[V] if and only if 2l ~~ cp. We do not yet have that ~l ~~ zli[V] if and only
if 21 ~~ cp, because the inductive evaluation of 2l ~~ cp goes along different
clauses, hence gives a different sets of valuations. (For example, if we take zli
as above and cp :- dx~z~y~x[x - y], the second step of the evaluation now
gives V' -{xz: c0,c1} for some c E{0, 1}, hence V' ~ V. A sentence cp'
with ~l ~~ cp' iff 2[ ~~ z~[V] would be cp' :- ~xdz~y~2[x - y].)
. Another interesting question is that of satisfiability of a given IFG-formula
zli and suitable model 21 (due to Peter van Emde Boas): can we find a set of
valuations V for ~ in 2l such that ~l [-~ ~[V] (and similarly for S?.1 ~~ z(i[V])?
If so, what is the complexity of finding such V?
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. The main difference of the semantics of [CK99] with Hodges' Trump seman-
tics (cf. [Hod97a]) is that in Hodges' system, formulas come with a fixed
domain for the sets of variables with which they are evaluated. This makes
a formula ~(x) different from the formula ~(x, z), even if z does not occur
in z~. These domains restrict the class of the sentences in which they can
occur: ~i(x) can only occur under the scope of precisely one quantification
(over x), while ~(x, z) can only occur in the scope of precisely two quantifi-
cations (over x and over z). This does not seem to be a big difference, but
we are careful after the subtle results and warnings of chapter 6, which also
involve the domains of the valuations. It would be worth wile to compare
our semantics with Trump semantics in more detail.
7.5 The requirement of regularity
Hilbert and Ackermann defined the language of first order predicate logic in such
a way that a variable never occurs both free and bound within a single formula,
nor can a formula contain nested quantification over the same variable [HA59, p.
74]. In this thesis, we have called formulas that satisfy these properties regular
(cf. definition 6.3.15). Although first order languages are nowadays usually defined
without these restrictions (as we also did in our chapter 2), iinposing them does
not affect the properties of the logic: by renaming of bound variables, any irregular
first order formula may be transformed into a regular equivalent.
In chapters 5 and 6 however, we have showed that the difference between
regular and irregular formulas does have semantical consequences for both IF- and
IFG-logic. First, we showed that a restriction to regular formulas is crucial in
Hintikka's claim that IF-logic is a conservative extension of classical first order
logic (cf. section 5.6).
For IFG-logic, the matter is even more subtle, as is shown by the efforts in
chapter 6 in order to free the prenex normal form theorem of [CK99] from flaws
related to irregular formulas. Complicating factor in this logic is the fact that we
also have to be careful with the domains of the valuations we evaluate a formula
with: these act just like free variables of the formula (even if they do not actually
occur free in the formula), and should therefore be included in the restriction
to regularity (the domain of the valuations may not contain variables that occur
bound in the formula). Regularity for IFG-logic with the semantics we presented
in this thesis is thereby a notion with aspects outside the syntax of the formulas.
In this respect, we see a big advantage in Hodges' choice to let the domains be a
parameter that comes with the formula.
The problems with irregularity can be seen as an artefact caused by coding the
positions in the semantic games by valuations. If in a later move a new value is
assigned to a variable, the old value in the valuation is overwritten and therefore
becomes inaccessible to the players. In this way, nested quantification over the
same variable, or free variables that occur bound later in the formula, introduce
another form of imperfect information in an intrinsic way, that may become sig-
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nificant in combination with the slash operator. Or, in Hintikka's approach: with
the Skolenuzation procedure. To avoid this, we must follow the good example of
Hilbert and Ackermann, and restrict ourselves to regular situations.
7.6 Some possible directions for future research
We highlight a couple of possible directions for further research, which we think
are interesting to pursue.
We have not paid much attention to (non-)constructivistic aspects of the defini-
tions and results in this thesis. Chapter 10 of [Hin96] is dedicated to a construc-
tivist approach to game theoretical semantics and IF-logic (as in Hintikka's ap-
proach). The idea is basically to restrict the interpretation of the Skolem functions
in the Ei-truth conditions to recursive functions. Of course, we would also have
to interpret the connectives and predicates constructively. We note that in [CS98]
it is argued this idea to turn to recursive Ei, will not deliver an intuitionistic ap-
proach, as it would conflict with Brouwer's thesis that every real-valued function
is continuous. These are all subtle issues, and they deserve to be studied in more
detail.
A non-constructivistic element that is incorporated in game theoretic seman-
tics, is the axiom of choice. This is a consequence of the conception of strategies
as (consisting of) functions, as is usual in game theory. Alternatively, one could
define a different concept of strategy, viz. in terms of a relation, and avoid in-
corporating the axiom of choice in the logic (as we noted on page 96). We
have not looked extensively into the consequences of this switch, but the proofs
of some results in chapter 6 use the function approach (e.g. lemmas 6.2.5, 6.4.7).
We can therefore not yet say whether, or in which form, the prenex normal form
theorem would hold for this conception of strategy (if we keep avoiding the axiom
of choice, of course).
An interesting attempt to get a grip on the relation between the notion of
winning strategy in semantic games, and proof for first order validity, is pre-
sented in [Bny04]. It uses the idea, also present in game semantics for linear logic
([Abr02]), that (one of the) players may choose to return to a previous position in
the game and play again from there. In linear logic, a similar idea is used to define
one of the implications. Maybe similar ideas may also lead to some game-theoretic
notion of implication for IF(G)-logic.
In section 3.8, we collected some reflections on game-theoretic negation, and in
section 3.6, we mentioned the possibility of extending IF-logic to EIF-logic, by
adding a weak, sentence-initial, contradictory negation. It would be interesting to
look at possible connections between EIF-logic and other systems with strong and
weak negations, most notably Nelson's logic of constructible falsity ([Ne149],
or sections 3.1-3.2 of [Jas94]). In this constructive propositional logic, a formula
is true if we have a proof. The strong negation of a formula is true if we have a
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refi~tation, while the weak negation of it is satisfied if we have no proof. Replace
`proof' by `strategy for Eloïse', and `refutation' by `strategy for Abélard', and we
see how this corresponds to the strong and weak negation of EIF-logic. (However,
when trying to elaborate this connection, through studying the algebras associated
with Nelson's logic (cf. [MVO1]), we hit the problem that in EIF-logic the weak
negations only occur sentence-initially, while the strong negations -by negation
normal form- occur only at atomic level.)
After our study of the proposal of [Hin96], we have become a bit skeptical about
Hintikka's claim that IF-logic is truly new and revolutionary, and even whether
IF-logic is truly first order. This is because in Hintikka's approach, IF-logic almost
coincides with Ei: classical existential second order logic. Nevertheless, the ideas
and concepts that are presented in the book have proved to be intriguing, inspir-
ing, and puzzling. They force us to be more precise about `old' notions because
translating them to IF(G)-logic may not be as straightforward as we expected.
In this respect, the book is also an inspiration for the philosophy of logic and
mathematics.
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Appendix A
About Abélard and Eloïse
Throughout this thesis, Abélard and Eloïse feature as the players of the abstract
semantic games. The use of the names of Abélard (in the role of falsifier) and
Eloïse (in the role of verifier), is common in the literature on logic games, mainly
because of their mnemonic value (Abélard for the `d-quantifier and Eloïse for the
~-quantifier). In this appendix, for those who wonder who Abélard and Eloïse
were, we give some historic background to these names.
The `real' Abélard (Pierre Abélard, 1079-1142) and Eloïse (or Heloise, 1101-
1162) are nowadays mostly remembered for their legendary love affair, which be-
came literary history by the letters they wrote to each other while they lived in
separation. Much of what we know about Abélard's life and his character, is con-
veyed to us in Abélard's Historia Calamitatum, which could be described as an
autobiography written in the form of a letter.
Pierre Abélard came from a noble Breton family. It was usual for young men of
his standing to opt for a military career. But instead, Abélard chose to study di-
alectic, i.e. philosophy, which at the time consisted mainly of the logic of Aristotle
as transmitted through latin channels. He was very bright and had an unmis-
takable talent for teaching. At the early age of 22, he set up a very successful
school, which soon rivalled the school of his former teacher, William of Cham-
paux. Shortly after he started attending the theology lectures of St. Anselm at
Laon, he was allowed to teach there as well. Around the year 1115, his fame
reached a climax, and his lectures drew large numbers of students. He obtained
the chair at Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris, and was nominated canon (this is a
clergyman belonging to the chapter or staff of a cathedral or collegiate church).
At Notre-Dame, his eye was caught by the very young Eloïse, who lived there
as the protégéé of her uncle F~lbert, canon at the Notre Dame. Not only was
she beautiful, she also had an unusually broad knowledge. He seduced her while
being her tutor. He saw no reason to be secretive about their relationship, but
in fact there was at least one: her uncle. When Fulbert found out about it, he
separated Abélard and Eloïse. But they kept meeting in secret; she got pregnant
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and gave birth to their son, Astrolabius. Abélard wanted to take his responsibility,
and proposed to marry in an attempt not to offend Fulbert. At the same time, he
wanted the marriage to remain a secret in order to keep his prospects for a career
in the church open.
Even though Eloïse tried to convince him to keep his independence, they did
marry. However, F~lbert didn't keep it a secret. Abélard helped Eloïse escape
from her uncle and humiliation, to the convent of Argenteuil, and their son was
sent to live with Eloïse's sister. Fulbert, thinking that Abélard had helped Eloïse
just to be rid of her, took revenge by castrating him. While Abélard's ambitions
to become reach a high position in the church, Eloïse became a nun.
In 1120, Abélard turned back to his studies, and started teaching anew, again
with great success. But his views kept making him new enemies: for the rest of
his life he was followed by persecution, trials, condemnations for his rationalistic
doctrines. In 1121, having escaped from incarceration at the Abbey of St. Medard,
he set up a school which he named the "Paraclete" (an appellaton of the Holy
Ghost meaning comforter).
A few years later, he was absolved and reinstated as a monk. He made Eloïse
Abess of the Paraclete, of which he still was the spiritual director. This gave him
some opportunity to see her every once in a while. The reading of his Historia
Calamitatum, moved her to write her first letter, followed by others, in which she
step by step reconciles herself with the fact that they should live as brother and
sister rather than as lovers.
In 1141, Abélard died in Cluny, while on his way to Rome, where he was to
defend himself against a number of charges of herecy. His remains were secretly
transferred to Paraclete, and given over to the loving care of Eloïse. When she
died in 1164, she was laid to rest beside him. In 1817, they were transferred to the
cemetery of Père Lachaise in Paris, where they still lay side-by-side in a monument
erected for them out of materials from the Paraclete.
The correspondence of Abélard and Eloïse inspired the English poet Alexander
Pope (1688-1744) to capture their love affair in his poem Eloisa to Abelard. The
phrase "Eternal sunshine of a spotless mind" , taken from this poem, was used
for the title of a recent movie in which a company called Lacuna Inc. sells the
opportunity to erase unwanted memories. (In a sense, they sell imperfect recall. )
(This brief description of the lives of Pierre Abélard and Eloïse is based on
the entries for Abélard and Eloïse at the internet encyclopedia Wikipedia. The
picture of Abélard and Eloïse used for the cover of this thesis comes from a 15th
century lettrine.)
Samenvatting
In zijn boek The Principles of Mathematics Revisited (1996) betoogt de Finse
filosoof en logicus Jaakko Hintikka dat de als `klassiek' te boek staande eerste
orde logica aan vervanging toe is. Hij stelt voor om de semantiek van Tarski
te vervangen door een speltheoretische semantiek (Game Theoretical Semantics),
en een operator `~' aan de logische taal toe te voegen, waarmee kwantoren (en
voegtekens) onafhankelijk gemaakt kunnen worden van andere kwantoren: in de
formule dx~yR(x, y) mag de waarde van y afhangen van de waarde van x, in de
formule dx~y~~R(x, y) is dit expliciet verboden. Het resultaat heet "Independence
Friendly"-logica, afgekort: IF-logica.
Of een (gesloten) formule waar of onwaar is in een gegeven model, wordt
bepaald door het bestaan van een winnende strategie voor een van de spelers
(resp. Eloïse en Abélard) in een abstract evaluatiespel, dat we een semantisch spel
noemen. De onafhankelijkheidsoperator in de logische taal maakt de semantische
spelen tot spelen van onvolledige informatie, en deze zijn in het algemeen niet
beslist (in de zin dat een van de spelers een winnende strategie heeft). Een op-
vallende eigenschap van IF-logica is dan ook dat de wet van het nitgesloten derde
niet geldt.
In bovengenoemd boek beschrijft Hintikka de IF-logica en zijn eigenschappen
zonder precieze formele definities of bewijzen te geven. Dit proefschrift: Game,
Set, Maths: een formele verkenning van logica met onvolledige informatie, beoogt
basisbegrippen van de IF-logica en haar semantiek op een mathematisch precieze
wijze te geven, en de daarbij aan het licht komende subtiliteiten te bespreken.
In hoofdstuk 1 geven we een informele inleiding in het onderwerp en een kort
overzicht van verwante literatuur. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat de notaties en basisbegrip-
pen zoals deze gebruikt worden in dit proefschrift.
In hoofdstuk 3 volgen we Hintikka's benadering van IF-logica door de strate-
gieën in semantische spelen gelijk te stellen aan rijtjes Skolem-functies. We schrij-
ven Hintikka's op eerste-orde Skolemisatie gebaseerde vertaalprocedure van IF-
logica naar Ei tot in detail uit. (Ei is eerste orde logica uitgebreid met tweede orde
kwantificatie over functievariabelen.) De volgorde van de Skolemisatie-stappen
bepaalt of eerdere existentiële kwantoren wel of niet opgenomen worden als ar-
gument in de Skolemfuncties. We laten zien dat verschillende volgordes voor
IF-logica niet-equivalente uitkomsten opleveren (in tegenstelling tot voor eerste
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orde logica). Dit wordt gedemonstreerd door een belangrijk voorbeeld van Wilfrid
Hodges, waarin de afhankelijkheidsrelatie van de kwantoren niet-transitief is. Om
de voor klassieke logica gebruikelijke `van buiten naar binnen'-volgorde te kun-
nen blijven hanteren voor IF-logica, heeft Hintikka een tegen-intuïtieve aanname
nodig, namelijk dat de spelers hun eerdere zetten vergeten.
Hintikka's vertaalprocedure is gebaseerd op het gelijkstellen van de uitdruk-
kingskracht van een formule met zijn waarheidsconditie. Doordat de wet van
het uitgesloten derde niet geldt, is onwaarheid echter een tweede dimensie in de
uitdrukkingskracht van de formule. We laten zien hoe we onwaarheidscondities
kunnen bepalen; hiervoor moeten we o.a. Hintikka's oorspronkelijke IF-taal eerst
symmetrisch maken. We vertalen een resultaat van John Burgess voor Henkin-
logica naar IF-logica; dit laat zien dat ieder paar van incompatibele Ei-zinnen te
zien is als een paar van waarheidsconditie en onwaarheidsconditie voor een IF-zin.
Vanaf hoofdstuk 4 maken we ons losser van Hintikka's (eigen) werk en definities.
We werken met een generalisatie van Hintikka's syntax, GzFC, gebaseerd op de
taal uit [CK99].
We formaliseren de semantische spelen in het speltheoretische standaardmodel
van de extensive garrces. Deze benadering van IF-logica ontbreekt in het werk van
Hintikka zelf, maar is in recenter werk van anderen op dit gebied de standaard
geworden. Dit levert een directe wiskundige formalisering op van het centrale
concept van winnende strategie, op basis van een formalisering van het spel zoals
het beschreven wordt door de regels (iets wat ontbreekt in Hintikka's benadering
met Skolemfuncties als strategieën). Aan de hand van het model bespreken we in
hoeverre we de taal zouden kunnen uitbreiden door niet alleen onafhankelijkheid
van gekwantificeerde variabelen, maar ook van voegtekens toe te laten.
Op basis van de speltheoretische formalisering, verkennen we in hoeverre spel-
theoretische begrippen en resultaten kunnen bijdragen aan onze inzichten in de
logica. We zien dat de in de speltheorie vermeden eigenschap van onvolledige
herinnering in de semantische spelen voor IFG-zinnen eerder uitzondering dan
regel is. Ook bespreken we de vier Thompson transformaties in relatie met logis-
che equivalentieschema's voor IFG-logica.
Tot en met hoofdstuk 4 hebben we (zoals Hintikka zelf) alleen gewerkt met
zinnen, d.w.z. gesloten formules. In de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 stappen we over op de
semantiek van [CK99] om te kunnen werken met IFG-forinules met vrije variabe-
len. Een open IFG-formule wordt geëvalueerd ten opzichte van een verzanzeling
valuaties, om de onafhankelijkheidsoperator te kunnen interpreteren.
In hoofdstuk 5 signaleren we een probleem met de inductieve regel van deze
semantiek voor de existentiële kwantor. Het probleem ontstaat als een zelfde vari-
abele dubbel gebruikt wordt: dit kan zogeheten signalen blokkeren, en daarmee
het verschil maken tussen het wel of niet bestaan van een winnende strategie. Met
`dubbel gebruik' bedoelen we geneste kwantificatie over dezelfde variabele, of het
zowel vrij als gebonden voorkomen van een variabele. Uit de verschillende (tegen-
)voorbeelden in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6, blijkt dat alle variabelen in het domeiu
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van de verzameling valuaties waarmee een IFG-formule geëvalueerd wordt, wat
dit betreft gezien moeten worden als vrije variabelen van de formule (ook als ze
niet vrij in de formule voorkomen). Situaties waarin dit `dubbel gebruik' niet
voorkomt, noemen we regulier. We laten zien dat beperking tot reguliere zinnen
nodig is voor de claim dat Hintikka's IF-logic een conservatieve uitbreiding is van
klassieke eerste orde logica.
In hoofdstuk 6 laten we zien dat ook de prenexnormaalvormstelling voor IFG-
logica van [CK99] beperkt moet worden tot reguliere situaties: voor vrijwel alle
leinma's en stellingen uit het artikel vinden we tegenvoorbeelden. We laten zien
hoe deze gerepareerd kunnen worden. Het noodzaakt tot de invoering van een
nieuw, minder strict, maar partieel equivalentie-begrip, met behulp waarvan de
ondersteunende lemma's opnieuw bewezen worden.
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat een overzicht van conclusies en open vragen die binnen de
beperkte termijn van dit onderzoek opgekomen maar niet opgelost zijn, en als
inspiratie zouden kunnen dienen voor toekomstig werk.
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